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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
ENSEMBLE FUZZY BELIEF INTRUSION DETECTION DESIGN 
by 
Te-Shun Chou 
Florida International University, 2007 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Kang K. Yen, Major Professor 
With the rapid growth of the Internet, computer attacks are increasing at a fast pace and 
can easily cause millions of dollar in damage to an organization. Detecting these attacks 
is an important issue of computer security. There are many types of attacks and they fall 
into four main categories, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, Probe, User to Root (U2R) 
attacks, and Remote to Local (R2L) attacks. Within these categories, DoS and Probe 
attacks continuously show up with greater frequency in a short period of time when they 
attack systems. They are different from the normal traffic data and can be easily 
separated from normal activities. On the contrary, U2R and R2L attacks are embedded in 
the data portions of the packets and normally involve only a single connection. It 
becomes difficult to achieve satisfactory detection accuracy for detecting these two 
attacks. Therefore, we focus on studying the ambiguity problem between normal 
activities and U2R/R2L attacks. The goal is to build a detection system that can 
accurately and quickly detect these two attacks. 
In this dissertation, we design a two-phase intrusion detection approach. In the first 
phase, a correlation-based feature selection algorithm is proposed to advance the speed of 
detection.  Features with poor prediction ability for the signatures of attacks and features 
 vii 
inter-correlated with one or more other features are considered redundant. Such features 
are removed and only indispensable information about the original feature space remains. 
In the second phase, we develop an ensemble intrusion detection system to achieve 
accurate detection performance. The proposed method includes multiple feature selecting 
intrusion detectors and a data mining intrusion detector. The former ones consist of a set 
of detectors, and each of them uses a fuzzy clustering technique and belief theory to solve 
the ambiguity problem. The latter one applies data mining technique to automatically 
extract computer users’ normal behavior from training network traffic data. The final 
decision is a combination of the outputs of feature selecting and data mining detectors. 
The experimental results indicate that our ensemble approach not only significantly 
reduces the detection time but also effectively detect U2R and R2L attacks that contain 
degrees of ambiguous information.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
With the rapid growth of Internet based technology, applications of computer networks 
such as web service, file transfer, and voice IP are extensively used. In the meantime, the 
networks inevitably become as the targets of computer attacks and the attacks can easily 
cause millions of dollar damage to an organization. According to the annual report from 
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [1], only 8 computer security 
incidents were documented in 1988 but over 130,000 in 2003. Since 2004, CERT no 
longer publishes the number of incidents because the attacks against Internet-connected 
systems have become so commonplace. Not only are those attacks increasing in a fast 
pace, they are also becoming more sophisticated with the advance of technology. 
Consequently, to manage breaches of security has become an important issue for 
nowadays network infrastructures and has become an irreplaceable element in modern 
security systems. Today intrusion detection has caught researchers’ attention greater than 
ever. Its development and improvement have been set with the highest priority by 
academia, government, research institutes, and industrial corporations.   
Intrusion detection is a technology developed to discover breaches of security, attempted 
breaches, or open vulnerabilities that could lead to potential breaches [2]. An intrusion 
detection system is a security management system for computers and networks. It 
examines activities from computer users and identifies inappropriate, incorrect, or 
anomalous activities within computers or networks. The possible attempts to breach the 
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security could be either attacks from outside of the computer system or misuse conducts 
from inside of the computer system [3]. The former aims at gaining access to penetrate 
the system and the latter tries to exploit security vulnerabilities or mistreat their approved 
privileges. While there are many types of attacks, they fall into four main classes. 
• Denial of Service (DoS) attacks: Attackers disrupt a host or network service in order 
to make legitimate users not be able to have an access to a machine;  
• Probe attacks: Attackers use programs to automatically scan networks for gathering 
information or finding known vulnerabilities; 
• User to Root (U2R) attacks: Local users get access to root access of a system without 
authorization and then exploit the machine’s vulnerabilities; and 
• Remote to Local (R2L) attacks: Unauthorized attackers gain local access from a 
remote machine and then exploit the machine’s vulnerabilities. 
During the past years, a large variety of techniques to the task of detecting the above 
mentioned intruders’ activities have been proposed [6]-[12]. These techniques are mainly 
categorized into two groups: anomaly detection and misuse detection. Anomaly detection 
searches for intrusive activities by comparing network traffic to those established 
acceptable normal usage patterns learned from training data. If the pattern of observed 
data is different from those learned normal ones, the data is classified as an attack. This 
approach can successfully detect novel and unseen malicious occurrences from computer 
users. However, it suffers from a high volume of false alarms. Misuse detection involves 
the comparison of observed traffic data with a set of well defined rules that describe 
signatures of intrusions. If the signature of observed network traffic is not matched with 
any of predefined rules, it is declared as an attack. This approach can detect the 
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recognized attacks in an efficient way with high level of accuracy. However, it suffers 
from its inability of identifying attacks which differ from these predefined patterns. A 
minor variation of an attack may not be identified during the whole detection procedure.  
1.1 Problem Statement 
Using either anomaly detection or misuse detection techniques in the design of intrusion 
detection systems, a data set of network traffic is necessary to be collected in advance for 
analysis. It consists of a great amount of traffic records with various features such as the 
length of connection, the type of protocol, the network service and other information. 
Based on this set of data, misuse detection specifies well defined attack signatures and 
anomaly detection constructs acceptable user behavior. However, there are several 
problems in the collected database.  
a) Problem of Redundant Information  
Not every feature of the network traffic information we are monitoring is relevant to the 
intrusion detection task. Some features may be irrelevant to the signatures of attacks, and 
some features may be redundant since they are highly inter-correlated with one or more 
of the other features [4]. The detection speed becomes slow if unnecessary information is 
involved in the analysis.  
b) Problem of Uncertainty  
The collected data always enclose uncertainty when only limited amount of information 
about intrusive activities is available. It is difficult to completely collect intrusive 
behavior because new exploits are discovered at anytime and anywhere. The available 
data is always incomplete that only contains limited information.  
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c) Problem of Ambiguity  
Within the four attack categories, DoS and Probe attacks continuously show up with 
large amounts in a short period of time when they attack systems. They are different from 
the normal traffic data and can be easily separated from normal activities. On the 
contrary, U2R and R2L attacks are embedded in the data portions of the packets and 
normally involve only a single connection (a data packet related to a particular service). 
Their patterns are similar to those of normal activities. The boundaries between those two 
attacks and the normal behavior are always unclear. When processing an intrusion 
detection task, the attacks may not be detected if the ambiguous behavior is not 
considered anomalous. On the other hand, if the ambiguity is considered anomalous, then 
system administrators may be alerted by false alarms, i.e., in cases where there is no 
attack [5].  
Past research results [6]-[12] shown in Table 1.1 have indicated that it is difficult to 
achieve satisfactory detection accuracy while detecting U2R and R2L attacks. Therefore, 
our study will address the issue on how to accurately and quickly detect them in the 
network traffic. We expect that our system not only has the ability to correctly detect 
those two types of attacks but also achieve a minimum number of incorrect false alarms. 
More specifically, we are trying to solve four major problems.  
• To select a subset of features from the network traffic to advance speed of detection 
• To solve the ambiguity problem between U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities 
• To solve the uncertainty problem associated with the available data which is always 
incomplete 
• To build an accurate model with high detection rate but low false negative rate 
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1.2 Research Hypotheses 
This dissertation describes the work done with the following hypotheses. 
• Feature selection technique can reduce the complexity of network traffic data and 
therefore increase the detection speed. 
• Fuzzy clustering technique [13], [14] can solve the ambiguity problem between 
U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities. 
• Dempster-Shafer theory [15], [16] can solve the uncertainty problem caused by 
limited information during the detection process. 
• Multiple intrusion detectors can get better detection performance than that of 
individual one.  
 
Table 1.1. Detection Performances of Past Study 
DoS  Probe  U2R  R2L Ref. Method 
DR FPR  DR FPR  DR FPR  DR FPR 
6 KDD cup winner 97.10% 0.30%  83.30% 0.60%  12.30% 0.00%  8.40% 0.01% 
7 SOM map 95.10% -  64.30% -  22.90% -  11.30% - 
8 Gaussian classifier 82.40% 0.90%  90.20% 11.30%  22.80% 0.50%  9.60% 0.10% 
8 K-means clustering 97.30% 0.40%  87.60% 2.60%  29.80% 0.40%  6.40% 0.10% 
8 Nearest cluster alg. 97.10% 0.30%  88.80% 0.50%  2.20% 0.00%  3.40% 0.01% 
8 Radial basis 73.00% 0.20%  93.20% 18.80%  6.10% 0.04%  5.90% 0.30% 
8 C4.5 decision tree 97.00% 0.30%  80.80% 0.70%  1.80% 0.00%  4.60% 0.01% 
9 PN-rule - -  - -  6.60% -  10.70% - 
10 Linear GP 96.70% -  85.70% -  1.30% -  9.30% - 
11 Online k-means  69.81% 5.00%  99.62% 5.00%  49.45% 5.00%  6.48% 5.00% 
11 SVM 99.90% 5.00%  67.31% 5.00%  0.00% 5.00%  29.09% 5.00% 
11 KMO+SVM 75.76% 5.00%  99.61% 5.00%  49.45% 5.00%  22.24% 5.00% 
11 SVM 99.96% 10.00%  68.10% 10.00%  0.00% 10.00%  29.16% 10.00% 
12 Backpropagation 97.23% -  96.63% -  87.71% -  30.97% - 
* DR: Detection Rate, FPR: False Positive Rate 
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1.3 Proposed Approach 
In the entire course of work, we develop a system using the intrusion detection 
benchmark data set DARPA KDD99 [17], which not only includes a large quantity of 
network traffic but also collects a wide variety of attacks. It is a standardized data set for 
researchers to develop and test their intrusion detection systems as well as to compare 
their results with those of others. In the beginning of research, a correlation-based feature 
selection algorithm is proposed to advance both the detection speed and accuracy. 
Features with poor prediction ability to the signatures of attacks and features inter-
correlated with one or more other features are considered redundant. Such features will 
be removed and the remaining ones contain indispensable information about the original 
feature space. Then, the selected features are incorporated with other feature subsets into 
the ensemble intrusion detection design. This design includes multiple feature selecting 
intrusion detectors and a data mining intrusion detector that act as anomaly detection and 
misuse detection, respectively. This ensemble approach is capable of further improving 
the detection performance. 
Each feature selecting intrusion detector uses a subset of features to derive independent 
decision about an input network traffic data, then all the decisions from multiple ones are 
combined into a fused result. In the kernel of each detector, a developed machine learning 
algorithm is used to detect both known and novel U2R and R2L attacks. The problems of 
uncertainty and ambiguity caused by incomplete and imprecise information are solved 
during the intrusion detection procedure. Using the developed algorithm, we are 
considering the intrusion detection task as a decision making process rather than 
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identifying the vicious usages by their similarity to earlier defined recognized attacks. 
Specifically, fuzzy clustering technique is applied to maximize the intra-class of similar 
types of normality and abnormality, as well as to minimize the inter-class of dissimilar 
types of normality and abnormality. By the use of Dempster-Shafer theory, the input 
network traffic is identified by fusing evidences from clustering process. Also, the k-
nearest neighbors (k-NN) technique [18] is employed to speed up the detection process.   
The data mining intrusion detector uses data mining technique to automatically extract 
computer users’ normal behavior from training data set. We combine the output of this 
detector with the result from multiple feature selecting intrusion detectors to derive an 
output, which is the final decision of the input network traffic. The data mining intrusion 
detector acts as a filtering mechanism to reduce the number of false alarms. 
1.4 Contributions  
• Speed up the detection process: Based on the concept of information theory, a feature 
selection algorithm is implemented. With the use of selected features, the detection 
time is reduced during the intrusion detection task.  
• Solve the uncertainty problem: By using the developed machine learning algorithm, 
the uncertainty problem caused by deficient information and the ambiguity between 
U2R/R2L attacks and normal activities is included in the design.  
• Improve the detection performance: The proposed ensemble intrusion detection 
model not only increases the detection rate but also reduces the number of false 
alarms compared to the results of past research.  
 8 
1.5 Dissertation Organization  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter II includes a discussion of taxonomy 
schemes on grouping attacks into categories, the survey of the popular used intrusion 
detection approaches, and the overview of feature selection and multiple-classifier 
techniques. Chapter III presents the idea of correlation based feature selection technique. 
We afterwards describe our proposed feature selection algorithm. Chapter IV initially 
explains the importance of considering the problem of uncertainty during the detection 
process. We then present the intrusion detector, namely fuzzy belief k-NN classifier. 
Chapter V discusses the experimental results of our developed feature selection algorithm. 
Chapter VI describes the evaluation of the fuzzy belief k-NN classifier. Also, we employ 
the feature selection results from Chapter V to test the detection accuracy and detection 
speed of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier. Chapter VII presents the ensemble fuzzy belief 
selection model, which combines several fuzzy belief k-NN feature selecting classifiers 
with a data mining classifier. Chapter VIII draws the conclusions and lists future research 
directions.  
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The main concern of intrusion detection systems is to detect possible abnormal behavior 
from computer users. This chapter starts with the discussion of a variety of taxonomies 
for intrusions. DARPA KDD99 intrusion detection benchmark data set used throughout 
our entire research is described. Next, we introduce two categories of systems and their 
related research work. The former category is host-based and network-based intrusion 
detection. The later one is knowledge-based and behavior-based intrusion detection. We 
then introduce feature selection techniques that have been applied to find informative 
feature subset from a network traffic data stream. At last, multiple-classifier intrusion 
detection systems are described.  
2.1 Intrusion Categorization 
The concept of detecting abnormal behavior of computer users was first introduced by 
Anderson in 1980 [3]. He published a paper, Computer Security Threat Monitoring and 
Surveillance, and defined that an attack was a specific formulation or execution of a plan 
to carry out a threat. He classified a threat as a deliberate unauthorized attempt to  
z access information,  
z manipulate information, or  
z render a system unreliable or unusable.  
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Since then, a variety of taxonomy schemes on grouping attacks into categories have been 
proposed. For example, in 1987 Denning [19] classified abnormal patterns of system 
usage into eight categories. They are attempted break-in, masquerading or successful 
break-in, penetration by legitimate user, leakage by legitimate user, inference by 
legitimate user, trojan horse, virus, and denial-of-service. In 1988 Smaha [20] divided 
intrusions into six main types: attempted break-ins, masquerade attacks, penetration of 
the security control system, leakage, denial of service, and malicious use. Howard [21] 
summarized the variations of taxonomy of attacks on the Internet from 1989 to 1995 in 
one of the chapters in his PhD dissertation. Dekker [22] defined network security incident 
as an activity threat violated an explicit or implicit security policy and classified incidents 
into the probe, scan, account compromise, root compromise, packet sniffer, denial of 
service, exploitation of trust, malicious code, and Internet infrastructure attacks in 1997. 
In 1999, Lincoln Laboratory at MIT created the KDD99 data set, which is known as 
“DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set” [17]. The data set includes thirty-nine 
types of attacks that are classified into four main categories. They are DoS, Probe, U2R, 
and R2L attacks. 
The first category of attacks is DoS attacks. In this type of attacks, attackers attempt to 
disrupt a host or network resource in order to make legitimate users not be able to access 
to the computer service. The victim machines can be web server, domain name system 
server, mail server, and so on. In the DARPA KDD99 data set, there are many common 
forms of DoS attacks that are included. For example, smurf attack is one and takes over 
70% of the attacks in the DoS category. By using the vulnerability of ICMP (Internet 
Control Message Protocol), the attack can cause a target system crash. The attacker can 
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send a large number of ICMP “echo request” packets to the broadcast address and every 
packet has a spoofed source address of the intended target system. Any machine in the 
subnets will respond by sending ICMP “echo reply” packets back to the target. If the 
number of the packets is more than the system can handle, the result is the spoofed 
system can no longer be able to service to the real ICMP requests. Another common way 
to fail a system is neptune attacks. Over 25% of DoS attacks are neptune in the data set. It 
is a SYN (Synchronize) flood attack that exists in TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol) implementation of a network. The attacker just simply rapidly 
sends out a large number of connection requests but never responds to any replies from 
the system. While the attacker continues to request new connections faster than the 
system can handle, the legitimate connection requests can never be accommodated. In the 
mean time, the system may run out of memory and even crash. 
The second category of attacks is Probe attacks. By using programs to automatically scan 
a large amount network IP addresses, the attacker can explore vulnerabilities of the 
computers. Once any vulnerability is found, the attacker can thus gain the access to the 
system and start to gather information without authorization. The DARPA KDD99 data 
set collects six scanning attacks of Probe attack category. They are ipsweep, mscan, 
nmap, portsweep, saint, and satan. 
The third category of attacks is U2R attacks. The attacker pretends as a legitimate user of 
the system without authorization and then exploits the system’s vulnerabilities to get root 
access of that system. The DARPA KDD99 data set consists of eight different types of 
U2R attacks. Among them, buffer_overflow attack is the most common one that starts 
with by feeding many data into a fix length buffer. When the volume of data exceeds the 
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size of the buffer that can hold, the extra information will overflow into other buffers and 
overwrite the instructions that suppose to be executed. The result may cause the system 
crash or make the system execute the attacker's program as if it is part of the system’s 
original programs. 
The forth category of attacks is R2L attacks. This type of attacks is that an unauthorized 
attacker through networks gains local access as a user of local machine and then exploits 
the machine’s vulnerabilities. Totally fifteen types of R2L attacks are included in the 
DARPA KDD99 data set. For example, the ftp_write attack is one that the attacker creates 
rhost file to make anonymous FTP (File Transfer Protocol) directory writable and finally 
obtains local login to the system. The guess_passwd is another one that the attacker tries 
to gain access to a user’s account by repeatedly guessing the possible passwords. Any 
service that needs password to access possibly becomes an attacked target, for example, 
rlogin, ssh, ftp, telnet, pop, and imap.  
2.2 Host-Based vs. Network-Based Intrusion Detection 
Based on the sources of data, intrusion detection systems can be divided into two major 
classes, host-based and network-based. In the first kind of systems, the intrusion 
detection mechanism is installed on the local host/terminal. By examining the status of 
audit information on system’s behavior, the system finds signs of intrusion and can then 
protect its own local machine. The audit information can be obtained from different 
sources such as system logs and activities, application logs, and target monitoring [23]. 
These logs could be Unix logs, NT/2000/XP logs, firewall logs, router logs, web server 
logs, and FTP logs. The intrusions can be critical file modifications, segmentation fault 
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errors recorded in logs, crashed services or extensive usage of the processors [24]. From 
the system point of view, all users are considered as local clients to the target 
environment. 
Unlike the host-based intrusion detection system that only protects its own host machine 
by examining audit trail, network-based intrusion detection system protects the entire 
environment of the network by monitoring all the activities from both inside and outside 
of the network. By inspecting the traffic data that goes through the network, the possible 
intrusions can be identified. In general, the network traffic that needs to be monitored is 
quite large. For releasing each sensor’s detection burden, the network based intrusion 
system deploys its sensors on different locations instead of one central point. With a good 
design of sensor placement on the network, the network-based intrusion detection system 
can efficiently monitor a large network environment. 
Compared to the audit trial used by a host-based intrusion detection system, the data 
shown on network-based intrusion detection system always has less information about 
what exactly happens during the attack courses. However, the data of network-based 
intrusion detection system has a broader range of attacks because the background traffic 
is much wider than that of a host-based intrusion detection system. With the popular use 
of the Internet and the growth of larger network systems, more attention has been focused 
on the development of network-based intrusion detection systems. Also, current trend 
shows people incline to use both host-based and network-based information to design 
hybrid systems. These intrusion detection systems are capable of running detection on 
local host and monitor network traffic as well.  
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2.3 Knowledge-Based vs. Behavior-Based Intrusion Detection 
Based on the use of detection technique, intrusion detection systems are categorized as 
knowledge-based and behavior-based intrusion detection systems as shown in Figure 2.1. 
Knowledge-based intrusion detection is typically realized by modeling known attack 
behavior with prior understanding about specific attacks and system vulnerabilities. This 
technique is to compare network traffic data being observed with well defined attack 
patterns for identifying the possible penetrations to a system. When the data is the same 
as one of the explicitly defined attack patterns, an alarm is raised. The defined attack 
patterns are frequently referred to as the signatures of intrusions. The signature could be a 
static string or a sequence of events. This type of detection method is called misuse 
detection [25].  
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Figure 2.1. Comparison of Knowledge-Based and Behavior-Based Intrusion Detection 
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Advantages of this type of approach are it is very efficient to detect known attacks and is 
very accurate with a very low false alarm rate. Since the attack patterns are 
comprehensively encoded in advance for matching against computer user activities on 
background traffic, the recognized attacks can be promptly identified. Once an attack is 
identified, the security administrator can quickly analyze the problem and make a correct 
action to prevent any breaches of security.   
However, the main shortcoming of this approach is that it is only good for detecting 
known attacks. Once the attack pattern is slightly changed or a novel attack appears, the 
unseen attack will be considered as acceptable pattern and thus cannot be successfully 
detected. In addition, maintenance of the knowledge database is an extremely tedious and 
time-consuming task. It is very difficult to collect the required information of the known 
attacks since to label records of data as either normal or a specific type of attack requires 
careful analysis. Especially in this fast pace world, it is impossible to keep an intrusion 
detection system always up to date with all attacks and vulnerabilities information. 
While knowledge-based intrusion detection is achieved by modeling known attack 
behavior, on the contrary, behavior-based intrusion detection also known as anomaly 
detection models normal or expected behavior of computer users. It looks for malicious 
activities by comparing the observed data with those acceptable behavior. If the data 
diverges from the learned normal behavior, an alarm is raised. Advantage of this 
approach is that novel and unseen attacks can be detected. Since it assumes any deviation 
from normal patterns is regarded as anomalous activities, the technique is not required to 
continuously keep up with hackers’ techniques [26], [27]. Also, it is less dependent on 
target operating environments compared with the misuse detection technique. 
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The main drawback of this approach is it might have a high number of false alarms due to 
any deviations from the learned behaviors are treated as attacks. Since not every 
deviation is a real intrusion, the security administrator may spare precious time to take 
care of these false alarms and ignore the real anomalous activities. 
2.4 Intrusion Detection Techniques 
The popular intrusion detection techniques are reviewed in this section. We start with the 
expert systems based intrusion detection techniques. Expert systems are primary used in 
the design of misuse detection systems and most of them are rule-based systems. An 
expert system contains a set of predefined rules on the basis of knowledge of the intrusive 
activities. The inference engine then uses these rules to identify indications of known 
attacks from the background of network traffic. For example, SNORT [28] is a popular 
open-source network intrusion detection system of this kind. SNORT uses rules to 
describe attacks in which each rule uses a single line of text to explicitly describe the 
signatures of a certain attack. When monitoring the network traffic, SNORT compares 
traffic data with rule database and fires an alarm if a traffic matches SNORT’s rule 
signatures. A sample SNORT rule [29] is shown in the following equation.  
alert tcp !HOME_NET any −> HOME_NET any (flags: SF; msg: “SYN-FIN scan”;)      (2.1) 
This rule fires an alert message “SYN-FIN scan” when an outsider attempts to make an 
internal home network TCP connection. For building such kind of rules, SNORT 
employs human knowledge to recognize those attempts of security breach. It provides a 
systematic search for attacks in the audit data, yet it will not flag alarm if the attack 
signatures are not described within the rules. For maintaining its up-to-date status, a 
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regular update is posted on the SNORT website. This update could be a very tedious and 
difficult task because the rules in the system must be reformulated by security 
professionals. In addition, the rule-based technique lacks flexibility in the rule-to-audit 
record representation [30]. Expert systems based approach suffers from its inability to 
identify attacks which differ from those predefined patterns. A minor variation of an 
attack itself or an attack sequence is possible to affect the rule comparison result and 
causes the attack never be found during the detection process.   
Unlike the rule-based system that provides a set of predefined rules to identify indications 
of known attack activities, researchers also apply a variety of approaches to model the 
normal behavior of the protected system. In such approaches, neural networks and fuzzy 
logic are two well-known techniques in the development of intrusion detection systems. 
Neural network system acts as a computational model to process the network traffic 
information, which the system can be trained to perform intrusion detection tasks based 
on the traffic data provided. At the end of the training procedure, the neural network 
gains the knowledge that can extract the normal and attack signatures from the provided 
data automatically. With the ability to generalize rules from learned data, the neural 
network performs generalization of attacks and fault tolerance to imprecise and uncertain 
information. 
Approaches using various neural network structures have been applied in building 
anomaly intrusion detection systems and the two most common architectures are the Self-
Organizing Maps (SOM) [31] and the Multilayer Perceptrons (MLP) network [32]. A 
SOM uses unsupervised learning algorithm to group similar data to clusters in the input 
space. It is a data visualization technique that produces a low dimensional topological 
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map to help people understand the original high dimensional data. Once the neural 
network is trained, the map converges to a stationary distribution and shows a clear 
separation between normal and attacks. The output neurons are considered as the counts 
for normal and attacks. Next, future connections can be rapidly classified as normal or 
attacks by visualizing the histogram of the map. Examples can be found in the works of 
Kayacik et al. [7], Depren et al. [33], and DeLooze [34]. These researchers selected 
various subsets of features of KDD99 data set to build different sizes of networks in order 
to simplify the complexity of the networks. Kayacik et al. built a hierarchical topological 
SOM maps for network intrusion detection. In the first layer, they selected six basic TCP 
features (length of the connection, protocol type, network service, status flag, total data 
bytes from source to destination, and total data bytes from destination to source) to build 
six 6×6 SOMs, each individual one was associated with each basic feature. The second 
layer integrated the information from the first level SOMs into a single view of the 
problem. Then in the third layer six SOMs were built for the second layer SOM neurons 
that demonstrated significant counts for both attack and normal connections. In each third 
layer SOM, 20×20 neurons were included. By using the same six basic features as 
Kayacik et al. did, Depren et al. built 15×15, 8×8, and 6×6 SOM maps for TCP, UDP 
(User Datagram Protocol) and ICMP traffic data, respectively. Each SOM structure was 
trained with the normal traffic data. When the training process was completed, any 
incoming anomalous traffic would be clustered outside of the normal clustering or inside 
the normal clustering with high quantization error. In the work of DeLooze, he created 
three 20×20 SOM maps using content, time, and connection features. Content features 
included number of total packets, acknowledgement packets, data bytes, retransmitted 
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packets, pushed packets, SYN and FIN packets flowing to or from the source and 
destination, and the status of completed, not completed and reset for each connection. 
Time features included the number of connections and the type of services to or from the 
source and destination within the last 5 seconds. Connection features were the duration of 
the connection, the service requested, and protocol used. Each feature space was used 
independently to detect anomalous behavior. Then the results of the individual SOMs 
were combined using the majority ensemble method (reports an attack if two of the three 
SOMs report an attack for a particular connection) and the belief ensemble method 
(reports an attack if any of the three SOMs reports an attack for a particular connection). 
Here, the problems shown in the above three works are how to select a feature space as 
the input to the network and how to configure a network with proper size. These two 
factors play important roles in the detection performance and the granularity of the 
network nodes, which training a SOM with a large amount of neurons needs long 
computational time and a SOM with a small volume of neurons may loss some important 
information. Also, the empirical nature of training parameters development is still an 
unresolved question, which the topology, learning rate and function, the number of 
training epochs, and initial weights of the network are decided by trial and error.  
MLP uses a feedforward structure to solve classification problems by its supervised 
learning algorithm. The network weights are updated by using gradient-based 
optimization algorithm during the training period. When the network converges to the 
local minima of error, the output layer of the network will show the result when data is 
fed into the input layer. In the reported work of Faraoun and Boukelif [12], they applied 
k-Means algorithm to group the input data into a number of clusters. Having obtained the 
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clustering centers and their relative boundaries, the distances between the centers and 
input data were calculated and only the most discriminating samples that cover at 
maximum the region of each class were selected for the learning process. The selected 
samples were then presented to the MLP network for classifying four classes of attacks in 
the KDD99 data set. Although they tried to improve the learning process by reducing the 
amount of training samples, the network still had a heavy computational burden because 
it was complex with 41, 30, and 5 neurons in input, hidden, and output layers, 
respectively. Also, the neural network suffers its “black box” nature that it does not 
provide explicit knowledge representation of its internal connections between layers. It is 
difficult to understand why a network event is classified as a normal or abnormal activity.  
Fuzzy logic [35] is specifically designed to deal with imprecision of facts. With its 
capability of dealing with vagueness, there are several reasons it is a possible approach in 
the design of intrusion detection system. First, there is often no clear boundary between 
normal and abnormal of a computer user’s activity [36]. Instead of a network traffic is 
either completely assigned to a member of normal category or a member of abnormal 
category, the traffic is possible classified into more than one categories. Fuzzy logic 
provides a dynamic decision boundary in the detection of intrusions. Second, the moment 
that we raise an alarm is often fuzzy. There would be too many alarms if we raise an 
alarm every time when we suspect an intrusion event occurs. At what degree of intrusion 
we should raise an alarm often depends on different situations. It depends on the degrees 
of intrusion and different circumstances [37]. With the dynamic decision boundary 
characteristic provided by fuzzy logic, the security officers can decide the best time to 
raise alarms according to the alarm threshold desired.  
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The work of Dickerson et al. [38] is an example of applying fuzzy logic to spot malicious 
activities against computers. In their work, they built an anomaly-based intrusion 
detection system named FIRE (Fuzzy Intrusion Recognition Engine). Initially the FIRE 
system applied data mining technique to TCP packet data to extract metrics. The metrics 
were chosen to reveal anomalies in the network traffic and formed the basis for the fuzzy 
inputs as well. For example, SDP was one of the metrics, that were composed of the IP 
source, IP destination, and the destination port fields. Once the system completed the 
metrics extraction, it used the historical data to calculate the ranges over the input space. 
All of the data were evaluated in terms of three fuzzy characteristics, COUNT, 
UNIQUENESS, and VARIANCE. Each input space had five fuzzy membership 
functions: LOW, MEDIUM-LOW, MEDIUM, MEDIUM-HIGH, and HIGH. With the 
use of metrics, three fuzzy characteristics, and five fuzzy membership functions, the 
authors then developed fuzzy inference rules to describe intrusions with their past 
experiences. For example, Equation 2.2 is a fuzzy inference rule to detect the port scan. 
IF (COUNT OF SDPs = MEDIUM) AND (UNIQUENESS OF SDPs      (2.2) 
Observed = HIGH) THEN “Port Scan” = HIGH 
 
During the development of any fuzzy inference engine such as FIRE, the settings of 
fuzzy parameters, fuzzy characteristics and fuzzy membership functions, heavily depend 
on the experience of human experts. However, those settings are very critical to the result 
of fuzzy inference. It’s preferable if we can find a solution to automatically covert the 
professional’s expertise to a knowledge-based fuzzy inference machine. Hence, 
Dickerson et al. [39] improved the settings of five fuzzy membership functions by the use 
of fuzzy c-Means (FCM) clustering algorithm. They applied FCM to a data set and 
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obtained the clustering centers and membership grades. By the reference of clustering 
results, the extents and midpoints of the five fuzzy membership functions were 
determined. Methods such as neural networks [40], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [37], 
genetic algorithms [41], and data mining technique [42] had also been proposed to help 
the decision of the fuzzy parameters. All of them did improve the decision process of 
deriving necessary parameters of fuzzy logic, however more or less human expert’s 
knowledge is still involved. Also, a large number of labeled data is needed during the 
design process. 
With the fast growing of Internet and the large and complex network systems, it becomes 
impossible for a security officer to look for intrusive activities by manually analyzing the 
traffic data. Thus data mining technique has caught researchers’ attention because it is 
capable of extracting useful information by sorting through a large amount of data. The 
intrusion detection is therefore treated as a data analysis process with a data-centric point 
of view [43]. The technique is defined as an information discovery task that looks for 
patterns in the network traffic data and can be applied to both misuse and anomaly 
intrusion detections. The data mining procedure from data collection to model 
computation can be made totally automatic. Unlike hand coding intrusion signatures into 
the systems [44], [45], data mining reduces the effort on manually analyzing and 
encoding intrusion patterns. However, it suffers from the degree of complexity if the raw 
data is formed by a great amount of data with a large number of features. For avoiding 
too many information included, feature selection or feature extraction technique is always 
applied to reduce the dimensionality of the original feature space. 
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Generally speaking, two data mining techniques, association rules and decision trees, are 
mostly applied to intrusion detection tasks. In the works of Lee and Stolfo [46], they 
created a framework: Mining Audit Data for Automated Models for Intrusion Detection 
(MADAM ID). Their idea was using frequent episode algorithm and association rules to 
compute patterns from system audit data and extract predictive features from the patterns. 
Then RIPPER classification algorithm [47] was applied to generate intrusion detection 
rules such as Equation 2.3, which represents the telnet connection and is a guessing 
password attack if the number of failed logins is greater than 4. 
guess:- failed_logins ≥ 4            (2.3) 
 
Although the design process from extracting discriminative features to generating 
detection rules is totally automatic, the amount of labeled network traffic is usually large, 
which the expert-based labeling process is very tedious and time-consuming. In addition, 
labeling a large number of network traffic can possibly lead to errors [11]. 
The other typical data mining approach is associated with decision trees. Levin [6] used a 
data mining tool, Kernel Miner, to generate decision trees for classifying normal behavior 
and attacks in KDD99 data set. By randomly choosing 10% data from the entire training 
data set, they constructed 218 decision trees for normal and four attack classes (DoS, 
Probe, U2R, and R2L). The result showed that the system achieved satisfactory detection 
rates on normal examples, DoS and Probe attacks, but failed on detecting U2R and R2L 
attacks. The system can only correctly detect 12.3% and 8.4% of U2R and R2L attacks, 
respectively, and misclassify most of them that belong to the new attack types not shown 
in the training set. Examples of using decision trees technique can also be found in the 
publications of Sabhnani and Serpen [9], [48]-[50]. In their works, they focused on 
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detecting both U2R and R2L attacks. They analyzed training and testing sets of KDD99 
data set through C4.5 decision trees algorithm [51] and concluded that no pattern 
classification algorithm or machine learning could be trained to successfully demonstrate 
misuse detection on both U2R and R2L attack categories. The reason is that not only 
these two attacks are content-based (embedded in the data portions of the packets) but 
also the testing set has extensive new types of attacks that are not correlated with attacks 
shown in the training set.  
2.5 Feature Selection Techniques 
For designing an intrusion detection system, a training set involving thousands of traffic 
connections is always required. In each traffic connection, it includes a number of 
features plus a class label of normal or a type of attack. By the use of misuse or anomaly 
detection technique, a model can be induced and used to classify future traffic into 
malicious activities or normal usage behavior.  
Theoretically and ideally, the ability to discriminate attack from normal behavior should 
be performed better if more features are added during the detection process. However, the 
answer is sometimes negative. The reason is that some of the features may be irrelevant 
with poor prediction ability to the target class, and some of the features may be redundant 
due to they are highly inter-correlated with one of more of the other features [52]. 
Therefore, analysis of traffic features is a very critical step in the development of 
intrusion detection system. Of the large number of features included in the high 
dimensional data set, it is very important to have a good understanding which features are 
truly essential in detecting the attacks; which are less significant in only providing the 
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auxiliary information; and which are redundant that can be discarded. Based on the 
understanding of the significance of these features, irrelevant and redundant features can 
be discarded effectively. The remaining relevant features thus contain most significant 
information related to the given intrusion detection task. The feature selection result is 
helpful to speed up the detection time and to enhance the detection accuracy. The 
maximum overall performance can therefore be achieved. 
Generally, the algorithms of feature selection are mainly divided into two categories, 
filter and wrapper, as defined in the work of John et al. [53]. Filter method operates 
without engaging any information of induction algorithm. By using prior knowledge such 
as features should have strong correlation with the target class or should uncorrelate to 
each other, filter method selects the best subset of features. Example is the work of 
Kayacık et al. [54]. They performed feature relevance analysis in the KDD99 training set. 
In order to get feature relevance measure for attacks, they applied information gain to 
binary classification (normal and attack) and reported their chosen relevant features for 
normal behavior and part of the attacks. In their paper, they only reported the feature 
selection result but didn’t demonstrate any evaluation of it. During the feature selection 
process, only the irrelevant features were considered to be removed. However, there was 
no description about the setting of threshold, which is critical in the elimination of the 
irrelevant features. Also, the information gain is possibly biased if feature with more 
values, i.e., the features with greater numbers of value will gain more information than 
those with fewer values even if the former ones are actually less informative than the 
latter ones.  
 26 
On the other hand, wrapper method employs a predetermined induction algorithm to find 
a subset of features with the highest evaluation by searching through the space of feature 
subsets and evaluating quality of selected features. The process of feature selection acts 
like “wrapped around” an induction algorithm. Machine learning algorithms such as ID3 
[55] and C4.5 [51] are commonly used as the induction algorithm. Since wrapper method 
includes a specific induction algorithm to optimize feature selection, it often provides an 
accurate classification result than that of filter approach. However, wrapper method is 
more time consuming than filter method due to it is strongly coupled with an induction 
algorithm with repeatedly calling the algorithm to evaluate the performance of each 
subset of features. It thus becomes unpractical to apply a wrapper method to select 
features from a large data set that contains numerous features and instances [56]. 
Furthermore, wrapper approach is required to re-execute its induction algorithm for 
selecting features from data set while the algorithm is replaced with a dissimilar one. It is 
less independent of any induction algorithms than filter is.  
The work of Mukkamala and Sung [57] is an example of using wrapper method. With the 
use of KDD99 data set, they applied both Support Vector Machines (SVM) and Support 
Vector Decision Function Ranking Method (SVDFRM) to rank important input features 
for the intrusion detection task. For each feature, it was deleted from the training and 
testing sets and the remaining ones were used to train the classifier. Then the classifier’s 
performance was compared with that of using full feature set. Finally, the importance of 
the feature was ranked according to a set of rules based on the performance comparison. 
Equation 2.4 shows one of the rules. 
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IF accuracy decreases AND training time increases AND testing time decreases       (2.4) 
THEN the feature is important 
 
With its iterative search and evaluation procedure, the forty-one features were grouped 
into important features, secondary features, and unimportant features for normal, DoS, 
Probe, U2R, and R2L attacks. Table 2.1 shows their experimental results in which group 
1 represents important features, group 2 represents secondary features, and group 3 
represents unimportant features. This work used wrapper approach to execute its SVM-
base induction algorithm. Without doubt, this process was computationally expensive to 
determine the final subset of features because the induction algorithms were iteratively 
executed on data sets that is with a large number of records and features. 
Table 2.1. Experimental Results of the Work of Mukkamala and Sung 
SVM 
Normal {1,3,5,6,8-10,14,15,17,20-23,25-29,33,35,36,38,39,41}, <2,4,7,11,12,16,18,19,24,30,31,34,37,40>, (13,32) 
Probe {3,5,6,23,24,32,33}, <1,4,7-9,12-19,21,22,25-28,34-41>, (2,10,11,20,29,30,31,36,37) 
DoS {1,3,5,6,8,19,23-28,32,33,35,36,38-41}, <2,7,9-11,14,17,20,22,29,30,34,37>, (4,12,13,15,16,18,19,21,3) 
U2R {5,6,15,16,18,32,33}, <7,8,11,13,17,19-24,26,30,36-39>, (9,10,12,14,27,29,31,34,35,40,41) 
R2L {3,5,6,24,32,33}, <2,4,7-23,26-31,34-41>, (1,20,25,38) 
SVDFRM 
Normal {1-6,10,12,17,23,24,27,28,29,31-34,36,39},  <11-14,16,19,22,25,26,30,35,37,38, 40,41>, (7-9,15,18,20,21) 
Probe {1-6,23,24,29,32,33}, <10,12,22,28,34-36,38-41>,  (7-9,11,13-21,25-27,30,31,37,40) 
DoS {1,5,6,23-26,32,36,38,39}, <2,3,4,10,12,29,33,34>,  (7-9,11,13-22,27,28,30,31,35-37,40,41) 
U2R {1-6,12,23,24,32,33}, <4,10,13,14,17,22,27,29,31,34,36,37,39>, (7-9,11,15,16,18-21,25,26,28,30,35,38,40,41) 
R2L {1,3,5,6,32,33}, <2,4,10,12,22-24,29,31,34,36,37,38,40>, (7-9,11,13-21,25-28,30,35,39,41) 
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2.6 Multiple Classifiers Systems 
Ensemble is to combine the outputs of a set of base classifiers together in a proper way 
when classifying input data. The fused result is expected to perform a better outcome 
than that of any individual base classifier within the ensemble. In the schemes of building 
an ensemble classifier, three distinct topologies are frequently engaged, they are 
cascading, parallel, and hierarchical structures [58]. Figure 2.2 illustrates these three 
basic frameworks. In the cascading structure, the output from the previous classifier is 
fed into the next one. By cascading all the classifiers together, the final result is obtained 
at the last classifier’s output of the chain. While each previous classifier’s output is the 
input of succeeding classifier, the latter classifier has difficulty to correct inaccuracy 
made by former one. In the parallel structure, the predictions of base classifiers are 
integrated to produce a fused output of the ensemble. The combination method is the key 
factor to decide if the result is successful or not. A careful choosing of combination 
methods can lead the ensemble classifier to a supreme performance, and on the contrary 
to poor consequence with an improper selection of combination methods. The 
hierarchical structure is a combination of cascading and parallel configurations. It is 
possible to alleviate both shortcomings of cascading and parallel structures and thus to 
achieve an optimal classification result. 
The types of decision generated by the individual base classifier can be classified into 
three major categories: abstract form, rank level, and measurement level [59]. The 
abstract form is that a classifier only outputs a solitary class label for an input pattern. 
The rank level is that a classifier ranks a list of classes in accordance with the degrees of 
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belief on classes the input pattern belongs to. The list is always sorted in descending way 
where the first and the last components are the highest and lowest ranked output classes, 
respectively. The measurement level is that the classifier assigns a level of confidence to 
each class for expressing the classifier’s degree of belief for an input pattern. Among the 
combination methods that work with abstract form outputs, the popular methods are 
behavior knowledge space method, majority voting, weighted majority voting, naive 
bayes method. For measurement level outputs, the combination methods are Dempster-
Shafer method, MAX, MIN, SUM, PROD, AVG, and MED methods that the ensemble 
Figure 2.2. Three Topologies of Ensemble Classifiers  
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selects the maximum, minimum, summation, product, average, or median value of the 
combined classifiers as its output. 
Example is the work of Giacinto and Roli [60]. In their research, they restricted the 
problem domain in the ftp service of the KDD99 data set and selected 30 out of the 41 
available features from the data set. They built three neural networks using 4 intrinsic 
features, 19 traffic features, and 7 content features, respectively. Also, they built one 
neural networks using 30 features for the sake of comparison. All of the networks were 
three layers fully-connected multi-layer networks, which each had 5 output neurons (for 
normal and four attack classes), a number of input neurons that equal to the number of 
features, and a hidden layer made up of 5 neurons for the networks using distinct features 
and 15 neurons for the network trained using all of the 30 features. For performing the 
ensemble operation, they carried out three fusion techniques: the majority voting rule, the 
average rule, and the belief function to combine the outputs from the networks trained on 
three distinct features together. The results showed that all of the fusion techniques 
improved the overall detection performance compared with those of individual classifiers 
and the classifier using 30 features. However, it also showed that the ensemble model did 
not improve the detection on unknown attacks in testing set, which had around 15% error 
rates. During the entire course of work, they only used 725 training connections and 
7,436 testing connections but did not explain the reason. It explicitly hints that the neural 
networks could need a long time for training. The work of Mukkamala et al. [61] is 
another example using multiple classifiers approach. They used the KDD99 data set and 
performed five-class (normal, DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L) classification. They designed 
two ensemble models. One consisted of three multilayer feedforward neural networks and 
 31 
the other was made up of neural networks, SVM and MARS (Multivariate Adaptive 
Regression Splines). By using the majority voting technique, individual base classifiers’ 
outcomes of each ensemble model were combined together. The experimental results 
showed that each ensemble outcome outperformed that of its every base classifier. In one 
of their experiments, they fused three base classifiers’ outputs with 48%, 0%, and 16% 
accuracies together and get 56% ensemble accuracy. However, Hansen and Salamon [62] 
had proved that multi-classifiers will only work when it is possible to build individual 
classifiers which are more than 50% accurate. But, in the paper they did not describe the 
input features of every individual base classifier. This is very important because base 
classifiers should be independent of each other, otherwise no improvement can be 
obtained through the combination.  
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CHAPTER III 
CORRELATION-BASED FEATURE SELECTION 
 
In an intrusion detection task, the quantity of network traffic data is enormous with a 
large amount of features. The objective of feature selection is to reduce the 
dimensionality of the original feature space with a way to select a subset of features. 
However, the problem is how to select the feature subset, which still can represent 
sufficient information about the original data set. For solving this problem, approaches 
based on information gain are employed in this dissertation in order to find the strength 
of predictive from features to targets and the strength of correlation between features 
themselves. As described in Section 2.5, the algorithms of feature selection are mainly 
divided into two categories, filter and wrapper. Since filter method is computational 
efficient than wrapper method, we choose it when the number of features is large. In the 
following, we will address aspects of feature selection based on filter method because the 
size of data collected from the network is always large which includes many traffic 
records with a number of various features. Our approach uses the concept of information 
theory to evaluate the worth of features and eliminate both irrelevant and redundant 
features. The approach is close to the Fast Correlation-Based Filter (FCBF) [63], however 
the difference is we treat the correlation between features in a global perspective. We 
measure the total amount of information associated with a feature as the summation of 
the inter-correlations to all of the rest of the features, but FCBF only considers on a 
feature of rest ones at a time. Figure 3.1 shows FCBF feature selection scheme. 
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First of all, the algorithm calculates the symmetrical uncertainty (SU) [65] value for each 
feature to the class C, selects the relevant features whose SU values are larger than a 
predefined threshold, and orders them in a descending order. In Figure 5, five features are 
selected as relevant features and ranked in descending order. In the second step, it 
processes the relevant features to remove the redundant ones. The algorithm starts from 
the left-most feature Fi and calculates its SU value with the remaining ones (the one Fj 
right next to Fi to the last one). If SUi,j ≥ SUj,c, Fj is considered as a redundant feature and 
is removed from the list. After one round of removing features based on Fi, the algorithm 
takes the feature right next to Fi as the new reference to repeat the process. It stops until 
no more features can be selected. By using this technique, some so called redundant 
features can be removed quickly. However, FCBF may be tricked in a situation where the 
dependence between a pair of features is weak but the total inter-correlated strength of 
one feature to the others is strong. So the FCBF possibly will keep a feature that its 
information can be found in the remaining selected subset of features. In addition, FCBF 
requires adjusting a threshold for its feature selection procedure, while our algorithm 
does not. 
In the following sections, we first introduce the theoretical framework which forms the 
base of our proposed approach in measuring the goodness between features, and between 
F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 C
 
 
Figure 3.1. FCBF Feature Selection Scheme 
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features and classes. We then describe our proposed feature selection algorithm in 
Section 3.2.  
3.1. Theoretical Framework  
In information theory, entropy [64] is a measure of the amount of uncertainty about a 
source of messages. The entropy of variable Y before and after observing values of 
another variable X can be described by. 
∑−=
i
ii ypypYH )(log)()( 2            (3.1) 
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Here p(yi) is the prior probabilities for all values of random variable Y and p(yi|xj) is the 
conditional probability of yi given xj. By treating Y as classes and X as features in a data 
set, the entropy is 0, i.e., without any uncertainty at all if all members of a feature belong 
to the same class. On the other hand, members in a feature set are totally random to a 
class if the value of entropy is 1. The range of entropy is between 0 and 1. 
The amount by which the entropy of Y decreases reflects additional information about Y 
provided by X. This is called information gain (or mutual information) [55] as shown in 
Equation 3.3.  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )YXHXH XYHYHXYI −= −=;            (3.3) 
It measures how well a given variable separates instances into another variable. The 
function I(Y; X) is symmetrical, i.e., the amount of information gained about Y after 
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observing X is equal to the information gained about X after observing Y. Symmetry is a 
desired property for correlation measurements between features. However, information 
gain is biased if feature with more values, which the features with greater numbers of 
values will gain more information than those with fewer values even if the former ones 
are actually less informative than the latter ones. Also, the range of information gain is 
not from 0 to 1. Its values should be normalized in order to ensure they are comparable 
and have the same affect. Therefore, we choose SU as our tool to find the strength of 
predictive from features to target classes and that of correlations between features 
themselves. Its definition is shown in the following equation. 
( ) ( )( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
+⋅= YHXH
XYIXYSU ;2;            (3.4) 
It averages the values of two uncertainty variables, compensates for information gain’s 
bias toward features with more values, and normalizes its values to the range [0, 1]. A 
value of 1 indicates that knowing the value of either one completely predicts the value of 
the other and a value of 0 indicates that X and Y are independent each other. In addition, it 
still treats a pair of features symmetrically.  
In the following study, we apply SU measure to calculate the correlation between features 
and target class. If a feature has a low SU to the target class, it implies that the feature has 
poor prediction ability to the class. On the other hand, the feature has strong prediction 
ability to the class if the SU is high. Once having all the symmetric uncertainties between 
features and the target class, features can be ranked in descending order according to their 
degrees of association to the target class Y. Those features which have the lowest ranks 
are considered as irrelevant features and will be filtered out. 
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Similarly, we apply SU measure to pairs of features. If the measure of mutual information 
between a pair of features is low, it represents these two features are independent to each 
other, i.e., knowing one feature cannot provide any information about the other. On the 
contrary, the two features are highly inter-correlated with each other if they have a high 
mutual information measure. This means that one feature contains similar information 
about the other and implies that knowing one feature can gain necessary information 
about the other. Under this circumstance, one of them can be considered as a redundant 
feature and can be discarded.  
For a better understanding of the idea of redundant feature, we use Venn diagram to 
illustrate correlations among multiple features X1, X2 and X3. As shown in Figure 3.2, 
SU(X1; X3) = b + c, SU(X1; X2) = c and SU(X2; X3) = c + d. Obviously, some redundant 
information will be included if we choose all three features since the information 
included in SU(X1; X3), SU(X1; X2), and SU(X2; X3) is b + 3c + d, which is greater than b + 
c + d in SU(X1, X2; X3). Therefore, removing redundant features from the original feature 
space is necessary in order to discard needless information. The intrusion detection 
f 
X3 
Figure 3.2. Illustration of Correlations of Three Features in Venn Diagram 
X2 
e 
d 
b a 
c 
X1 
f 
 37 
processing time can therefore be reduced by the use of a subset of the original feature 
space.   
In Figure 3.2, feature X3 is highly inter-correlated with both features X1 and X2. By using 
Shannon’s information-theoretic measure, we get the joint entropy:  
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The larger mutual information SU(X1; X3) and SU(X2; X3) are, the smaller area f will be. 
When f is very small, it represents that X3 heavily depends on both X1 and X2. The 
measure of joint entropy H(X1, X2, X3) is approximately equal to H(X1, X2). It implies that 
the total amount of information of X1, X2, and X3 can be represented by the amount of 
information of X1 and X2. Feature X3 is considered as a redundant feature and can be 
removed with only losing a little information of the original feature space. Finally, we 
select the feature that is neither an irrelevant feature nor a redundant feature and call this 
type of feature as “significant feature”.  
3.2 Feature Selection Algorithm 
Table 3.1 describes our proposed feature selection algorithm. The algorithm mainly 
consists of two parts for achieving the goal of reducing dimensionality of the original 
feature space. In the first part (lines 1-5), the algorithm removes irrelevant features with 
poor prediction ability to target class. Given a data set with a number of input features 
and a target class, the algorithm first calculates the mutual information between features 
and class. The algorithm then ranks the features in descending order according to their 
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degrees of association to the target class. Once the input features’ degrees of importance 
are ranked, those terms whose information measure are equal to zero are removed. 
The second part of the algorithm (lines 6-12) eliminates redundant features that are inter-
correlated with one or more of other features. It starts with calculating the inter-correlated 
strengths of each pair of features. The total amount of mutual information for each 
feature is acquired by adding all mutual information measures together that relate to that 
feature. For adjusting the discriminative power of mutual information performed on 
feature-to-feature and feature-to-class to the same level, we introduce factor w and its 
Table 3.1. Feature Selection Algorithm 
  
1 // Remove irrelevant features 
2 Input original data set D that includes features X and target class Y  
3 For each feature Xi  
      Calculate mutual information SU(Y; Xi) 
4 Sort SU(Y; Xi) in descending order 
5 Put Xj whose SU(Y; Xi) > 0 into relevant feature set RXY 
6 // Remove redundant features 
7 Input relevant feature set RXY 
8 For each feature Xj 
      Calculate pairwise mutual information  
      SU(Xj; Xk) ∀j ≠ k 
9 SXX = Σ (SU(Xj; Xk)) 
10 Calculate means µR and µS of RXY and SXX , respectively. 
w =  µS /µR 
11 R = w⋅RXY - SXX 
12 Select Xj whose R > 0 into final set F 
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value is equal to the mean of summation of feature-to-class information divided by the 
mean of summation of feature-to-feature information. By multiplying w to each feature-
to-class measure, both feature-to-class and feature-to-feature reach to the same important 
rank. Finally, the differences of them are computed and we only keep those features 
whose values are greater than zero; which means the selected features are the most 
“significant features” that restrain indispensable information of the original feature space. 
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CHAPTER IV 
FUZZY BELIEF k-NN ANOMALY DETECTION 
 
This chapter presents an intrusion detection method named fuzzy believe k-NN anomaly 
detection. It is a combination of fuzzy clustering technique and Dempster-Shafer theory 
since both of them have merit of resolving the uncertainty problems caused by limited 
and ambiguous information during a decision process. Also, the k-NN technique is 
applied to speed up the detection process.  
In the first part of this chapter, we describe the reason of choosing anomaly detection 
technique. Then, we explain the importance of considering the problems of uncertainty 
while designing intrusion detection models. Finally, we present our proposed fuzzy 
believe k-nearest neighbors anomaly detection design. 
4.1 Anomaly Detection  
As described in Section 2.3, two approaches are typically used for detecting intruders of 
the information from network traffic or system audit trail. They are misuse detection and 
anomaly detection. Misuse detection models known attack behavior and anomaly 
detection models normal behavior. The main drawback of misuse detection technique is 
that it cannot detect unknown intrusions. Whenever a novel attack is discovered, it is 
necessary to spend a number of hours or days on the development of this new attack 
signature and then to update it manually into the intrusion detection system. Maintenance 
of the knowledge database therefore becomes an extremely tedious task. Moreover, 
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misuse detection approach becomes impractical while the number and types of intrusions 
increase dramatically with the networks grow rapidly. Human analysis becomes 
insufficient to catch the growing speed of intrusions. 
A misuse intrusion detection system can neither cover all intrusive behavior space nor 
include all normal behavior space. This is due to the fact that there is not only a large 
amount of vulnerabilities that already have been discovered [1] but also an unknown 
number of vulnerabilities that may be immediately exposed. So it is very difficult to 
model such behavior spaces completely and correctly in reality. Additionally, computer 
attacks are usually polymorphic [66]. Computer hackers in general use different 
approaches to exploit a same vulnerability. The attack codes may look different from the 
known signature but are functionally equivalent. For example, the Internet worms are 
polymorphic and spread automatically across networks by exploiting vulnerabilities [67]. 
These worms are able to mutate as they spread across the network by using self-
encryption mechanisms or semantics-preserving code manipulation techniques. Hence, it 
is correspondingly difficult to generate all possible combinations to cover the variations 
of attacks using misuse detection technique. It is necessary to develop an efficient way 
that is able to identify different variations of a same type of attack.   
To address the above problems, an obvious solution would be to develop intrusion 
detection systems using anomaly detection, which are totally orthogonal to misuse based 
models. The anomaly based models have been successfully implemented by modeling 
what is normal instead of what is anomalous. It is advantageous to distinguish any 
deviations from normal behavior. Consequently, unusual or abnormal patterns are 
possible to be discovered. Furthermore, it offers the ability to resist polymorphic attacks 
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at the moment that novel attacks are constantly being introduced to the networks today. 
The anomaly based models provide a much more feasible approach by the use of 
generalizing the signatures of attacks than generating a number of signatures that cover 
possible variations of attack as in misuse based models. 
4.2 Handling of Uncertainty  
Uncertainties exist in our daily life. Sometimes the uncertainty is totally random, e.g., the 
future state of weather and the occurrence of failure of our home appliances. In other 
occasions it happens due to lack of knowledge or unpredictable factors such as the trend 
of stock and whether a war is going to happen. Therefore, people generally classify 
uncertainties into two categories, aleatory uncertainty and epistemic uncertainty, based on 
their fundamental difference in nature. Aleatory uncertainty is also known as variability, 
random uncertainty, stochastic uncertainty, objective uncertainty, and irreducible 
uncertainty [68], [69]. It is caused by inherent random variations associated with the 
physical system or the environment under consideration. Examples can be found in the 
outcomes while rolling a dice, the location and time of occurrence of future earthquakes, 
and the variability of a machining operation. The random nature of aleatory uncertainty is 
inherent. The occurrence of an event is not predicable even a large quantity of past data is 
collected.  
The second type of uncertainty is epistemic uncertainty. This uncertainty is also referred 
to as imprecision, reducible uncertainty, subjective uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, 
model form uncertainty, and state-of-knowledge uncertainty [68], [69]. On the contrary to 
aleatory uncertainty that uncertainty arises from the system itself, epistemic uncertainty is 
 43 
an uncertainty that is due to a lack of knowledge or information of processes of the 
system or the environment. Since it is not caused by the inherent random variations of the 
system but by the incomplete information or knowledge, the uncertainty is possible to be 
reduced by including new knowledge or information about the system or environmental 
factors. Examples of epistemic uncertainty can be seen when there are insufficient 
experimental data to describe physical parameters of a new material, limited 
understanding of a physics phenomena, and imperfect measurement of a complex 
physical model.  
Actually, epistemic uncertainty does happen in intrusion detection tasks. From the 
decision-based perspective, the goal of intrusion detection is to make decisions on 
whether future traffic data are malicious or normal. For effectively and precisely making 
the decisions, data are collected in advance for analysis in either misuse or anomaly 
detection case. However, the collected data always enclose uncertainty when only limited 
information about intrusive activities is available. In real world modern computer systems 
and networks, hackers constantly develop new attack codes to exploit security 
vulnerabilities of organizations everyday. Not only are these attacks becoming more 
numerous, they are also becoming more sophisticated. Accordingly, it is not realistic to 
cover all intrusive behavior space completely for the use of decision making in an 
intrusion detection system.  
Uncertainty is also occurred due to ambiguous information about computer users’ 
activities. The patterns generated from users’ behavior cannot be specifically defined as 
normality and abnormality. In order to illustrate this type of uncertainty, let us consider 
the following example of a person who tries to access an account from a remote machine. 
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A user attempts to retrieve forgotten passwords when he/she logins his/her own account, 
this action is considered as a normal behavior. On the other hand, the action that a hacker 
attempts to access other people’s accounts by guessing passwords is definitely an 
intrusive activity. Thus, uncertainty is involved during the process of classification. If the 
guessing passwords behavior of a hacker is considered as a normal activity, then the 
intrusion can never be detected. If the retrieving forgotten passwords behavior of a user is 
considered as an intrusive activity, then the system administrators may fire an alarm but 
actually there is no intrusion happened. Hence, uncertainty is necessary to be concerned 
in the imprecise available data set during the intrusion detection procedure.  
4.3 Approach 
Intrusion detection in fact is a classification task that classifies network traffics into 
normal usage category or attack category. In our work, the main goal is to identify U2R 
and R2L attacks from the KDD99 intrusion detection benchmark data set. For 
successfully achieving the goal, we divide the development of an intrusion detection 
system into two phases: training phase and classification phase. In the training phase, 
decision rules are generated in accordance with the clustering result of provided training 
data. The rules are used for classifying future network traffic whether is a normal activity 
or an attack in the classification phase. Figure 4.1 depicts the general operation scheme of 
the proposed approach. The details are described as follows. 
A. The Training Phase 
Let us assume the available information in a given training set is from a network with N 
traffic connections, and each of them is composed of n distinct features with positive 
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numeric values. We denote the training set as T, the training traffic connection as x, and 
the set of features in each connection as F. Equations 4.1 and 4.2 denote T and F, 
respectively. 
}...,,,{ 21 NxxxT =             (4.1) 
and 
}...,,,{ 21 nfffF =             (4.2) 
As described in the previous section, a training traffic connection sometimes could not be 
crisply defined as normality or abnormality. The boundary between normal activities and 
abnormal ones are always unclear. Crisp clustering algorithms cannot handle this 
ambiguity problem among network activities. Therefore, we decide to apply fuzzy c-
Means (FCM) clustering technique developed by Dunn in 1973 [14] and improved by 
Bezdek in 1981 [13] to the following study. It allows one piece of data with gradual 
memberships to the clusters rather than completely assigning to just one cluster. By using 
this feature of FCM, the problem of ambiguity between attacks and normal activities can 
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be solved. The connection could be assigned to diverse classes with different degrees of 
memberships. We denote the set L as a number of p possible classes. 
{ }plllL ...,,, 21=                         (4.3) 
The clustering procedure is done by using iterative optimization technique to minimize an 
objective function J. 
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where the parameter σ is a weighting exponent on each fuzzy membership and has a 
value in the range [1, ∞). This parameter determines the amount of fuzziness in the 
classification process. When it is set to 1, the FCM approaches a hard c-Means algorithm, 
i.e., the membership grade assigning to cluster is either 0 or 1. As this parameter becomes 
larger, the fuzzier are the membership assignments to the clusters. Also, convergence of 
the algorithm tends to be slower as the value of σ increases. Normally, its value is in the 
range of 1.25 to 2 [70]. xi is the ith connection of the training set, cj is the center of cluster 
j, and uij is the membership grade of xi in the cluster j with a value between 0 and 1. || || 
denotes norm expressing the distance between any measured data and the cluster center. 
The membership grades uij and cluster centers cj are updated by the following 
expressions, 
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and 
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By iteratively updating the cluster centers and the membership grades for each training 
connection, FCM moves the cluster centers gradually to their correct values. Finally, the 
iteration stops when ε<−+ )()1( kijkijij uumax , where ε is a selected threshold for 
terminating the iteration process and k denotes the number of iterations.   
The connection that lies “closer” to the center of a class has a higher membership grade 
to that class. On the contrary, the connection that lies “farther” away from the center of a 
class has a lower membership grade to that class. Training connections are grouped into p 
classes such that each connection has a certain membership grade to every class. The set 
of cluster centers C and membership partition matrix U are shown below. 
{ }pcccC ...,,, 21=              (4.7) 
and 
]...,,,[ 21 ipii uuuU =             (4.8) 
where i is the connection number of the training set and p is the number of possible 
classes. For each cluster center, it has a number of n values.  
Within each row of U, the p membership grades are treated intuitively to be our degrees 
of confidence on p classes that a connection can belong to. Consequently, we can build p 
decision rules from a connection and each consists of a number of feature values F, a 
class label l, and a confidence value α.  
{ } α,,: lFrwhererR UUU =              (4.9) 
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The confidence values are in proportion to the correspondent membership grades that a 
connection belongs to certain classes. For a training connection, only portion of our belief 
is devoted to a certain class in a rule whereas the rest of beliefs are committed to other 
classes in other rules. The summation of the degrees of confidence on rules that generated 
from a training connection must be equal to 1. It is not possible that the connection can 
belong to any other classes except these p classes. 
1
1
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where i is the connection number and j is the class number. Since the training set has N 
connections and each contains a number of p membership grades, totally N times p 
decision rules can therefore be generated.  
In addition to the rules created from membership partition matrix U, a number of p rules 
are generated from the cluster centers. In each rule, the antecedent part includes n values 
of a cluster center and the corresponding class label. The degree of confidence is 
designated to 1 because we have full confidence that the cluster center should belong to 
that partitioned class without any doubt.  
{ } 1,,: == αlcrwhererR CCC         (4.11) 
With Equations 4.9 and 4.11, totally (N+1)p rules are included in the decision rule set R. 
These rules will act as pieces of evidence to assign beliefs to an incoming connection in 
the decision making stage.  
CU RRR U=            (4.12) 
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B. The Classification Phase 
In the classification problem of intrusion detection, a complete prior knowledge regarding 
the probability distributions of attacks and normal behavior is not available. Also, the 
amount of traffic data for design is always limited. Hence, we decide to incorporate 
Dempster-Shafer theory into this phase because it does not require an assumption 
regarding the probability of the individual classes. It computes the probability that 
evidences support the attack or normal class. Also, this theory offers a solution for the 
mathematical representation of uncertainty. It is suitable for anomaly detection on unseen 
network traffic by using limited information on the uncertainty. With the combination of 
accumulative evidences from an insufficient amount of information, it is capable of 
making decision on a traffic whether it is normality or abnormality. In this phase, the 
pieces of evidences will be derived from the decision rules of the training phase.  
Dempster-Shafer theory also known as Evidence Theory or Theory of Believe Functions, 
was introduced by Glenn Shafer in the late 1970s [16] based on the work of Arthur 
Dempster [15]. It starts by defining a sample space named frame of discernment (or 
simply frame), which is a finite set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive hypotheses in a 
problem domain under consideration. For adopting the theory into our intrusion detection 
design, we identify the set of class labels L as the frame of the problem domain. The 
possible subset A of L represent hypothesis that one could present evidence. The set of all 
possible subsets of L, including itself and the null set ∅ , is called a power set and 
designated as 2L. Assume v be an incoming traffic connection to be classified. To classify 
v means to assign it to one of the members in L, i.e., to assign v to a member of p classes: 
v ∈ lq, q = 1, 2, …, p.  
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A piece of evidence that influences our degree of belief on a hypothesis can be quantified 
by a mass function which is denoted as m(⋅). It is a mapping function and defined as m: 2L 
→ [0, 1] such that 
∑
⊆
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0)( =∅m            (4.14) 
where A⊆L is called a focal element of m if m(A) > 0. The quantity m(A) is defined as the 
hypothesis A’s basic probability assignment. It can be interpreted as the portion of total 
belief to hypothesis A given the available evidence. For example, if m(A) = 0.2, then it 
means that one’s belief committed to A is 20%. The left 80% beliefs are committed to 
other focal elements of frame L. 
We treat the set of decision rules as pieces of evidence that alters our degrees of belief to 
which class v should belong while classifying it into the correct class. If the distance is 
large between v and a decision rule, it represents that v is “far” from the rule, i.e., the rule 
only has a little influence on v. On the other hand, we have stronger belief that v should 
belong to the same class of the rule if v is “close” to it, which means the distance has a 
smaller value. Here, distances from v to all decision rules are computed and the most 
informative rules are selected. By using this technique, the computational time is less 
than that of using the whole set of rules. Additionally, the weighted k-NN rule [70] is 
used to assign different weights to the selected rules.  
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where xi is the ith rule, xk and x1 are the farthest and nearest rule of v, respectively, and d 
is the Euclidean distance between v and a rule. This weighting factor is used to give each 
decision rule a different amount of influence in a way that closer rule to v has larger 
influence. The factor is calculated such that the nearest neighbor of v has a weight value 
of 1 and the farthest kth neighbor has a value of 0. Since the range of this factor is from 0 
to 1, the resulting weights possibly have very similar values. Therefore, for further 
differentiating the rules’ degrees of importance to v, the confidence value α is added to 
alter the degree of our belief on v.   
iiq wlm α⋅=)(           (4.16) 
where i is the rule number and q is the corresponding class number of the ith rule. Up to 
this stage, each rule creates a number of belief assignment indicating the degrees that v 
belongs to certain classes. If the value of m is large, it means that we have a strong belief 
that v belongs to the class of which m indicates. Otherwise v should belong to other 
classes if m is small. Nevertheless, we need to notice that a belief should also be 
designated to the frame (with every class labels). The reason is that only part of our 
beliefs is committed to single class for a given training connection, and the rest of our 
belief should be assigned to the frame. According to Dempster-Shafer theory, the 
summation of all mass functions inferred from one training connection is equal to 1.  
Thus, the belief belonged to the frame becomes one minus the summation of beliefs of all 
of the single class.  
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From the mass function given by Equation 4.16, the belief function Bel and plausibility 
function Pl can be derived to characterize certain hypotheses. They are shown in the 
following equations, 
)()( jj lmlBel =           (4.18) 
)(1)( jj lBellPl −=           (4.19) 
where j is class number and jl  is the hypothesis “not lj” with value between 0 and 1. 
Belief function is a measure of the total amount of belief that directly supports for a given 
hypothesis. The greater the support assigns to a hypothesis, the higher belief that the 
hypothesis is true. It can be regarded as a lower bound that indicates the impact of 
evidence of the hypothesis. Plausibility quantifies the extent to which one doubts the 
hypothesis. It shows the belief on the given hypothesis can only up to this value, which is 
an upper bound on the belief. The gap between them indicates the uncertainty about the 
hypothesis. It is a good reference in deciding whether more evidences are needed or not. 
Haralick and Shapiro [72] represent those various measurements over the interval unit as 
shown in Figure 4.2.  
Now let us assume that the frame of the problem domain includes normal and attack 
classes. A network traffic connection is coming and the goal is to decide whether it is a 
normal activity or an attack by the use of belief and plausibility functions. Suppose we 
have two pieces of evidence regarding the connection and the mass functions are 0.1 and 
0.2 for normal class and attack class, respectively. By using Equations 4.18 and 4.19, the 
belief and plausibility that support for normal class are 0.1 and 0.8 and for the attack class 
are 0.2 and 0.9, respectively. From the observation of the gap between belief and 
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plausibility, it has a high degree of uncertainty. This indicates that more evidences are 
required to be incorporated so that we can make a better decision that the connection is a 
normal activity or an attack. 
Generally speaking, the mass function is a piece of evidence that supports certain 
hypothesis concerning to the class member of a rule. When more evidences appear with 
same class label, those evidences can be integrated to generate a single belief function 
which represents the total support for the same class. Dempster Rule of Combination is 
applied here to combine all the beliefs induced from distinct pieces of information with 
same class label together. Using this combination rule, the final belief on every subset of 
class set can be obtained. In our case, a number of belief functions for single classes and 
one belief function for the class set will be generated.  
Now assume that there are two mass functions m1 and m2 induced by distinct items of 
evidence X and Y. By using Dempster Rule of Combination, these two independent  
evidences can be fused into a single belief function Z that expresses the support of the 
hypotheses in both evidences. The combination result is called orthogonal sum of m1 and 
m2 and noted as m = m1 ⊕ m2. 
Belief Bel(A)                 Uncertainty                      Non-belief Bel(~A) 
Figure 4.2. Functions of Belief and Plausibility 
Plausibility Pl(A) 
Double Pl(~A) 
0                           j                                                   k                                 1 
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where the factor k-1 is the renormalization constant. Using the above equations, the final 
belief on single class and the frame are obtained. In an intrusion detection task, a number 
of p belief functions for single classes and one belief function for class set will be 
generated. For example, totally four final belief functions are obtained if there are three 
classes in the frame. There are three belief functions for single class and one belief 
function for the frame. They give fused allocations of belief and emphasize the agreement 
between multiple sources.  
Let us continue with the previous example that we already have two pieces of evidence 
regarding a connection. The mass functions of corresponding evidences are 0.1 and 0.2 
for normal class and attack class, respectively. Now assume that we have two more 
pieces of evidence regarding the same traffic connection and the correspondent mass 
functions are 0.3 and 0.6 for normal class and attack class, respectively. Table 4.1 shows 
the information of this example. The frame is 
{ } { }ANllL ,, 21 ==           (4.22) 
By using Dempster Rule of Combination, the above evidences can be aggregated into two 
fused belief functions Bel(N) and Bel(A). First, the renormalization constant factor k-1 is 
calculated in Equation 4.23. Then, individual fused mass functions can be obtained by 
using Equation 4.24. Equations 4.25 to 4.27 show the fused results. 
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[ ] 1212121 )()()()()()()( −⋅⋅+⋅+⋅= klmLmLmlmlmlmlm qqqqq      (4.24) 
m(N) = m1⊕m2(N) = (0.03 + 0.01 + 0.21)⋅k-1 = 0.28 = Bel(N)     (4.25) 
m(A) = m1⊕m2(A) = (0.12 + 002 + 0.42)⋅k-1 = 0.64 = Bel(A)     (4.26) 
m(L) = m(N, A) = m1⊕m2 (N, A) = [m1(N, A)⋅m2(N, A)]⋅k-1 = 0.07⋅ k-1 = 0.08   (4.27) 
The two fused belief functions m(N) and m(A) express the total support of normal class 
and attack class, respectively. The plausibility and uncertainty functions for both normal 
and attack classes can be derived using Equations 4.28 to 4.31. 
( ) ( ) ( ) 36.064.0111 =−=−=−= ABelNBelNPl       (4.28) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 72.028.0111 =−=−=−= NBelABelAPl        (4.29) 
U(N) = Pl(N) - Bel(N) = 0.36 - 0.28 = 0.08       (4.30) 
U(A) = Pl(A) - Bel(A) = 0.72 - 0.64 = 0.08       (4.31) 
Table 4.1. Connection Information of the Example 
 m1(N) = 0.1 m1(A) = 0.2 m1(N, A) = 0.7 
m2(N) = 0.3 m(N) = 0.03 m(NIA) = 0.06 m(N) = 0.21 
m2(A) = 0.6 m(NI A) = 0.06 m(A) = 0.12 m(A) = 0.42 
m2(N, A) = 0.1 m(N) = 0.01 m(A) = 0.02 m(N, A) = 0.07
     * Normal and Attack are abbreviated as N and A, respectively. 
        Uncertainty between belief and plausibility is abbreviated as U. 
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The gap between belief and plausibility is 0.08. We can tell that uncertainty is reduced 
significantly after incorporating more evidences. We have stronger believe that the 
connection should be an attack.  
At the data fusing level, each piece of evidence initializes the finite amount of belief to 
hypotheses of the frame. Part of the belief is allocated to the single class and part of it is 
allocated to the frame. To decide which class v should belong to, Equation 4.32 shows the 
pignistic probability function and it is applied to make the final decision.  
p
LmlmlBp qq
)()()( +=          (4.32) 
where q is the class number and p is the number of classes. The function quantifies our 
beliefs to individual classes with pignistic probability distribution. These probabilities 
distributed from zero to one and the summation of them equals to one. For making an 
optimal decision, v is assigned to a class with the highest pignistic probability. Continue 
with the example, the degrees of final belief on normal and attack classes are shown in 
Equation 4.33 and 4.44, respectively. Table 4.2 shows the computation result. 
Table 4.2. Data Fusion Result 
 {N} {A} {N, A} 
m1 0.1 0.2 0.7 
Bel1 0.1 0.2 1 
Pl1 0.8 0.9 1 
m2 0.3 0.6 0.1 
Bel2 0.3 0.6 1 
Pl2 0.4 0.7 1 
m 0.28 0.64 0.08 
Bel 0.28 0.64 1 
Pl 0.36 0.72 1 
U 0.08 0.08  
Bp 0.32 0.68  
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Bp(N) = m(N) + m(L)/2 = 0.28 + 0.08/2 = 0.32       (4.33) 
and 
Bp(A) = m(A) + m(L)/2 = 0.64 + 0.08/2 = 0.68       (4.34) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 58 
CHAPTER V 
EVALUATION OF FEATURE SELECTION ALGORITHM 
 
In order to test the effectiveness of our feature selection method and compare it with 
other methods, we test our method in a various sizes of data sets. In this chapter, the data 
sets involved during the experiment are first introduced. We then demonstrate the 
experimental methodology, followed by a discussion of the experiment results.   
5.1 DARPA KDD99 Intrusion Detection Evaluation Data Set  
In the beginning of the research of intrusion detection, the most preliminary step is to 
prepare a data set that is good for developing an intrusion detection algorithm and for 
future test. Some people built their own simulated network environment and collected 
data by using sniff software such as tcpdump [73]. Although they included attacks 
purposely, it is often difficult to build a large network with hundreds of computer to 
mimic the real network scenario. Also the results of the specific simulated network 
environment could not be compared with those from different networks. On the other 
hand, people can use an existing data set to design and test their intrusion detection 
systems and the most popular one is DARPA KDD99 Intrusion Detection Evaluation data 
set [74]. The data set, also known as “DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set”, 
has been chosen for analyzing the performance of our proposed classifier. It was created 
by Lincoln Laboratory at MIT [17] and was used in The Third International Knowledge 
Discovery and Data Mining Tools Competition, which was held in conjunction with 
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KDD-99 The Fifth International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining 
with the main objective of intrusion detection and report [74].   
It is a tailor-designed data set for the research of intrusion detection and includes a wide 
variety of intrusions from a simulated network environment. Although some people 
criticize that the data set deliberates mix different types of legitimate traffic (different 
ports and client platforms) with attacks, it is still the most realistic and publicly available 
one with a full list of actual attacks [75]. Consequently, people have been using it for 
designing and evaluating their intrusion detection systems. Also, the best is they can 
compare their experimental results with those from others.  
For acquiring the evaluation data set, Lincoln Labs built a Local Area Network (LAN) to 
simulate a typical U.S. Air Force LAN. The LAN was operated as if it were a true Air 
Force environment, but peppered it with multiple attacks. The victim machines subjected 
to these attacks ran Linux, SunOSTM, and SolarisTM operating systems. The data set was 
acquired from raw tcpdump data for a length of nine weeks. It is made up of a large 
number of network traffic activities that include both normal and malicious connections. 
In the KDD99 data set, three independent sets are included, they are “whole KDD”, “10% 
KDD”, and “corrected KDD”. In our experiment, “10% KDD” and “corrected KDD” are 
taken as our training and testing set, respectively. The training set contains a total of 22 
training attack types, with an additional 17 types in the testing set. Totally 39 attack types 
are included and they fall into four main classes, DoS, Probe, U2R, and R2L. Table 5.1 
summarizes the connection distributions of training and testing sets we have used during 
the entire work. Table 5.2 lists the attacks and note that the 22 types of attacks in training 
set are marked underline. Figure 5.1 shows the detailed distributions of DoS, Probe, U2R, 
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and R2L attacks. The signatures in DoS and Probe attacks in the testing set are very 
similar to those present in the provided training set. However, the types of attack of U2R 
and R2L attacks differ significantly between the training and the testing sets. In the 
testing set, over 80% U2R attacks and 60% R2L attacks are new to the training set. 
Each connection is a sequence of TCP packets starting and ending at some well defined 
times. The set describes each connection in terms of 41 features plus a label of either 
normal or a type of attack. The content of these features are continuous, discrete, or 
symbolic with vary scales and ranges. These features can be classified into four classes, 
basic, content, time-based, and host-based features. Table 5.3 shows the detailed 
information of these 41 features. Features 1 to 9 are basic features that are derived from 
packet header without inspecting the payload. Features 10 to 22 are content features that 
are obtained by analyzing the payload of the original TCP packets. Features 23 to 31 are 
time-based traffic features that capture properties of connections in the past 2 seconds. 
Table 5.1. Connection Distributions  
Data Set Normal DoS R2L U2R Probe Total 
Training Set 97,277 391,458 1,126 52 4,107 494,020 
Testing Set 60,593 229,853 16,189 228 4,166 311,029 
 
Table 5.2. Thirty-Nine Attacks 
DoS R2L U2R Probe
apache2, back, 
land, mailbomb, 
netpune, pod, 
processtable, 
smurf, teardrop, 
udpstorm. 
ftp_write, guess_passwd, 
imap, multihop, named, 
phf, sendmail, 
snmpgetattack, 
snmpguess, spy, 
warezclient, warezmaster, 
worm, xlock, xsnoop.
buffer_overflow, 
httptunnel, 
loadmodule, perl, 
ps, rootkit, 
sqlattack, xterm. 
ipsweep, mscan, 
nmap, portsweep, 
saint, satan.
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Features 32 to 41 are host-based traffic features that examine a number of connections 
using a window of 100 connections instead of a 2-second time window.  
5.2 UCI Data Sets  
In our experiment, six different sizes of data sets are chosen from the UCI Machine 
Learning Repository [76]. In the following we briefly describe the six data sets. 
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(c) U2R attacks                                                 (d) R2L attacks 
 
Figure 5.1. Distributions of Four KDD99 Attack Categories  
   : Training Set          : Testing Set 
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Table 5.3. Forty-One Features  
No. Feature Description Type 
1 duration length (no. of seconds) of the connection  continuous 
2 protocol_type type of the protocol discrete 
3 service network service on the destination  discrete 
4 flag status flag of the connection discrete 
5 src_bytes no. of data bytes from source to destination continuous 
6 dst_bytes no. of data bytes from destination to source continuous 
7 land 1 if connection is from/to the same host/port; 0 otherwise discrete 
8 wrong_fragment no. of wrong fragments continuous 
9 urgent no. of urgent packets continuous 
10 hot no. of “hot” indicators continuous 
11 num_failed_logins no. of failed logins continuous 
12 logged_in 1 if successfully logged in; 0 otherwise discrete 
13 num_compromised no. of “compromised” conditions continuous 
14 root_shell 1 if root shell is obtained; 0 otherwise continuous 
15 su_attempted 1 if “su root” command attempted; 0 otherwise continuous 
16 num_root no. of “root” accesses continuous 
17 num_file_creations no. of file creation operations continuous 
18 num_shells no. of shell prompts continuous 
19 num_access_files no. of operations on access control files continuous 
20 num_outbound_cmds no. of outbound commands in an ftp session continuous 
21 is_host_login 1 if the login belongs to the “hot” list; 0 otherwise discrete 
22 is_guest_login 1 if the login is a “guest” login; 0 otherwise discrete 
23 count no. of connections to the same host as the current connection in the past two seconds continuous 
24 srv_count no. of connections to the same service as the current connection in the past two seconds continuous 
25 serror_rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous 
26 srv_serror_rate % of connections that have “SYN” errors continuous 
27 rerror_rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous 
28 srv_rerror_rate % of connections that have “REJ” errors continuous 
29 same_srv_rate % of connections to the same service  continuous 
30 diff_srv_rate % of connections to different services continuous 
31 srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to different hosts continuous 
32 dst_host_count count of connections having the same destination host continuous 
33 dst_host_srv_count count of connections having the same destination host and using the same service continuous 
34 dst_host_same_srv_rate % of connections having the same destination host and using the same service continuous 
35 dst_host_diff_srv_rate % of different services on the current host  continuous 
36 dst_host_same_src_port_rate % of connections to the current host having the same src port continuous 
37 dst_host_srv_diff_host_rate % of connections to the same service coming from different hosts  continuous 
38 dst_host_serror_rate % of connections to the current host that have an S0 error continuous 
39 dst_host_srv_serror_rate % of connections to the current host and specified service that have an S0 error continuous 
40 dst_host_rerror_rate % of connections to the current host that have an RST error continuous 
41 dst_host_srv_rerror_rate % of connections to the current host and specified service that have an RST error continuous 
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Abalone: This data set is used for predicting the age of abalone from physical 
measurements. It includes totally 4,177 data records and each of them consists of eight 
features and one class label. Features include length (continuous), diameter (continuous), 
height (continuous), whole weight (continuous), shucked weight (continuous), viscera 
weight (continuous), shell weight (continuous), rings (integer). Classes are M (man), F 
(female), and I (infant).  
Cmc: The data set is provided to study the problem of predicting the current 
contraceptive method choice (no use, long-term methods, or short-term methods) of a 
woman based on her demographic and socio-economic characteristics. It contains 1,473 
data records and each has nine features. Features are wife’s age (numerical), wife’s 
education (categorical), husband’s education (categorical), number of children ever born 
(numerical), wife’s religion (binary), wife’s now working (binary), husband’s occupation 
(categorical), standard-of-living index (categorical), and media exposure (binary). 
Classes are 1 (no-use), 2 (long-term), and 3 (short-term). 
Ionosphere: This is radar data that were collected by a system in Goose Bay, Labrador. 
It has 351 data records and each one has thirty four continuous features plus a class label. 
It is used for binary classification tasks and therefore the class label is either good or bad. 
Pima: This data set collects information from patients who are all females over 21-year 
old of Pima Indian heritage. It includes 768 data records and has eight features which are 
number of times pregnant, plasma glucose concentration a 2 hours in an oral glucose 
tolerance test, diastolic blood pressure, triceps skin fold thickness, 2-hour serum insulin, 
body mass index, diabetes pedigree function, and age. Classes are 0 and 1. 
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Wdbc: For the study of breast tumor diagnosis, this data set provides 569 data records 
and each one comprises an ID number plus thirty features that describe characteristics of 
the cell nuclei presented in the image. The class label is M (malignant) or B (benign). 
Wine: This data set includes 178 data records that represent the chemical analysis results 
of wines grown in the same region in Italy but derived from three different cultivars. 
Each data record has thirteen features, alcohol, malic acid, ash, alcalinity of ash, 
magnesium, total phenols, flavanoids, nonflavanoid phenols, proanthocyanins, color 
intensity, hue, OD280/OD315 of diluted wines, and praline, plus a class label (1, 2, or 3).   
5.3 Experimental Methodology 
A. Discretization of Features 
In the six UCI data sets and KDD99 data set, each record is composed by a set of 
features. The type of features is either discrete or continuous which the former is a 
qualitative scale and the latter is quantitative. For qualitative scales, the values are simply 
labels without any order involved. They could be symbolic or numeric values where are 
distinct and separated. Also, it is a form of categorical data that has no “numeric” 
meaning. By using the features of KDD99 data set as an example, the value of feature 
protocol_type is one of the symbolic set {icmp, tcp, udp}. The numeric value of feature 
logged_in is 1 or 0 to represent the user successfully logged in the system or not. For 
quantitative scales, the data are characterized by numeric values within a finite interval. 
The distance between any two adjacent values is not necessary the same. Examples can 
be found in feature duration where it is given by numeric values to represent the lengths 
of record, and the values are within an interval [0, 58,329].  
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Since SU is calculated for discrete features only, all the continuous features in a given 
data set are necessary to be discretized prior to the feature selection analysis. Thus, we 
apply discretization method to transform continuous features to discrete ones prior to the 
analysis. For a numeric feature, cut points effectively decompose the range of continuous 
values into a number of intervals. These intervals can then be treated as categorical 
values of a discrete feature. In our work, equal frequency binning technique [77] is 
applied to each continuous feature individually. It is an unsupervised discretization 
method with no class information involved. It sorts the observed values of a continuous 
feature and then divides these values into a specified number of intervals. Each of the 
intervals has an approximate equal number of values. With the use of discretization of 
features, the complexity of every continuous feature is reduced as well.  
B. Experimental Methodology 
In order to evaluate the performance of our proposed feature selection algorithm on data 
sets, two representative feature selection algorithms, CFS [77] and FCBF [63], built on 
the top of SU are chosen. CFS method uses a correlation-based heuristic search algorithm 
to evaluate the worth of subsets of features. It considers good feature subsets that are 
highly correlated with the class, yet uncorrelated with one another. The heuristic 
algorithm measures the merit of feature subsets from pairwise feature correlations and 
then the subset with the highest merit found during the search is reported. Rather than 
scoring the worth of subsets of features of CFS approach, FCBF method measures 
correlations between features and classes and correlations between pairs of features as 
well. It then selects features which are highly correlated with the class to predict but are 
less correlated to any feature already selected. In addition, we apply two machine 
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learning algorithms, naive bayes and C4.5 algorithm, to evaluate the detection accuracy 
on the selected features for each feature selection algorithm. 
The experiments are performed on the six UCI data sets and binary classification 
(normal/attack) of KDD99 data set. Four new sets of data are generated from KDD99 
data set according to the normal class and four categories of attack (DoS, Probe, U2R and 
R2L). In each data set, connections with the same attack category and all the normal ones 
are included. For each set, we run our proposed approach and the other two feature 
selection algorithms CFS and FCBF, and record those features selected by each 
algorithm. Throughout the entire experiments, the threshold of FCBF is set to 0. We then 
apply C4.5 and naive bayes machine learning algorithms on each original full data set as 
well as each newly obtained data set that includes only those selected features from 
feature selection algorithms. By applying 10-fold cross-validation evaluation on each 
data set, classification accuracy of six UCI data sets and standard measurements, such as 
the detection rate (DR), false positive rate (FPR), and overall classification rate (CR), for 
evaluating the performance of intrusion detection tasks are reported. The denotations of 
True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP), and False Negative (FN) are 
defined as follows.  
• True Positive (TP): The number of malicious records that are correctly identified. 
• True Negative (TN): The number of legitimate records that are correctly classified. 
• False Positive (FP): The number of records that were incorrectly identified as attacks 
however in fact they are legitimate activities. 
• False Negative (FN): The number of records that were incorrectly classified as 
legitimate activities however in fact they are malicious. 
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Equations 5.1 to 5.3 describe DR, FPR, and CR, respectively. 
FNTP
TPDR +=                        (5.1) 
FPTN
FPFPR +=                        (5.2) 
FNFPTNTP
TNTPCR +++
+=                       (5.3) 
5.4 Experimental Results  
Based on our developed feature selection algorithm, Tables 5.4 and 5.5 summarize the 
selected features from our approach as well as those selected by CFS and FCBF 
algorithms of UCI and KDD99 data sets, respectively. Table 5.6 summarizes the 
classification accuracy of the six UCI data sets. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 summarize the 
percentages of DRs and FPRs performed on KDD99 data set with C4.5 and naive bayes 
learning algorithms, respectively. For an intrusion detection task, abnormal activities are 
expected to be correctly identified and normal activities are anticipated not to be 
misclassified. Therefore, a higher DR and a lower FPR are desired. In addition, we show 
the results of SU measures of feature to class and feature to feature of KDD99 data sets in 
Tables 5.9 and 5.10, respectively. 
From Table 5.6, our approach shows higher averaged accuracies in comparison with the 
outcomes of CFS and FCBF feature selection algorithms. Especially in the abalone data 
set, we get the highest classification accuracy by using 2 out of 8 features performed on 
C4.5 learning algorithm, which is better than that of using full feature set. The averaged 
accuracies of Tables 5.7 and 5.8 also show that our approach outperform over CFS and 
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FCBF feature selection algorithms. The averaged DRs and the averaged FPRs of our 
experimental results are better than those of using full feature set performed on C4.5 and 
naive bayes, respectively.  
In the Normal-DoS data set, the difference in DRs is very slight for all of the feature 
selection algorithms. With our approach, the DR is the same as that of using full feature 
set in C4.5 learning algorithm. In the Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, we have 
satisfactory DRs and FPRs. Though CFS and FCBF approaches achieve low FPRs, they 
have very poor DRs. In the Normal-Probe data set, both CFS and FCBF approaches fail 
to achieve an acceptable presentation on DRs while using naive bayes leaning algorithm, 
whereas our approach gains very high DRs performed on both leaning algorithms. 
For any of the feature selection algorithms, FPRs are low because sufficient normal 
records present in any of those four data sets. As for the number of misclassification 
Table 5.4. Selected Features of UCI Data Sets 
Data Set Ours CFS FCBF 
Abalone 3,8 2,3,6,8 8 
Cmc 1,4 2,4 2,4 
Ionosphere 1,5,6,8,9,16,33,34 1,33 1,33 
Pima 2,5,6,8 2,5,6 2 
Wdbc 1,3,4,6-8,11,13,14,21,23,24,26-28 8,21,23,24,28 24 
Wine 1,7,10,11-13 1,7,10-13 1,2,4,5,7,10-13
 
Table 5.5. Selected Features of KDD99 Data Sets 
Data Set Ours CFS FCBF 
Normal-DoS 1-6,12,23,24,31,32,37 3,6,12,37 3,12,31,32 
Normal-Probe 1-4,12,16,25,27-30,40 3,4,25,29 3,26,27,29  
Normal-U2R 1-3,10,16 10 10,16 
Normal-R2L 1-5,10,22 10 5,10,39 
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attack records, our approach provides acceptable DRs on Normal-DoS, Normal-Probe 
and Normal-R2L data sets using both C4.5 and naive bayes learning algorithms. It is not 
only because each of the above data set supplies sufficient attack records but also most of 
the attacks have a same attack signature. For example, the DoS attack type includes near 
400,000 data records distributed in 10 different attacks, which 99% of the attacks are 
netpune and smurf attacks. In the Probe attack category, 95% of attacks are ipsweep, 
portsweep and satan that are distributed in 4,107 attacks. As for R2L attack class, more 
than 90% of attacks are warezclient attack while 8 different kinds of attacks present. In 
contrast, the classification presented on Normal-U2R data set is satisfactory neither on 
full feature set approach nor on one of three feature selection algorithms. The Normal-
U2R data set includes 52 attack records which are insufficient for learning on a 
classification algorithm. The experimental results have been published in [78]. 
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Table 5.6. CRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of  
UCI Data Sets 
C4.5  Naive Bayes 
Data Set 
Full Set Ours CFS FCBF  Full Set Ours CFS FCBF
Abalone 51.90 56.00 51.90 51.90  63.23 53.60 51.90 51.90 
Cmc 63.68 54.65 52.89 52.89  53.36 52.61 52.27 52.27 
Ionosphere 74.93 74.93 74.93 74.93  99.15 97.72 94.02 94.02 
Pima 65.10 65.10 65.10 65.10  89.97 87.50 85.03 77.34 
Wdbc 62.74 62.74 62.74 62.74  99.30 99.30 99.65 94.02 
Wine 94.94 94.94 94.94 94.94  98.88 97.75 97.75 98.88 
Average 68.88 68.06 67.08 67.08  83.98 81.41 80.10 78.07 
 
Table 5.7. DRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of  
KDD99 Data Sets 
C4.5  Naive Bayes 
Data Set 
Full Set Ours CFS FCBF  Full Set Ours CFS FCBF
Normal-DoS 99.97 99.97 99.86 99.31  99.12 99.16 99.37 99.19 
Normal-Probe 98.51 97.78 95.52 94.91  98.27 96.54 62.53 45.31 
Normal-U2R 48.08 48.08 0 7.69  82.69 69.23 0 7.69 
Normal-R2L 93.52 97.69 0 27.44  99.11 93.25 0 33.84 
Average 85.02 85.88 48.85 57.34  94.80 89.55 40.48 46.51 
 
Table 5.8. FPRs of C4.5 and Naive Bayes Using Full and Selected Feature Sets of 
KDD99 Data Sets 
C4.5  Naive Bayes 
Data Set 
Full Set Ours CFS FCBF  Full Set Ours CFS FCBF
Normal-DoS 0.04 0.03 2.19 7.58  0.01 0.01 2.76 7.77 
Normal-Probe 0.02 0.38 0.36 0.36  1.29 0.87 0.15 0.10 
Normal-U2R 0 0 0 0  0.63 0.50 0 0 
Normal-R2L 0.01 0.01 0 0.02  1.31 0.49 0 0.08 
Average 0.02 0.11 0.64 1.99  0.81 0.47 0.73 1.99 
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Table 5.9. SU Measure of Feature (F) to Class (C) of KDD99 Data Set 
Normal-DoS  Normal-Probe  Normal-U2R  Normal-R2L 
Feature SU(F; C)  Feature SU(F; C)  Feature SU(F; C)  Feature SU(F; C)
12 0.5939  29 0.2427  10 0.0552  10 0.2000 
3 0.4638  27 0.2263  16 0.0131  22 0.1919 
6 0.4578  25 0.2243  1 0.0037  3 0.0484 
37 0.3639  4 0.2223  3 0.0033  39 0.0184 
5 0.3423  30 0.1941  33 0.0011  38 0.0171 
32 0.3352  28 0.1460  25 0.0010  33 0.0161 
2 0.3284  38 0.1374  41 0.0009  4 0.0154 
36 0.3126  40 0.1365  29 0.0008  5 0.0143 
23 0.2698  41 0.1248  40 0.0007  1 0.0129 
31 0.2418  12 0.1232  30 0.0006  40 0.0125 
24 0.1699  3 0.1071  36 0.0006  37 0.0114 
35 0.1344  35 0.0875  32 0.0005  36 0.0111 
1 0.1211  2 0.0695  4 0.0005  6 0.0100 
34 0.1158  37 0.0549  5 0.0005  2 0.0086 
33 0.1104  26 0.0493  37 0.0004  23 0.0063 
39 0.1100  34 0.0466  6 0.0004  24 0.0063 
38 0.1028  23 0.0417  27 0.0004  35 0.0061 
26 0.0898  5 0.0408  24 0.0003  32 0.0050 
25 0.0893  33 0.0389  35 0.0003  12 0.0045 
30 0.0891  39 0.0350  31 0.0003  31 0.0045 
4 0.0743  36 0.0336  23 0.0002  41 0.0038 
29 0.0670  6 0.0304  34 0.0002  34 0.0038 
41 0.0397  32 0.0173  39 0.0002  30 0.0017 
40 0.0119  31 0.0158  38 0.0002  29 0.0016 
13 0.0022  24 0.0124  2 0.0002  26 0.0016 
28 0.0014  1 0.0065  26 0.0002  25 0.0007 
10 0  16 0.0023  12 0.0001  28 0.0004 
27 0  7 0  28 0  27 0.0001 
7 0  8 0  7 0  7 0 
8 0  9 0  8 0  8 0 
9 0  10 0  9 0  9 0 
11 0  11 0  11 0  11 0 
14 0  13 0  13 0  13 0 
15 0  14 0  14 0  14 0 
16 0  15 0  15 0  15 0 
17 0  17 0  17 0  16 0 
18 0  18 0  18 0  17 0 
19 0  19 0  19 0  18 0 
20 0  20 0  20 0  19 0 
21 0  21 0  21 0  20 0 
22 0  22 0  22 0  21 0 
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Table 5.10. SU Measure of Feature to Feature of KDD99 Data Set 
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CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION OF FUZZY BELIEF INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
In this chapter, we first test the feasibility of proposed fuzzy belief k-NN classifier in 
intrusion detection task, and compare its result with those of three other k-NN based 
classifiers: k-NN classifier [18], fuzzy k-NN classifier [79], and evidence-theoretic k-NN 
classifier [80]. Then we apply the experimental results of Chapter V to all four classifiers 
for observing the dissimilarities between applying full feature set and selected feature 
subsets.   
6.1 Experimental Methodology 
A. Data Preprocessing 
Duplicated connections were removed from the original training and testing data sets.  
The new training set has 145,585 connections that are distributed as 87,831 normal 
connections, 54,572 DoS attacks, 2,131 Probe attacks, 52 U2R attacks, and 999 R2L 
attacks. The new testing set has 51,041 connections that are distributed as 47,913 normal 
connections, 23,568 DoS attacks, 2,682 Probe attacks, 215 U2R attacks, and 2,913 R2L 
attacks. In each connection, features represented by symbolic values and class labels are 
replaced by numeric values for the use of classifiers. For example, the values of icmp, 
tcp, and udp of feature protocol_type are replaced by values 1, 2, and 3, respectively. 
Class labels for normal connections, U2R attacks and R2L attacks are substituted by 
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values 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In addition, values of each feature are normalized 
between 0 and 1 in order to offer equal importance among features. 
B. Experimental Methodology 
In order to evaluate the detection performance of the proposed fuzzy belief k-NN 
classifier, three pattern classification algorithms are selected to compare with. One is k-
NN classifier and the other two are fuzzy k-NN classifier and evidence-theoretic k-NN 
classifier that built on the base of k-NN rule. 
The k-NN classifier is simple but effective in many pattern classification applications. 
For an input to be classified, k nearest training patterns are obtained based on the 
Euclidean distance measurement between the input and every training pattern. The input 
is then simply assigned to the class by majority voting, i.e., the input is classified to the 
most frequent class label among the k nearest training patterns. However, a major 
drawback of k-NN algorithm is that the precision of classification may decrease if all 
selected k nearest training patterns are equally important without considering the 
differences of distances [80]. To eliminate this drawback, fuzzy k-NN classifier assigns 
multiple membership grades to classes rather than a single class. By using the distance 
differences from the k nearest training patterns, the degrees of membership grades to 
classes are determined. As the evidence-theoretic k-NN classifier, it incorporates 
Dempster-Shafer theory to treat the k nearest training patterns of an input pattern as 
pieces of evidence to support certain hypotheses about the classes. By deriving evidences 
from both class labels and distances between input and k nearest training pattern pairs, 
these evidences are then combined into final beliefs with respect to each subset of the set 
of classes. 
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6.2 Experimental Results 
Generally, a large amount of traffic records are essential for a classifier to be trained 
when using anomaly detection and the consequence is that a long computational time is 
required to reach a final decision. But unfortunately, the intrusion detection system has to 
perform its analysis as quick as possible, otherwise serious damages could happen and 
possibly cause millions of dollars loss. Therefore, only a small amount of connections are 
included in our experiments for training the classifiers. It not only speeds up the 
classification process but also simulates the uncertainty caused by lack of network traffic 
information.  
The experiments are performed on the binary (normal/attack) classification. To minimize 
the inaccuracy and variation factor of experiment results, 10 trials are performed in every 
U2R and R2L detection task. In each trial, certain percentages of normal and attack 
connections are randomly selected from the training and testing sets. For detecting U2R 
attacks, the training and testing sets comprise 930 (878 normal and 52 U2R) and 694 (479 
normal and 215 U2R) connections, respectively. For detecting R2L attacks, the training 
and testing sets include 977 (878 normal and 99 R2L) and 770 (479 normal and 291 R2L) 
connections, respectively.  
To detect the attacks, training and testing are performed in each trial. In the training 
phase, the four classifier, k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, evidence-theoretic k-NN, and fuzzy belief 
k-NN, are constructed. The testing data are then fed into the trained classifiers to identify 
intrusions in the testing phase. 
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We evaluate the performances of the four classifiers using distinct values of k that ranges 
from 1 to 10. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 summarize the maximum, minimum, and averaged rates 
of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show FPRs, DRs, CRs, and 
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) graphs of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. 
A ROC graph is a plot with FPR on the X axis and DR on the Y axis. Since these four 
classifiers are discrete classifiers, each of them produces a single point representing the 
pair of FPR and DR in the ROC space.  
The results show that DRs of our classifier are much higher than those of other three 
classifiers in detecting both U2R and R2L attacks. With our proposed classifier, a high 
averaged DR of 98.16% is achieved when detecting U2R attacks. By using only one 
nearest training connections for each testing connection, 98.33% DR has been reached. 
On the contrary, the other three classifiers can only reach around 15% DRs no matter 
fewer or more nearest training connections are applied. While detecting R2L attacks, the 
averaged DR of 67.88% has been achieved. However the other three classifiers provide 
only around 20% DRs. For the other three k-NN based classifiers, evidence-theoretic k-
NN classifier has a slightly better performance over k-NN and fuzzy k-NN classifiers. It 
indicates that Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence-theoretic k-NN classifier provides a 
degree of influence while detecting attacks in network traffic. 
For identifying the normal connections in our classifier, the averaged FPRs are 13.71% 
and 11.58% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. Three classifiers have very low FPRs 
because they treat most network traffic data as normal connections no matter they are 
normal or malicious activities. The above observation can be explained from the ROC 
graphs. 
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Table 6.1. FPRs and DRs Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-U2R Data Sets  
with k Ranging From 1 to 10 
   FPR    DR  
  Max Min Avg.  Max Min Avg. 
k-NN  0.56 0.04 0.20  20.14 8.37 12.87
Fuzzy k-NN  0.56 0.15 0.27  20.14 11.67 15.49
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN  0.56 0.08 0.31  21.81 13.26 16.87
Fuzzy Belief k-NN  14.99 12.73 13.71  98.47 97.77 98.16
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Figure 6.1. ROC Graphs of Four Classifiers Performed on Normal-U2R Data Set 
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN,  : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN 
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Table 6.2. FPRs and DRs Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-R2L Data Sets  
with k Ranging From 1 to 10 
   FPR    DR  
  Max Min Avg.  Max Min Avg. 
k-NN  0.56 0.15 0.36  23.51 14.26 18.91
Fuzzy k-NN  0.56 0.19 0.33  26.29 15.26 20.92
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN  0.61 0.25 0.39  25.67 16.22 21.50
Fuzzy Belief k-NN  12.17 10.92 11.58  71.17 64.23 67.88
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Figure 6.2. ROC Graphs of Four Classifiers Performed on Normal-R2L Data Set 
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN,  : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN 
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 In a ROC graph, the point (0, 1) represents the classifier performs a perfect 
classification; it classifies all positive cases and negative cases correctly. On the contrary, 
the point (1, 0) represents the classifier in the worst case, i.e., it classifies all cases 
incorrectly. The lower left point (0, 0) represents the classifier never reports any false 
positive errors, while the upper right point (1, 1) has an opposite policy that the classifier 
predicts all cases to be positive. From both ROC graphs of U2R and R2L attacks, we can 
see points of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN classifiers are all gathering 
near point (0, 0), which indicate all of them seldom report false positive errors and 
correctly predict a few of attacks. However, all the points of fuzzy believe k-NN classifier 
are close to point (0, 1), which have higher DRs and have lower FPRs as well.  
In summary, our classifier has a better performance compared with the other three 
classifiers. By including only a small portion of connections from the training set of 
KDD99, we achieve high DRs of identification of both U2R and R2L attacks.  
Once we finish the feasibility test of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier, the results obtained in 
Chapter V can thus be provided to classifiers to identify traffic data in a shorter period of 
time. Tables 6.3 and 6.4 summarize the averaged FPRs and the averaged DRs performed 
on four classifiers with k ranging from 1 to 10 of Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, 
respectively.  
In the comparison of four classifiers performed in different feature sets, k-NN, fuzzy k-
NN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN classifiers have similar detection performances using 
either full feature set or one of selected feature subsets, which all the three k-NN based 
classifiers have poor detection performances. The maximum DRs in rows 1 to 3 of Tables 
6.3 and 6.4 are 19.64% and 26.33% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, 
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respectively. With our proposed fuzzy belief k-NN classifier, the results of using three 
feature selection algorithms differ a lot, which our selected features provide much 
accurate DRs than those from CFS and FCBF. In the last row, the DRs of our approach 
reach 83.86% and 69.82% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. Both 
CFS and FCBF achieve low FPRs in the data sets because they treat most of the network 
traffic data as normal usages no matter the traffic are normal or malicious activities. For a 
better demonstration, Figure 6.3 shows the ROC graphs of four classifiers performed on 
Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets using our selected feature subset with k ranging 
from 1 to 10. It shows the points of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, and evidence-theoretic k-NN 
classifiers are all gathering near point (0, 0), which indicates that none of them can 
correctly identify attacks. However, all the points of fuzzy believe k-NN classifier are 
much closer to point (0, 1), which have higher DRs and have lower FPRs as well.  
Table 6.3. Averaged Rates Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-U2R Data Set  
with k Ranging From 1 to 10 
 Full Set  Ours  CFS  FCBF 
Classifier 
 FPR DR  FPR DR  FPR DR  FPR DR 
k-NN  0.20 12.87  2.55 18.03  0.20 15.07  0.21 15.21 
Fuzzy k-NN  0.27 15.49  2.50 18.47  0.19 14.52  0.20 15.27 
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN  0.31 16.87  2.65 19.64  0.23 16.99  0.26 18.48 
Fuzzy Belief k-NN  13.71 98.16  9.54 83.86  0.25 11.72  0.16 7.32 
 
Table 6.4. Averaged Rates Performed on Four Classifiers of Normal-R2L Data Set  
with k Ranging From 1 to 10 
 Full Set  Ours  CFS  FCBF 
Classifier 
 FPR DR  FPR DR  FPR DR  FPR DR 
k-NN  0.36 18.91  3.68 20.41  0.26 14.42  3.05 19.31 
Fuzzy k-NN  0.33 20.92  19.30 23.58  0.26 15.30  3.05 19.68 
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN  0.39 21.50  8.76 26.33  0.27 15.84  4.50 26.23 
Fuzzy Belief k-NN  11.58 67.88  9.86 69.82  0.18 7.78  0.19 7.98 
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In Figure 6.4, we show the result of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set and 
three feature subsets selected by our developed feature selection algorithm, CFS, and 
FCBF. For both data sets using features from CFS and FCBF, the diagrams show that all 
of the points are in the vicinity of (0, 0), which represents all the traffic are classified as 
normal activities and only a very few amount of attacks are correctly detected. In the left 
diagram, the DR with full feature set is higher than that of using our feature subset, 
however our selected features provide a better FPR result than that of using full feature 
set. In the right diagram, we notice that the points with our selected features are closer to 
point (0, 1) than those of using full feature set, which show that our selected features 
achieve better detection outcomes in both DR and FPR than those of using full feature 
set. In addition to the consideration of detection performance, we furthermore consider 
the detection processing time because an intrusion detection system has to perform its 
analysis as fast as possible before the attacks make any damage to the protected system. 
Consequently, we compare the computation time of fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using 
full feature set and our selected feature subset. Figure 6.5 illustrates the detection time on 
each testing connection of both data sets. The results show that we successfully reduce 
the computation time if our selected feature subset is used. Our approach only take about 
25% of the time with full feature set in Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets. The 
related works have been published in [81]-[84]. 
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Figure 6.3. The Performance of Four Classifiers Using Normal-U2R (left) and  
Normal-R2L (right) Data Sets  
x: k-NN, ∆: Fuzzy k-NN,  : Evidence-Theoretic k-NN, •: Fuzzy Belief k-NN 
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Figure 6.4. The Performance of Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Normal-U2R (left)  
and Normal-R2L (right) Data Sets  
x: Full Feature Set, ∆: CFS,  : FCBF, •: Ours 
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Figure 6.5. Detection Time of One Connection Using Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier 
(a) With all 41 features 
(b) With 5 selected features in Normal-U2R set  
(c) With 7 selected features in Normal-R2L set  
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CHAPTER VII 
ENSEMBLE INTRUSION DETECTION 
 
An ensemble of classifiers is a set of base classifiers, whose classification decisions are 
combined together in some way to achieve a better performance than that of individual 
base classifier. In the intrusion detection task, we apply different feature subsets to base 
classifiers. We call it as ensemble feature selection. Also, we apply data mining technique 
to promote the FPR.  
7.1 Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model 
While designing an intrusion detection system, detection accuracy and speed are two 
important considerations. The system needs to perform a proper detection task with low 
FPR on normal computer usages and high DR on malicious activities. Also, this system 
has to perform its analysis as soon as possible before the attacks make any damage to the 
protected system. In the past, approaches to intrusion detection based on ensemble 
techniques have been investigated with the use of different feature subsets [60] or soft 
computing techniques [61] in every individual classifier. However, they only focused on 
improving DR in known and unknown intrusions but did not consider reducing the 
number of false alarms. Therefore, we propose an ensemble model that includes an 
ensemble feature selecting classifier and a data mining classifier to act as anomaly 
detection and misuse detection to improve the DR and FPR, respectively. The former 
consists of a set of base feature selecting classifiers and each uses partial feature space. 
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The latter applies data mining technique to look for patterns of normal activities. We 
believe that the overall performance of this ensemble architecture is better than that of 
each individual classifier. Also, DR, FPR, and detection speed are more accurate and 
faster than those of using full feature set. Figure 7.1 depicts our design. 
A. Ensemble Feature Selection Classifier 
In an ensemble classifier design, it is important to understand that individual base 
classifiers should be independent of each other. If the base classifiers provide similar 
outputs, then no significant improvement of the ensemble result can be obtained through 
the combination process. It is critical to notice the diversity among base classifiers in 
order to get effective and correct classification result. Hence, we decide to use ensemble 
feature selection approach to be our feature selecting classifier structure. By choosing 
dissimilar feature subsets for various base feature selecting classifiers, the diversity 
among these classifiers is expected to be maximized to achieve a better result. In our 
Ensemble Feature Selecting Classifier 
Figure 7.1. Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model  
Result 
C
om
biner 
Selected Features Classifier 
Content Features Classifier 
Basic Features Classifier 
Traffic Features Classifier 
Data Mining  
Classifier 
Network 
Traffic 
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design, we select four distinct subsets of features to be the foundation of the base 
classifiers. One subset consists of features selected by our feature selection algorithm. 
The other three are the partitions of the original 41 features that are 9 basic features (1 to 
9), 13 content features (10 to 22), and 19 traffic features (23 to 41).  
Besides the notability of multiplicity among the base classifiers, the right choice of a 
combination method is another important issue in creating a successful ensemble result. 
As described in Section 2.6, research has shown that there are many methods [59] 
available for combining the abstract form outputs of the base classifiers into an ensemble 
result. However, some of them in fact are not suitable for our ensemble intrusion 
detection design. For example, the behavior knowledge space method requires enough 
representative data sets to estimate high order distribution of classifiers’ outputs. 
Otherwise overfitting is likely to occur, and the generalization error quickly increases 
[85]. In our designed intrusion detection model, we only use a very small amount of 
traffic data that is insufficient to offer behavior knowledge space method a representative 
number of observations. While the majority voting ensemble approach is used for 
integration, Hansen and Salamon [62] had proved that the ensemble only works if the CR 
of individual base classifier is higher than 50% accurate and independent of each other. 
However, we cannot guarantee that all the classification accuracies of our designed four 
base classifiers would satisfy the above requirement. Accordingly, naive bayes ensemble 
is selected to combine the decisions of base classifiers together. Based on its probabilistic 
approach, the evidences of base classifiers are computed and the most appropriate class 
can then be chosen. Its operation is explained as follows. 
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Let the possible classes of a system be  Llll p ∈...,,, 21  and these p classes are mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive, i.e., the decision result of the system belongs to only one of the 
classes. The set }...,,,{ 21 mdddD =  denotes a set of m base feature selecting classifiers 
and each of them is built from a feature subset of the feature space }...,,,{ 21 nfffF = . 
The output of each base classifier o is an abstract form class label. Then the objective is 
to find the probability over a class member l conditional on the outcomes of m classifiers, 
h1 through hm.  
∏
=
= m
j
iijim loPlhhP
1
1 )|()|...,,(            (7.1) 
∑
=
= p
i
iimm lPlhhPhhP
1
11 )()|...,,()...,,(           (7.2) 
Here, )|...,,( 1 im lhhP  is the conditional probability of mhh ...,,1  given li and P(oij|li) is the 
conditional probability of oij given li. The prior probability of each class is P(li) 
and )...,,( 1 mhhP  is the probability of mhh ...,,1 . 
Based on the Bayes theorem, we have 
)...,,(
)()|...,,()...,,|(
1
1
1
m
iim
mi hhP
lPlhhPhhlP =          (7.3) 
where i is the number of possible classes ranging from 1 to p. This posterior probability 
collects all evidences from base classifiers and integrates them together. Finally, the 
naive bayes classifier infers the state of system by choosing a class that achieves the 
highest posterior probability. 
To illustrate how naive bayes ensemble method works, we assume there are 4 intrusion 
detection base feature selecting classifiers h1, h2, h3, and h4 that are built by features 
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selected by our feature selection algorithm, 9 basic features, 13 content features, and 19 
traffic features, respectively. The intrusion detection task is a binary assignment, i.e., 
each base classifier assigns the network traffic data into either normal activity l1 or attack 
l2.  
Suppose we have tested an amount of network traffic data and the distributions of the 
normal activities and attacks of the testing set are 60% and 40%, respectively. The FPRs 
and DRs of four base feature selecting classifiers are shown in Table 7.1. Here the goal is 
to classify a future network traffic data x into normal activity if 
),,,|(),,,|( 4321243211 hhhhlPhhhhlP > , else into attack category. Now assume a traffic 
data passes through these 4 base classifiers. The first, second and fourth classifiers 
identify it as a normal usage, however the third one recognizes it as an attack. Then, 
1944.0)1.01(3.0)1.01()2.01()|()|,,,(
4
1
1114321 =−⋅⋅−⋅−==∏=j j loPlhhhhP     (7.4) 
006.0)9.01(5.0)6.01()7.01()|()|,,,(
4
1
2224321 =−⋅⋅−⋅−==∏=j j loPlhhhhP     (7.5) 
11904.04.0006.06.01944.0
)()|,,,(),,,(
2
1
43214321
=⋅+⋅=
= ∑
=i ii
lPlhhhhPhhhhP         (7.6) 
Table 7.1. Intrusion Detection Accuracies of Four Base Feature Selecting Classifiers 
 Classifier 1 Classifier 2 Classifier 3 Classifier 4 
FPR 20% 10% 30% 10% 
DR 70% 60% 50% 90% 
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Hence, the joint posterior probabilities of ),,,|( 43211 hhhhlP  and ),,,|( 43212 hhhhlP  
based on the above calculation and the prior probabilities of normal activities and attacks 
are 
9798.0
11904.0
6.01944.0
),,,(
)()|,,,(),,,|(
4321
114321
43211 =⋅== hhhhP
lPlhhhhPhhhhlP      (7.7) 
0202.0
11904.0
4.0006.0
),,,(
)()|,,,(),,,|(
4321
224321
43212 =⋅== hhhhP
lPlhhhhPhhhhlP      (7.8) 
We have 97.98% degree of confidence that the incoming traffic data x belongs to class l1 
which is greater than that of class l2. We therefore conclude x is a normal computer user 
activity. 
B. Data Mining Classifier 
Having finished the process of ensemble classification, another important concern is the 
problem of false alarm rate. Due to the entire scope of both normal and attack behavior is 
covered during the training procedure, much study has shown that one of the most 
common problems of anomaly intrusion detection is too many false alarms might happen 
likely resulted from normal behavior. Hence, we suggest a two levels model that 
combines parallel and serial ensemble topologies together for getting a better quality of 
detection. In the second level data mining classifier, we utilize data mining technique to 
construct a filter to eliminate false alarms.  
Data mining technique provides strategy to find useful information from large amount of 
data and induce inferences from those information. Here, we use C4.5 decision trees 
algorithm to extract patterns from training data. The goal is to find rules that represent 
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normal behavior of network traffic stream for our intrusion detection task. In this way, we 
can write decision rules as follows. 
Rule: IF conditions of features THEN the traffic is a normal behavior 
In each rule, the antecedent part consists of a number of conditions that are satisfied by 
the features. The consequent action of that rule is defined as the analyzed network traffic 
data is a normal behavior. 
The data mining classifier compares the result of first level ensemble classifier with those 
well defined normal patterns, and the normal computer user activity to the system can be 
identified if the data is matched with one of these defined patterns. The data mining 
classifier has a higher priority to determine a traffic data is whether a normal behavior or 
not if it has a disagreement with the result of ensemble classifier. 
7.2 Experimental Results  
 Continuing on the experiments of Chapters V and VI, we perform experiments over the 
KDD99 data set. As shown in the previous section, we propose a two levels model, 
ensemble feature selecting classifier and data mining classifier, to classify network traffic 
into normal and malicious activities. In the experiments, we first implement the data 
mining classifier which uses C4.5 decision trees algorithm to extract rules from the 
training set. 
Next, we implement the ensemble feature selecting classifier, which is constructed by 
four individual base classifiers and each models the system behavior from a single aspect 
of view point. By varying the feature subsets and maximizing the disagreement among 
four base classifiers, we use four distinct feature representations from the original feature 
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space, they are our feature selection result, the 9 basic features, the 13 content features, 
and the 19 traffic features. For each base classifier, fuzzy belief k-NN algorithm is used. 
Using the same experimental setup in Section 6.2, the experiments are performed on the 
binary (normal/attack) classification and 10 trials are performed for each k nearest 
neighbor experiment. For detecting U2R attacks, the training and testing sets include 930 
(878 normal and 52 U2R) and 694 (479 normal and 215 U2R) connections, respectively. 
For detecting R2L attacks, the training and testing sets include 977 (878 normal and 99 
R2L) and 770 (479 normal and 291 R2L) connections, respectively. The results of our 
experiments are summarized in Tables 7.2 and 7.3 for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data 
sets, respectively. For each of them, the tables show the averaged FPR, DR, and CR on 
the test sets of four base classifiers trained using full feature set and four diverse feature 
subsets. The averaged accuracies are reported with k ranging from 1 to 10 where the 
classification algorithm is run 10 times for each k. 
Table 7.2. DRs of Classifiers Performed on Normal-U2R Data Set 
Full Set Ours Basic  Content  Traffic 
Classifier 
FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR 
k-NN 0.20 12.87 2.55 18.03 6.33 19.98 0.09 18.57 1.06 15.12 
Fuzzy k-NN 0.27 15.49 2.50 18.47 5.94 26.40 0.09 26.40 0.99 15.85 
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN 0.31 16.87 2.65 19.64 7.16 28.74 0.12 20.24 1.13 15.80 
Fuzzy Belief k-NN 13.71 98.16 9.54 83.86 9.48 59.01 11.38 74.42 39.74 54.26 
 
Table 7.3. DRs of Classifiers Performed on Normal-R2L Data Set 
Full Set Ours Basic  Content  Traffic 
Classifier 
FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR FPR DR 
k-NN 0.36 18.91 3.68 20.41 8.11 17.14 0.24 22.62 1.43 28.71 
Fuzzy k-NN 0.33 20.92 19.30 23.58 21.48 24.39 0.25 24.39 1.41 28.80 
Evidence-Theoretic k-NN 0.39 21.50 8.76 26.33 10.73 20.40 0.27 26.65 1.52 29.60 
Fuzzy Belief k-NN 11.58 67.88 9.86 69.82 9.70 60.66 11.43 53.07 19.65 51.66 
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The results show that three classifiers, k-NN, fuzzy k-NN and evidence-theoretic k-NN 
classifiers, performed in different feature sets have similar detection performances using 
either full feature set or one of feature subsets, which all of them have poor detection 
performances. In rows 1 to 3 of Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the maximum DRs are 28.74% and 
29.60% for Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. These three classifiers 
have low FPRs because they treat most network traffic data as normal connections no 
matter these connections are normal or malicious activities. With our proposed fuzzy 
belief k-NN classifier, we achieve higher averaged accuracies in comparison with the 
outcomes of the other three k-NN based classifiers. Especially in the Normal-R2L data 
set, we get the highest classification accuracy by using 7 out of 41 features, which is 
better than that of using full feature set. 
Having built individual base feature selecting base classifiers, we then proceed to 
generate the ensemble one by fusing the outputs of base classifiers together. In addition, 
we utilize data mining technique to look for patterns of normal activities in training set 
and then to produce a set of ten decision rules which cover 95% of normal behavior. With 
the combination of ensemble feature selecting classifier and data mining classifier, the 
final intrusion detection model is thus obtained. Figures 7.2 and 7.3 show the 
comparisons between fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set and ensemble 
intrusion detection model. Table 7.4 shows the decision rules.  
With our proposed ensemble model, we achieve 95.45% and 87.33% averaged CRs for 
Normal-U2R and Normal-R2L data sets, respectively, which are higher than 89.97% and 
80.66% of the single fuzzy belief k-NN classifier using full feature set. As shown in the 
ROC graphs, all the points of ensemble model are much closer to point (0, 1) than those 
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of classifier using full feature set, which indicate the ensemble model not only has a high 
DR but also has a low FPR. To show the performance of ensemble model for specific 
intrusions, Table 7.5 describes the detailed DRs. The result shows that our model is 
capable of detecting most of the intrusions, especially 7 intrusions (loadmodule, perl, 
sqlattack, imap, worm, xlock, and xsnoop) are detected perfectly. In addition, we test the 
detection time on each testing connection and illustrate the result in Figure 7.4. The 
results show that we successfully reduce the detection time which our ensemble model 
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Figure 7.2. CRs (left) and ROC Graph (right) of Normal-U2R Data Set with  
k Ranging From 1 to 10 
x: Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Full Feature Set 
•: Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model 
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Figure 7.3. CRs (left) and ROC Graph (right) of Normal-R2L Data Set with  
k Ranging From 1 to 10 
x: Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Using Full Feature Set 
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only needs 0.44 and 0.41 of that of classifier using full feature set in Normal-U2R and 
Normal-R2L data sets, respectively. The results have been published in [86]. 
Table 7.4. Decision Rules 
Rule 1 Rule 2 Rule 3 
IF wrong_fragment < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service = http 
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = smtp  
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate >= 1 AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    service  = 20 AND 
    diff_srv_rate  < 0.01 AND 
    flag = REJ 
THEN normal connection 
Rule 4 Rule 5 Rule 6 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = udp AND 
    dst_host_rerror_rate < 0.01 AND 
    diff_srv_rate  < 0.01 AND 
    src_bytes >= 30 AND 
    src_bytes < 158  
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = udp AND 
    dst_host_rerror_rate < 0.01 AND 
    diff_srv_rate  >= 0.5  
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = 17 AND 
    dst_bytes < 29 AND 
    duration < 1 AND 
    src_bytes >= 5 AND 
    src_bytes < 30  
THEN normal connection 
Rule 7 Rule 8 Rule 9 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = ftp_data AND 
    dst_bytes < 29 AND 
    duration < 1 AND 
    src_bytes >= 32 AND 
    src_bytes < 246  
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = ftp_data AND 
    dst_bytes < 29 AND 
    duration < 1 AND 
    src_bytes >= 248 AND 
    src_bytes < 334  
THEN normal connection 
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = ftp_data AND 
    dst_bytes < 29 AND 
    duration < 1 AND 
    src_bytes >= 335 AND 
    src_bytes < 644  
THEN normal connection 
Rule 10   
IF wrong_fragment  < 3 AND 
    num_compromised < 1 AND  
    srv_serror_rate  < 0.06 AND 
    rerror_rate < 0.06 AND 
    flag = SF AND 
    hot < 1 AND 
    protocol_type = tcp AND 
    service  = ftp_data AND 
    dst_bytes < 29 AND 
    duration < 1 AND 
    src_bytes >= 726  
THEN normal connection 
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Table 7.5. Detection Performances of Ensemble Model 
Normal-U2R  Normal-R2L  
FPR 3.13 FPR 3.15 
DR 92.30 DR 71.66 
buffer_overflow
loadmodule
perl 
rootkit 
httptunnel 
ps
sqlattack 
xterm
97.00
100.00
100.00
50.77
98.92
77.19
100.00
67.08
ftp_write 
guess_passwd
imap
multihop 
phf
warezmaster
named
sendmail
snmpgetattack
snmpguess
worm
xlock 
xsnoop
93.75 
97.96 
100.00 
92.96 
0.00 
74.61 
77.40 
57.58 
0.00 
1.15 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
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Figure 7.4. Detection Time on One Connection  
(a) Full Feature Set 
(b) Ensemble Model in Normal-U2R set  
(c) Ensemble Model in Normal-R2L set  
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This research presents a solution to the problem of quickly and accurately detecting 
computer intrusions from network traffic data. The goal of our work has been set to 
detect attacks that attackers use illegal approaches to gain access to the target host and 
thus further to exploit the system’s vulnerabilities. The proposed solution includes three 
major parts. They are feature selection algorithm, fuzzy belief machine learning 
algorithm, and ensemble intrusion detection model.  
8.1 Feature Selection Algorithm  
 The first question in intrusion detection design is what features of a network traffic 
should be used to build the model. We start with our research on studying this problem 
and developing a correlation-based feature selection algorithm to select a set of most 
significant features that reserve vital information of traffic data. For evaluating the 
performance of our algorithm, six small and four large databases are used. We observe 
that the classification accuracy is improved by using our selected features from the 
original feature set, e.g., the CR of the abalone set performing on C4.5 algorithm with 2 
out of 8 features, the DR of Normal-DoS set performing on Naive Bayes algorithm with 
12 out of 41 features, and the DR of Normal-R2L set performing on C4.5 algorithm with 
7 out of 41 features. We also observe that our algorithm has a superior performance 
compared with that of two participating correlation-based feature selection algorithms, 
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CFS and FCBF, in both small and large data sets. Especially in the Normal-U2R and 
Normal-R2L data sets, CFS can detect none of the attacks and FCBF can only detect 
around 7% and 30% of U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. On the other hand, the 
detection performance of our selected features is close to that of using full feature set. 
The result shows that our algorithm approach can be a practical feature selector to select 
informative features from data sets for classification tasks. 
8.2 Fuzzy Belief Machine Learning Algorithm  
We study the problems of uncertainty and ambiguity in audit network traffic data. The 
key idea is to imitate ambiguous of users’ activities by fuzzy clustering technique, and to 
simulate uncertainty caused by limited information by incorporating only a small amount 
of network traffic data for analysis. With the use of Dempster-Shafer theory, we identify 
future network traffic by fusing evidences found in clustering development. Also, we 
employ k-NN technique to speed up the detection process. The experimental result shows 
that our approach is capable of detecting U2R attacks with an averaged DR of 98.16% 
using the full feature space. While detecting R2L attacks, we achieve an averaged DR of 
67.88%. Compared with the past research results [6]-[12] having very low DRs, we 
successfully improve the detection on those two attacks that contain degrees of 
ambiguous information. However, we do have relatively high false alarm rates of 13.71% 
and 11.58% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. That is the stimulus that we 
incorporate data mining technique in the ensemble model, which we hope to further 
reduce the number of false alarms.  
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8.3 Ensemble Intrusion Detection Model  
Having finished the development of feature selection and fuzzy belief machine learning 
algorithms, we then integrate them together to check whether our selected feature set is 
feasible to be applied to our developed detection method or not. The experimental result 
shows a DR of 83.86% is achieved in detecting U2R attacks, which drops a lot compared 
with the rate of using full feature set. It indicates that five features selected from the 
training set are not sufficient to cover all the attacks information that appears in the 
testing set. On the other hand, we get a DR of 69.82% in detecting R2L attacks by using 
only seven features, which is higher than that of full feature set. Also, the false alarm 
rates are reduced to 9.54% and 9.86% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively.  
For further improving the detection performance, we propose an ensemble intrusion 
detection model that consists of a set of feature selecting base fuzzy belief classifiers and 
a data mining classifier. The basic idea is using ensemble feature selection technique to 
promote the DR and data mining technique to reduce the number of false alarms. It is a 
combination of both anomaly detection and misuse detection. With our proposed 
ensemble model, we achieve 92.30% and 71.66% averaged DRs and 3.13% and 3.15% 
averaged false alarm rates in detecting U2R and R2L attacks, respectively. The false 
alarm rate is significant improved from around 10% to 3%. As for the CRs, the averaged 
rates are 95.45% and 87.33% for U2R and R2L attacks, respectively, which are higher 
than 89.97% and 80.66% if a single fuzzy belief machine learning algorithm with full 
feature set is used. This indicates that the detection performance is successfully improved 
through our proposed ensemble intrusion detection model. 
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8.4 Future Work  
Up to now, this dissertation has developed an intrusion detection system based on 
ensemble of multiple base classifiers. However, there are several topics that deserve to be 
future studied. 
• False alarms: In the design of an intrusion detection system, not only a high DR is 
necessary but also a low false alarms rate is required. Though it is not easy to control 
the false alarm rate because many unusual events sometimes are classified to hostile 
activities and most of these unusual events are actually normal behavior. In our 
research, we use data mining technique to extract decision rules from training set and 
achieve about 3% false alarms rate. We believe that this rate can be further reduced in 
the future if a more dedicated rule set can be built.  
• Respond to the intrusions: In our work we focus on developing a detection method 
which can efficiently and effectively differentiate intrusive activities from large 
volume of network events. We believe that the response to the intrusions is also 
equally important. Once an intrusion is happened, it is necessary to properly present 
the alarm in order that system administrator can make proper and prompt decision. In 
a word, to find a method to integrate the intrusion detection system with the intrusion 
response system deserves further research. 
• Feature selection: Feature selection plays an important role on both speed and 
accuracy of intrusion detection. It selects the most informative features that cover 
normal and intrusive activities by analyzing large quantity of network traffic data. In 
this dissertation we have developed a feature selection algorithm based on 
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symmetrical uncertainty measure to remove the worthless information from the 
original high dimensional database. However, we think there are still some issues that 
can be explored in order to get a better performance, e.g., relevant and redundant 
features analysis and discretization methods.  
• Multiple identification ability: The KDD99 data set includes four groups of attacks 
and each uses diverse skill to explore system’s vulnerabilities. In our work we use 
binary classification technique to identify a network event as either normality or 
abnormality. The future research will be directed to upgrade the system with multiple 
identification ability, i.e., the system will be able to classify a network traffic data into 
normal activity or one of four attacks.  
• Real time attack detection: We have made contributions in detecting both U2R and 
R2L attacks off-line in a publicly available intrusion detection database DARPA 
KDD99. However, the database we used is eight years old that is not enough to reflect 
the current status of Internet. In the future, the research can be expanded to the live 
Internet traffic based on our past achievement.  
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APPENDIX 
Matlab Code List of Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classifier Evaluation 
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som_read_data.m 
% Read data from an ascii file 
function sData = som_read_data(filename, varargin) 
error(nargchk(1, 3, nargin)) % check no. of input args is correct 
dont_care = 'NaN';  % default don't care string 
comment_start   = '#';  % the char a SOM_PAK command line starts with 
comp_name_line  = '#n';  % string denoting a special command line, 
% which contains names of each component 
label_name_line = '#l';  % string denoting a special command line, 
% which contains names of each label 
block_size = 1000;  % block size used in file read 
kludge = num2str(realmax, 100);  % used in sscanf                 
% open input file 
fid = fopen(filename); 
if fid < 0 
  error(['Cannot open ' filename]);  
end 
% process input arguments 
if nargin == 2  
  if isstr(varargin{1}) 
    dont_care = varargin{1}; 
  else 
    dim = varargin{1}; 
  end 
elseif nargin == 3 
  dim = varargin{1}; 
  dont_care = varargin{2}; 
end 
 % if the data dimension is not specified, find out what it is 
 if nargin == 1 | (nargin == 2 & isstr(varargin{1})) 
   fpos1 = ftell(fid); c1 = 0;   % read first non-comment line 
  while c1 == 0, 
    line1 = strrep(fgetl(fid), dont_care, kludge); 
    [l1, c1] = sscanf(line1, '%f '); 
  end 
  fpos2 = ftell(fid); c2 = 0;   % read second non-comment line 
  while c2 == 0, 
    line2 = strrep(fgetl(fid), dont_care, kludge); 
    [l2, c2] = sscanf(line2, '%f '); 
  end 
  if (c1 == 1 & c2 ~= 1) | (c1 == c2 & c1 == 1 & l1 == 1) 
    dim = l1; 
    fseek(fid, fpos2, -1); 
  elseif (c1 == c2) 
    dim = c1; 
    fseek(fid, fpos1, -1); 
    warning on 
    warning(['Automatically determined data dimension is ' num2str(dim) '. Is it correct?']);  
  else 
    error(['Invalid header line: ' line1]); 
  end 
end  
% check the dimension is valid 
if dim < 1 | dim ~= round(dim)  
 110 
  error(['Illegal data dimension: ' num2str(dim)]); 
end 
% read data 
sData = som_data_struct(zeros(1, dim), 'name', filename);  
lnum = 0;   % data vector counter 
data_temp = zeros(block_size, dim); 
labs_temp = cell(block_size, 1); 
comp_names = sData.comp_names; 
label_names = sData.label_names; 
form = [repmat('%g',[1 dim-1]) '%g%[^ \t]']; 
limit = block_size; 
while 1, 
  li = fgetl(fid);   % read next line 
  if ~isstr(li), break, end;   % is this the end of file?  
  % all missing vectors are replaced by value realmax because 
  % sscanf is not able to read NaNs   
  li = strrep(li, dont_care, kludge);      
  [data, c, err, n] = sscanf(li, form); 
  if c < dim   % if there were less numbers than dim on the input file line 
    if c == 0 
      if strncmp(li, comp_name_line, 2)   % component name line? 
    li = strrep(li(3:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; c = 1; 
    while c 
      [s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]'); 
      if ~isempty(s), i = i + 1; comp_names{i} = s; li = li(n:end); end 
    end 
    if i ~= dim  
      error(['Illegal number of component names: ' num2str(i) ... 
                ' (dimension is ' num2str(dim) ')']);  
    end 
      elseif strncmp(li, label_name_line, 2)   % label name line? 
    li = strrep(li(3:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; c = 1; 
    while c 
      [s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]'); 
      if ~isempty(s), i = i + 1; label_names{i} = s; li = li(n:end); end 
    end 
      elseif ~strncmp(li, comment_start, 1)   % not a comment, is it error? 
    [s, c, e, n] = sscanf(li, '%s%[^ \t]'); 
    if c 
      error(['Invalid vector on input file data line ' ... 
         num2str(lnum+1) ': [' deblank(li) ']']), 
    end 
      end 
    else 
      error(['Only ' num2str(c) ' vector components on input file data line ' ... 
         num2str(lnum+1) ' (dimension is ' num2str(dim) ')']); 
    end 
  else 
    lnum = lnum + 1;   % this was a line containing data vector 
    data_temp(lnum, 1:dim) = data';   % add data to struct 
    if lnum == limit   % reserve more memory if necessary 
      data_temp(lnum+1:lnum+block_size, 1:dim) = zeros(block_size, dim); 
      [dummy nl] = size(labs_temp); 
      labs_temp(lnum+1:lnum+block_size,1:nl) = cell(block_size, nl); 
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      limit = limit + block_size; 
    end 
    % read labels 
    if n < length(li) 
      li = strrep(li(n:end), kludge, dont_care); i = 0; n = 1; c = 1; 
      while c 
    [s, c, e, n_new] = sscanf(li(n:end), '%s%[^ \t]'); 
    if c, i = i + 1; labs_temp{lnum, i} = s; n = n + n_new - 1; end 
      end 
    end 
  end 
end 
% close input file 
if fclose(fid) < 0, error(['Cannot close file ' filename]); 
else fprintf(2, '\rdata read ok\n'); end 
% set values 
data_temp(data_temp == realmax) = NaN; 
sData.data        = data_temp(1:lnum,:); 
sData.labels      = labs_temp(1:lnum,:); 
sData.comp_names  = comp_names; 
sData.label_names = label_names; 
return; 
 
dataprocess.m 
% Separate data to normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l categories 
function [all_normal_data, all_normal_labels, ... 
 all_dos_data, all_dos_labels, ... 
 all_probe_data, all_probe_labels, ... 
 all_u2r_data, all_u2r_labels, ... 
 all_r2l_data, all_r2l_labels] = dataprocess(data, labels) 
% label has three groups 
% type: different attacks 
% category: 0:normal, 1:dos, 2:probe, 3:r2l ,4:u2r 
% binary -- 0:normal, 1:attack 
% find records in each category from set 
normal = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '0')); 
dos = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '1')); 
probe = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '2')); 
u2r = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '4')); 
r2l = find(strcmp(labels(:,2), '3')); 
% all records in each category -- data 
all_normal_data = data(normal(1:size(normal)),:); 
all_dos_data = data(dos(1:size(dos)),:); 
all_probe_data = data(probe(1:size(probe)),:); 
all_u2r_data = data(u2r(1:size(u2r)),:); 
all_r2l_data = data(r2l(1:size(r2l)),:); 
% all records in each category -- label 
all_normal_labels = labels(normal(1:size(normal)),:); 
all_dos_labels = labels(dos(1:size(dos)),:); 
all_probe_labels = labels(probe(1:size(probe)),:); 
all_u2r_labels = labels(u2r(1:size(u2r)),:); 
all_r2l_labels = labels(r2l(1:size(r2l)),:); 
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transfer.m 
% Randomly select records for normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l category  
function [transfer_data,transfer_labels,left_data,left_labels] = transfer(A,B,fetch_number) 
% A, B: original data set 
% fetch_number: number of select records  
FETCH = zeros(1,fetch_number); 
zero_array = find(FETCH==0); 
while ~isempty(zero_array) 
  rand('state', sum(100*clock));   
  a = ceil(rand(1)*size(A,1)); 
  origial_array = find(FETCH==a); 
  while ~isempty(origial_array) 
      a = ceil(rand(1)*size(A,1)); 
      origial_array = find(FETCH==a); 
  end 
  FETCH(zero_array(1)) = a; 
  zero_array = find(FETCH==0); 
end 
transfer_data = A(FETCH,:); 
transfer_labels = B(FETCH,:); 
index_A = 1:size(A,1); 
index_B = 1:size(B,1); 
left_data = A(setdiff(index_A,FETCH),:); 
left_labels = B(setdiff(index_B,FETCH),:); 
  
clust_normalize.m 
% Normalization of features  
function data=clust_normalize(data,method); 
% method can be 'var'or 'range' 
%   'var'      Variance is normalized to one (linear operation). 
%   'range'  Values are normalized between [0,1] (linear operation). 
data.Xold=data.X; 
if strcmp(method,'range') 
     data.min=min(data.X); 
     data.max=max(data.X); 
     array = (repmat(max(data.X),... 
     size(data.X,1),1)-repmat(min(data.X),size(data.X,1),1)); 
     index = find(array==0); 
     array(index) = 1; 
     data.X=(data.X-repmat(min(data.X),size(data.X,1),1))./array; 
elseif strcmp(method,'var') 
   array = (repmat(std(data.X),size(data.X,1),1));   
   index = find(array==0); 
   array(index) = 1;      
   data.X=(data.X-repmat(mean(data.X),size(data.X,1),1))./array; 
   data.mean=mean(data.X); 
   data.std=std(data.X); 
else 
     error('Unknown method given') 
end 
 
fselection.m 
% Feature selection 
function [traindata, testdata] = fs(data1, data2, f_s, w) 
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% f_s = 1: yes 
% w: feature set 
j = 1; 
if f_s 
   for i = 1:41 
       if w(i) ~= 0  
            traindata(:,j) = w(i).*data1(:,i); 
            testdata(:,j) = w(i).*data2(:,i); 
            j = j + 1; 
       end 
   end 
else 
    traindata = data1; 
    testdata = data2; 
end 
 
celltonum.m 
% Convert cell to number 
function [train_labels_num, test_labels_num] = celltonum(train_labels, test_labels) 
train_labels_num = zeros(size(train_labels,1),size(train_labels,2)); 
for i=1:1:size(train_labels,1) 
    for j=1:1:size(train_labels,2) 
        temp = cell2mat(train_labels(i,j)); 
        train_labels_num(i,j) = str2num(temp); 
    end 
end 
% to add 1 because the class of fknn needs to start from 1, but the class 
% label of train.labels starts from 0. same as test.labels 
train_labels_num = train_labels_num+1; 
test_labels_num = zeros(size(test_labels,1),size(test_labels,2)); 
for i=1:1:size(test_labels,1) 
    for j=1:1:size(test_labels,2) 
        temp = cell2mat(test_labels(i,j)); 
        test_labels_num(i,j) = str2num(temp); 
    end 
end 
test_labels_num = test_labels_num+1; 
 
fcm_order_binary.m 
% For FCM to find clustering order (final_perms) 
function [finalperms, fcm_labels] = fcm_order_binary(U, labels) 
% permutation (all combinations) of classes 
class = cell([2,1]); 
class{1}='0'; 
class{2}='1'; 
fcmcluster = perms(class); 
temp_current_no = 0; 
final_perms = 0; % 1xN where N = no of class, e.g. 0 1 
correct_no = 0; 
for (j = 1:1:size(fcmcluster,1)) 
     temp_perms = fcmcluster(j,:);  
     for (i=1:1:size(U,2)) 
          maxU = max(U(:,i)); 
          temp = U(:,i); 
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          index = find(temp == maxU); 
          temp_fcmlabels(i) = temp_perms(index); 
     end 
     temp_correct = find(strcmp(temp_fcmlabels(:),labels(:,2))); 
     temp_correct_no = length(temp_correct); 
     if temp_correct_no > correct_no 
        correct_no = temp_correct_no; 
        final_perms = temp_perms; 
        fcmlabels = temp_fcmlabels; 
     end     
end      
for i = 1:1:size(final_perms,2) 
    temp = cell2mat(final_perms(i)); 
    finalperms(i) = str2num(temp)+1; 
end 
for i = 1:1:size(fcmlabels,2) 
    temp = cell2mat(fcmlabels(i)); 
    fcm_labels(i) = str2num(temp)+1; 
end 
 
fknn.m 
% Fuzzy k-nearest neighbor classification algorithm 
function [predicted,memberships, numhits] = fknn(data, labels, test, ... 
                testlabels, k_values, info, fuzzy) 
if nargin<7 
    fuzzy = true; 
end 
num_train = size(data,1); 
num_test  = size(test,1); 
% scaling factor for fuzzy weights. see [1] for details 
m = 2; 
% convert class labels to unary membership vectors (of 1s and 0s) 
max_class = max(labels); %original 
temp = zeros(length(labels),max_class); 
for i=1:num_train 
    temp(i,:) = [zeros(1, labels(i)-1) 1 zeros(1,max_class - labels(i))]; 
end 
labels = temp; 
clear temp; 
% allocate space for storing predicted labels  
predicted = zeros(num_test, length(k_values)); 
% allocate space for 'numhits'. This will only be used if 'testlabels' is provided 
numhits = zeros(length(k_values),1); 
% will the memberships be stored? if yes, allocate space 
store_memberships = false; 
if nargout > 1, 
    store_memberships=true; 
    memberships = zeros(num_test, max_class, length(k_values)); 
end 
% BEGIN kNN 
% for each test point, do: 
t0=clock; 
tstart = t0; 
for i=1:num_test 
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    distances = (repmat(test(i,:), num_train,1) - data).^2; 
    % for efficiency, no need to take sqrt since it is a non-decreasing function 
    if size(distances,2) ~= 1 % add   
        distances = sum(distances');  
    else %add 
        distances = distances'; % add 
    end % add    
    % sort the distances 
    [junk, indeces] = sort(distances); 
    for k=1:length(k_values) 
    neighbor_index = indeces(1:k_values(k)); 
    weight = ones(1,length(neighbor_index)); 
    if fuzzy,  
        % originally, this weight calculation should be:  
        % weight = distances(neighbor_index).^(-2/(m-1)); 
        % but since we didn't take sqrt above and the inverse 2th power 
        % the weights are:  
        % weight = sqrt(distances(neighbor_index)).^(-2/(m-1)); 
        % which is equaliavent to: 
        weight = distances(neighbor_index).^(-1/(m-1)); 
        % set the Inf (infite) weights, if there are any, to  1. 
        if max(isinf(weight)) 
        warning(['Some of the weights are Inf for sample: ' ... 
            num2str(i) '. These weights are set to 1.']); 
        weight(isinf(weight))=1; 
        end 
    end 
    test_out = weight*labels(neighbor_index,:)/(sum(weight)); 
    if store_memberships, memberships(i,:,k) = test_out; end; 
    % find predicted class (the one with the max. fuzzy vote) 
    [junk, index_of_max] = max(test_out'); 
    predicted(i,k) = index_of_max; 
    % compute current hit rate, if test labels are given 
    if ~isempty(testlabels) && predicted(i,k)==testlabels(i) 
        numhits(k) = numhits(k)+1; 
    end 
    end 
    % print info 
    if mod(i,info)==0 
    elapsed = etime(clock, t0); 
    fprintf(1,['%dth sample done.  Elapsed (from previous info): %.2f' ... 
                   ' sn.  Estimated left: %.2f sn.\n\tHit rate(s) so far:   '], ... 
        i, elapsed, etime(clock, tstart)*((num_test-i)/i) ); 
    for k=1:length(k_values) 
        fprintf(1,'%3d: %.3f\t',k_values(k), 100*numhits(k)/i); 
    end 
    fprintf(1,'\n'); 
    t0=clock; % start timer again 
    end 
end 
 
knndsinit.m 
% Initialise parameter gamma and alpha of the BPA  
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm 
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% Last browsed in December 2007 
function [gamm,alpha] = knndsinit1(x,S); 
 [Napp,nent]=size(x); 
M=max(S); 
for i=1:M, 
  ii=find(S==i);Nii=length(ii); 
  D=zeros(1,Nii); 
  for j=1:Nii 
   D(1,j) = D(1,j) + sum(sqrt(sum(((ones(Nii,1)*x(ii(j),:))-x(ii,:))'.^2)')'); 
  end; 
Dm(i) = sum(D)/(Nii*Nii - Nii); 
end; 
gamm = ones(1,M) ./ Dm; 
gamm=gamm'; 
alpha=.95; 
 
knndsval.m 
% K-nearest neighbour classification rule based on Dempster-Shafer theory 
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm 
% Last browsed in December 2007 
function [m,L] = knndsval(xapp,Sapp,K,gamm,alpha,loo,xtst); 
 [Napp,nent]=size(xapp); 
M=max(Sapp); % original 
if loo, 
   xtst=xapp; 
end; 
 [Ntst,nent]=size(xtst); 
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbors in the training set 
  dst=[];ist=[]; 
  for i = 1:Ntst, 
    if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add   
        dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';  
    else % add 
        dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; %add 
    end % add    
    [dss,iss]=sort(dist); 
    dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN  where M=k, N=number of testing records 
         % each testing record has M nearest neighbors  
    ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN   
      % each testing record has M nearest training record number  
  end; 
% Computation of the BPA 
m = classdstst(alpha,gamm,xtst,dst,ist,Sapp,K);  
[temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)'); 
L=L'; 
function m = classdstst(alpha,gamm,xtst,ds,is,Sapp,K); 
N= max(size(xtst)); 
M=max(Sapp); % original 
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];  
cppv=zeros(N,1); 
for i=1:N, 
   for j=1:K, 
     m1 = zeros(M+1,1); 
     m1(Sapp(is(j,i))) = alpha*exp(-gamm(Sapp(is(j,i))).^2*ds(j,i)); 
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     m1(M+1) = 1 - m1(Sapp(is(j,i))); 
     m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i) + m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1); 
     m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i);     
  end; 
end; 
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m)); 
m=m'; 
 
myknn_binary.m 
% Fuzzy Belief k-NN Classification Algorithm 
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm 
% Last browsed in December 2007 
function [m,L1] = myknn(xapp,Sapp,K,U,loo,xtst,finalperms); 
 [Napp,nent]=size(xapp); 
if loo, 
   xtst=xapp; 
end; 
 [Ntst,nent]=size(xtst); 
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbours in the training set 
  dst=[];ist=[]; 
  for i = 1:Ntst, 
    if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add   
        dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';  
    else % add 
        dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; %add 
    end % add     
    [dss,iss]=sort(dist); 
    dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN  where M=k, N=number of testing records 
         % each testing record has M nearest neighbors  
    ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN   
      % each testing record has M nearest training record number  
  end; 
N= max(size(xtst)); 
% M=max(Sapp); 
M=2; % binay classification 
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];  
cppv=zeros(N,1); 
% distance weighted 
dw(K,N) = 0; 
for i = 1:N 
    for j = 1:K 
        if dst(j,i) == max(dst(:,i)) 
            dw(j,i) = 1; 
        else 
            dw(j,i) = (max(dst(:,i))-dst(j,i))/(max(dst(:,i))-min(dst(:,i))); 
        end 
    end 
end 
for i=1:N 
    num=ones(M+1,1); 
    for j=1:K 
           m1 = zeros(M+1,1); 
           m1(1:M) = U(1:M,ist(j,i))*dw(j,i);  
           m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1); 
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           m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1); 
           m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i); 
    end 
end 
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:); 
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m)); 
m=m'; 
 [temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)'); 
L=L'; 
L1=zeros(size(L,1),1); 
for i = 1:1:size(L,1) 
    if L(i)==1 
        L1(i)=finalperms(1); 
    elseif L(i)==2 
        L1(i)=finalperms(2); 
    end 
end 
 
weight.m 
% Weighting for myknn_binary_w.m 
function w = weight(data,labels,m) 
for i=1:size(data,1) 
    if labels(i,2) == 1 
       S(i,1) = 1; 
       S(i,2) = 0; 
    else 
       S(i,1) = 0; 
       S(i,2) = 1; 
    end 
end 
w = ones(size(data,1),3); 
for i = 1:size(data,1)-1 
    w(i,1:2) = 2*(m(i,1:2).*w(i,1:2)-S(i,1:2)).*m(i,1:2); 
    w(i+1,1:2) = w(i+1,1:2)+0.1*w(i,1:2); 
end 
w = w(size(w,1),:); 
 
myknn_binary_w.m 
% weighted fb_knn 
% Modifiy from Thierry Denoeux, http://www.hds.utc.fr/~tdenoeux/software.htm 
% Last browsed in December 2007 
function [m,L1] = myknn(xapp,Sapp,K,U,loo,xtst,finalperms,w); 
 [Napp,nent]=size(xapp); 
if loo, 
   xtst=xapp; 
end; 
 [Ntst,nent]=size(xtst); 
% Computation of the K-nearest neighbours in the training set 
 dst=[];ist=[]; 
  for i = 1:Ntst, 
    if size(xapp,2) ~= 1 % add   
        dist=sum(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)';  
    else % add 
        dist=(((ones(Napp,1)*xtst(i,:))-xapp)'.^2)'; % add 
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    end % add   
    [dss,iss]=sort(dist); 
    dst = [dst dss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % distance matrix: MxN  where M=k, N=number of testing records 
                    % each testing record has M nearest neighbors  
    ist = [ist iss(1+loo:K+loo)]; % index matrix: MxN   
               % each testing record has M nearest training record number  
  end; 
N= max(size(xtst)); 
M=2; % binay classification 
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];  
cppv=zeros(N,1); 
% distance weighted 
dw(K,N) = 0; 
for i = 1:N 
    for j = 1:K 
        if dst(j,i) == max(dst(:,i)) 
            dw(j,i) = 1; 
        else 
            dw(j,i) = (max(dst(:,i))-dst(j,i))/(max(dst(:,i))-min(dst(:,i))); 
        end 
    end 
end 
for i=1:N 
    num=ones(M+1,1); 
    for j=1:K 
           m1 = zeros(M+1,1); 
           m1(1:M) = U(1:M,ist(j,i))*dw(j,i);  
           m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1); 
           m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M).*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i).*m1(M+1); 
           m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i); 
     end 
end 
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:); 
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m)); 
m=m'; 
for i=1:N 
    m(i,1:M+1)=m(i,1:M+1).*w; 
end 
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:); 
 [temp,L]=max(m(:,1:M)'); 
L=L'; 
L1=zeros(size(L,1),1); 
for i = 1:1:size(L,1) 
    if L(i)==1 
        L1(i)=finalperms(1); 
    elseif L(i)==2 
        L1(i)=finalperms(2); 
    end 
end 
 
accuracy_binary.m 
% Detection performance 
function [correct_normal_rate, correct_attack_rate] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(labels_num, predicted, normal_record_no, attack_record_no, attack_index, attack_label) 
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% normal 
correct_normal = find(labels_num(:,2)==1 & predicted(:)==1); 
correct_normal_no = length(correct_normal); 
correct_normal_rate = correct_normal_no / normal_record_no; 
n_a = find(labels_num(:,2)==1 & predicted(:)==attack_label); 
n_a_no = length(n_a); 
% attack 
correct_attack = find(labels_num(:,2)==attack_index & predicted(:)==attack_label); 
correct_attack_no = length(correct_attack); 
correct_attack_rate = correct_attack_no / attack_record_no; 
a_n = find(labels_num(:,2)==attack_index & predicted(:)==1); 
a_n_no = length(a_n); 
fprintf('\n');  
 
ensemble_mv.m 
% Ensemble using majority voting 
function [e_result, predict] = ensemble_mv(A_predicted, B_predicted, C_predicted, test_label) 
predict = [A_predicted B_predicted C_predicted test_label(:,3)]; 
e_result = zeros(size(A_predicted)); 
for i=1:size(e_result) 
    if predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 1  
       e_result(i) = 1; 
    elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 2  
       e_result(i) = 2; 
    elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 2  
       e_result(i) = 1; 
    elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 1  
       e_result(i) = 1; 
    elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 1  
       e_result(i) = 1;        
    elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 1  
       e_result(i) = 2;     
    elseif predict(i,1) == 2 && predict(i,2) == 1 && predict(i,3) == 2  
       e_result(i) = 2; 
    elseif predict(i,1) == 1 && predict(i,2) == 2 && predict(i,3) == 2  
       e_result(i) = 2; 
    end 
end 
predict = [predict e_result]; 
 
ensemble_avg.m 
% Selects average value of the combined classifiers as the ensemble output 
function [m, e_result, predict] = ensemble_avg(A_memberships, A1, A2, index, ... 
    B_memberships, B1, B2, ... 
    C_memberships, C1, C2, ... 
    D_memberships, D1, D2, ... 
    test_label) 
e_memberships = zeros(size(A_memberships),2); 
e_result = zeros(size(e_memberships),1); 
A_memberships = [A_memberships(:,1) A_memberships(:,2) A_memberships(:,3)]'; 
B_memberships = [B_memberships(:,1) B_memberships(:,2) B_memberships(:,3)]'; 
C_memberships = [C_memberships(:,1) C_memberships(:,2) C_memberships(:,3)]'; 
D_memberships = [D_memberships(:,1) D_memberships(:,2) D_memberships(:,3)]'; 
M=2; 
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N = size(e_result); 
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];  
for i=1:N 
m(1,i) = A_memberships(1,i)*A1+B_memberships(1,i)*B1+… 
   C_memberships(1,i)*C1+D_memberships(1,i)*D1; 
m(2,i) = A_memberships(2,i)*A2+B_memberships(2,i)*B2+… 
   C_memberships(2,i)*C2+D_memberships(2,i)*D2; 
end 
m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m)); 
for i=1:size(e_result) 
    if (m(1,i) - m(2,i)) > 0 
            e_result(i) = 1; 
    else 
            e_result(i) = 2; 
    end 
end 
predict = e_result; 
 
ensemble_m.m 
% Ensemble using Dempster-Shafer theory 
function [m, e_result, predict] = ensemble_m(A_memberships, A_predicted, index, ... 
  B_memberships, B_predicted, ... 
  C_memberships, C_predicted, ... 
  D_memberships, D_predicted, ... 
  test_label) 
predict = [A_predicted B_predicted C_predicted D_predicted test_label(:,3)]; 
e_memberships = zeros(size(A_memberships),2); 
e_result = zeros(size(e_memberships),1); 
A_memberships = [A_memberships(:,1) A_memberships(:,2) A_memberships(:,3)]'; 
B_memberships = [B_memberships(:,1) B_memberships(:,2) B_memberships(:,3)]'; 
C_memberships = [C_memberships(:,1) C_memberships(:,2) C_memberships(:,3)]'; 
D_memberships = [D_memberships(:,1) D_memberships(:,2) D_memberships(:,3)]'; 
M=2; 
N = size(e_result); 
m = [zeros(M,N);ones(1,N)];  
for i=1:N 
    num=ones(M+1,1); 
    for j=1:4 
           m1 = zeros(M+1,1); 
           if j==1 
              m1(1:M) = A_memberships(1:M,i); 
           elseif j==2 
              m1(1:M) = B_memberships(1:M,i); 
           elseif j==3 
              m1(1:M) = C_memberships(1:M,i); 
           elseif j==4 
              m1(1:M) = D_memberships(1:M,i); 
           end   
           m1(M+1) = 1 - sum(m1); 
           m(1:M,i) = m1(1:M).*m(1:M,i)+ m1(1:M)*m(M+1,i) + m(1:M,i)*m1(M+1); 
           m(M+1,i) = m1(M+1) * m(M+1,i); 
     end 
end 
m(3,:) = 1-m(1,:)-m(2,:); 
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m=m./(ones(M+1,1)*sum(m)); 
for i=1:size(e_result) 
    if m(1,i) >= m(2,i) 
       e_result(i) = 1; 
    else 
       e_result(i) = 2; 
    end 
end 
predict = [predict e_result]; 
 
ensemble4.m 
% Ensemble using naive bayes 
function [result] = ensemble4(A1, A2, A_p, B1, B2, B_p, C1, C2, C_p, D1, D2, D_p, P1, P2) 
predict = [A_p B_p C_p D_p]; 
P_1 = zeros(size(A_p)); 
P_2 = zeros(size(A_p)); 
for i = 1:size(A_p) 
    if predict(i,:) == [1 1 1 1]  
           P_1(i) = A1*B1*C1*D1*P1 / (A1*B1*C1*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [2 2 2 2]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + 
A2*B2*C2*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 1 2]  
           P_1(i) = A1*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 2 1]  
           P_1(i) = A1*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / (A1*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*C2*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [1 1 2 2]  
           P_1(i) = A1*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*(1-B2)*C2*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [1 2 1 1]  
           P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [1 2 1 2]  
           P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*(1-C2)*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [1 2 2 1]  
           P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*C2*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,1) == [1 2 2 2]  
           P_1(i) = A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / (A1*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + (1-A2)*B2*C2*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 1 1]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*C1*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*C1*D1*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 1 2]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*(1-C2)*D2*P2);            
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 2 1]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*C2*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 1 2 2]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*B1*(1-C1)*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*(1-B2)*C2*D2*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 1 1]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*D1*P1 + A2*B2*(1-C2)*(1-D2)*P2); 
    elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 1 2]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*C1*(1-D1)*P1 + A2*B2*(1-C2)*D2*P2); 
      elseif predict(i,:) == [2 2 2 1]  
           P_1(i) = (1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 / ((1-A1)*(1-B1)*(1-C1)*D1*P1 + A2*B2*C2*(1-D2)*P2); 
    end 
    P_2(i) = 1-P_1(i); 
end 
for i = 1:size(A_p) 
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    if P_1(i) >= P_2(i) 
       result(i) = 1; 
    else 
       result(i) = 2; 
    end 
end 
 
 
attack_train_binary.m 
% The number of each attack in training set  
function [ train_3_no, train_4_no, train_5_no,  
  train_6_no,  train_7_no, train_8_no, train_9_no, train_10_no,   ... 
  train_11_no, train_12_no, train_13_no, train_14_no, train_15_no,   ... 
  train_16_no, train_17_no, train_18_no, train_19_no, train_20_no,   ...           
  train_21_no, train_22_no, train_23_no, train_24_no, train_25_no,   ... 
  train_26_no, train_27_no, train_28_no, train_29_no, train_30_no,   ...              
  train_31_no, train_32_no, train_33_no, train_34_no, train_35_no,   ... 
  train_36_no, train_37_no, train_38_no, train_39_no, train_40_no, train_41_no] =  ... 
                attack_train_binary(train_labels_num) 
% DOS  
train_3_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==3); 
train_3_no = length(train_3_record); 
train_9_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==9); 
train_9_no = length(train_9_record); 
train_12_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==12); 
train_12_no = length(train_12_record); 
train_16_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==16); 
train_16_no = length(train_16_record); 
train_20_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==20); 
train_20_no = length(train_20_record); 
train_22_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==22); 
train_22_no = length(train_22_record); 
train_27_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==27); 
train_27_no = length(train_27_record); 
train_25_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==25); 
train_25_no = length(train_25_record); 
train_30_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==30); 
train_30_no = length(train_30_record); 
train_37_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==37); 
train_37_no = length(train_37_record); 
% PROBE  
train_8_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==8); 
train_8_no = length(train_8_record); 
train_13_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==13); 
train_13_no = length(train_13_record); 
train_17_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==17); 
train_17_no = length(train_17_record); 
train_19_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==19); 
train_19_no = length(train_19_record); 
train_28_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==28); 
train_28_no = length(train_28_record); 
train_32_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==32); 
train_32_no = length(train_32_record); 
% R2L  
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train_5_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==5); 
train_5_no = length(train_5_record); 
train_6_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==6); 
train_6_no = length(train_6_record); 
train_7_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==7); 
train_7_no = length(train_7_record); 
train_11_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==11); 
train_11_no = length(train_11_record); 
train_15_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==15); 
train_15_no = length(train_15_record); 
train_21_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==21); 
train_21_no = length(train_21_record); 
train_23_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==23); 
train_23_no = length(train_23_record); 
train_24_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==24); 
train_24_no = length(train_24_record); 
train_29_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==29); 
train_29_no = length(train_29_record); 
train_33_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==33); 
train_33_no = length(train_33_record); 
train_34_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==34); 
train_34_no = length(train_34_record); 
train_35_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==35); 
train_35_no = length(train_35_record); 
train_38_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==38); 
train_38_no = length(train_38_record); 
train_39_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==39); 
train_39_no = length(train_39_record); 
train_40_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==40); 
train_40_no = length(train_40_record); 
% U2R  
train_4_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==4); 
train_4_no = length(train_4_record); 
train_10_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==10); 
train_10_no = length(train_10_record); 
train_14_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==14); 
train_14_no = length(train_14_record); 
train_18_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==18); 
train_18_no = length(train_18_record); 
train_26_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==26); 
train_26_no = length(train_26_record); 
train_31_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==31); 
train_31_no = length(train_31_record); 
train_36_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==36); 
train_36_no = length(train_36_record); 
train_41_record = find(train_labels_num(:,1)==41); 
train_41_no = length(train_41_record); 
  
attack_test_binary.m 
% The correct predict attack number in testing set  
function [ total_3_no,  correct_3_no, total_4_no,  correct_4_no, total_5_no,  correct_5_no,  ... 
  total_6_no,  correct_6_no, total_7_no,  correct_7_no, total_8_no,  correct_8_no,  ... 
  total_9_no,  correct_9_no, total_10_no, correct_10_no, total_11_no, correct_11_no,  ... 
  total_12_no, correct_12_no, total_13_no, correct_13_no, total_14_no, correct_14_no,  ... 
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  total_15_no, correct_15_no, total_16_no, correct_16_no, total_17_no, correct_17_no,  ... 
  total_18_no, correct_18_no, total_19_no, correct_19_no, total_20_no, correct_20_no,  ...           
  total_21_no, correct_21_no, total_22_no, correct_22_no, total_23_no, correct_23_no,  ...           
  total_24_no, correct_24_no, total_25_no, correct_25_no, total_26_no, correct_26_no,  ... 
  total_27_no, correct_27_no, total_28_no, correct_28_no, total_29_no, correct_29_no,  ... 
  total_30_no, correct_30_no, total_31_no, correct_31_no, total_32_no, correct_32_no,  ... 
  total_33_no, correct_33_no, total_34_no, correct_34_no, total_35_no, correct_35_no,  ... 
  total_36_no, correct_36_no, total_37_no, correct_37_no, total_38_no, correct_38_no,  ... 
  total_39_no, correct_39_no, total_40_no, correct_40_no, total_41_no, correct_41_no] = ... 
  attack_test_binary(labels_num, ... 
  predicted1,   predicted2,   predicted3,   predicted4, ... 
  predicted5,   predicted6,   predicted7,   predicted8, ... 
  predicted9,   predicted10, predicted11, predicted12, ... 
  predicted13, predicted14, predicted15, predicted16, ... 
  predicted17, predicted18, predicted19, predicted20, ... 
  predicted21, predicted22, predicted23, ... 
  predicted24, predicted25, predicted26, ... 
  predicted27, predicted28, predicted29) 
for i = 1:29 
    if i == 1 
       predicted = predicted1; 
    elseif i == 2 
       predicted = predicted2; 
    elseif i == 3 
       predicted = predicted3; 
    elseif i == 4  
       predicted = predicted4; 
    elseif i == 5  
       predicted = predicted5; 
    elseif i == 6  
       predicted = predicted6; 
    elseif i == 7  
       predicted = predicted7; 
    elseif i == 8  
       predicted = predicted8; 
    elseif i == 9  
       predicted = predicted9;        
    elseif i == 10  
       predicted = predicted10; 
    elseif i == 11  
       predicted = predicted11; 
    elseif i == 12 
       predicted = predicted12; 
    elseif i == 13 
       predicted = predicted13; 
    elseif i == 14  
       predicted = predicted14; 
    elseif i == 15  
       predicted = predicted15; 
    elseif i == 16  
       predicted = predicted16; 
    elseif i == 17  
       predicted = predicted17; 
    elseif i == 18  
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       predicted = predicted18; 
    elseif i == 19  
       predicted = predicted19;        
    elseif i == 20  
       predicted = predicted20; 
    elseif i == 21  
       predicted = predicted21; 
    elseif i == 22 
       predicted = predicted22; 
    elseif i == 23 
       predicted = predicted23; 
    elseif i == 24  
       predicted = predicted24; 
    elseif i == 25  
       predicted = predicted25; 
    elseif i == 26  
       predicted = predicted26;        
    elseif i == 27  
       predicted = predicted27;       
    elseif i == 28  
       predicted = predicted28;       
    elseif i == 29  
       predicted = predicted29;       
    end 
% DOS  
total_3_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==3); 
total_3_no(i) = length(total_3_record); 
correct_3_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==3 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_3_no(i) = length(correct_3_record); 
total_9_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==9); 
total_9_no(i) = length(total_9_record); 
correct_9_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==9 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_9_no(i) = length(correct_9_record); 
total_12_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==12); 
total_12_no(i) = length(total_12_record); 
correct_12_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==12 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_12_no(i) = length(correct_12_record); 
total_16_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==16); 
total_16_no(i) = length(total_16_record); 
correct_16_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==16 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_16_no(i) = length(correct_16_record); 
total_20_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==20); 
total_20_no(i) = length(total_20_record); 
correct_20_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==20 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_20_no(i) = length(correct_20_record); 
total_22_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==22); 
total_22_no(i) = length(total_22_record); 
correct_22_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==22 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_22_no(i) = length(correct_22_record); 
total_27_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==27); 
total_27_no(i) = length(total_27_record); 
correct_27_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==27 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_27_no(i) = length(correct_27_record); 
total_25_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==25); 
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total_25_no(i) = length(total_25_record); 
correct_25_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==25 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_25_no(i) = length(correct_25_record); 
total_30_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==30); 
total_30_no(i) = length(total_30_record); 
correct_30_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==30 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_30_no(i) = length(correct_30_record); 
total_37_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==37); 
total_37_no(i) = length(total_37_record); 
correct_37_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==37 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_37_no(i) = length(correct_37_record); 
% PROBE  
total_8_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==8); 
total_8_no(i) = length(total_8_record); 
correct_8_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==8 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_8_no(i) = length(correct_8_record); 
total_13_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==13); 
total_13_no(i) = length(total_13_record); 
correct_13_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==13 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_13_no(i) = length(correct_13_record); 
total_17_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==17); 
total_17_no(i) = length(total_17_record); 
correct_17_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==17 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_17_no(i) = length(correct_17_record); 
total_19_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==19); 
total_19_no(i) = length(total_19_record); 
correct_19_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==19 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_19_no(i) = length(correct_19_record); 
total_28_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==28); 
total_28_no(i) = length(total_28_record); 
correct_28_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==28 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_28_no(i) = length(correct_28_record); 
total_32_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==32); 
total_32_no(i) = length(total_32_record); 
correct_32_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==32 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_32_no(i) = length(correct_32_record); 
% R2L  
total_5_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==5); 
total_5_no(i) = length(total_5_record); 
correct_5_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==5 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_5_no(i) = length(correct_5_record); 
total_6_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==6); 
total_6_no(i) = length(total_6_record); 
correct_6_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==6 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_6_no(i) = length(correct_6_record); 
total_7_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==7); 
total_7_no(i) = length(total_7_record); 
correct_7_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==7 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_7_no(i) = length(correct_7_record); 
total_11_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==11); 
total_11_no(i) = length(total_11_record); 
correct_11_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==11 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_11_no(i) = length(correct_11_record); 
total_15_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==15); 
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total_15_no(i) = length(total_15_record); 
correct_15_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==15 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_15_no(i) = length(correct_15_record); 
total_21_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==21); 
total_21_no(i) = length(total_21_record); 
correct_21_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==21 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_21_no(i) = length(correct_21_record); 
total_23_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==23); 
total_23_no(i) = length(total_23_record); 
correct_23_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==23 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_23_no(i) = length(correct_23_record); 
total_24_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==24); 
total_24_no(i) = length(total_24_record); 
correct_24_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==24 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_24_no(i) = length(correct_24_record); 
total_29_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==29); 
total_29_no(i) = length(total_29_record); 
correct_29_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==29 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_29_no(i) = length(correct_29_record); 
total_33_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==33); 
total_33_no(i) = length(total_33_record); 
correct_33_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==33 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_33_no(i) = length(correct_33_record); 
total_34_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==34); 
total_34_no(i) = length(total_34_record); 
correct_34_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==34 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_34_no(i) = length(correct_34_record); 
total_35_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==35); 
total_35_no(i) = length(total_35_record); 
correct_35_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==35 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_35_no(i) = length(correct_35_record); 
total_38_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==38); 
total_38_no(i) = length(total_38_record); 
correct_38_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==38 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_38_no(i) = length(correct_38_record); 
total_39_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==39); 
total_39_no(i) = length(total_39_record); 
correct_39_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==39 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_39_no(i) = length(correct_39_record); 
total_40_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==40); 
total_40_no(i) = length(total_40_record); 
correct_40_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==40 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_40_no(i) = length(correct_40_record); 
% U2R  
total_4_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==4); 
total_4_no(i) = length(total_4_record); 
correct_4_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==4 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_4_no(i) = length(correct_4_record); 
total_10_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==10); 
total_10_no(i) = length(total_10_record); 
correct_10_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==10 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_10_no(i) = length(correct_10_record); 
total_14_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==14); 
total_14_no(i) = length(total_14_record); 
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correct_14_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==14 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_14_no(i) = length(correct_14_record); 
total_18_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==18); 
total_18_no(i) = length(total_18_record); 
correct_18_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==18 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_18_no(i) = length(correct_18_record); 
total_26_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==26); 
total_26_no(i) = length(total_26_record); 
correct_26_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==26 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_26_no(i) = length(correct_26_record); 
total_31_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==31); 
total_31_no(i) = length(total_31_record); 
correct_31_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==31 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_31_no(i) = length(correct_31_record); 
total_36_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==36); 
total_36_no(i) = length(total_36_record); 
correct_36_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==36 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_36_no(i) = length(correct_36_record); 
total_41_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==41); 
total_41_no(i) = length(total_41_record); 
correct_41_record = find(labels_num(:,1)==41 & predicted(:)~=1); 
correct_41_no(i) = length(correct_41_record); 
end 
 
main.m 
clc; 
clear all; 
close all; 
% READING DATA 
t0 = clock; 
kdd_train = som_read_data('kdd_org_Data_allnumber.txt'); 
kdd_test = som_read_data('kdd_test_Data_allnumber.txt'); 
t = etime(clock,t0); 
fprintf('\nreading data time =%6.2f sec\n', t); 
% SEPARATE DATA to normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l categories 
[all_normal_train.data, all_normal_train.labels, ... 
 all_dos_train.data,    all_dos_train.labels, ... 
 all_probe_train.data,  all_probe_train.labels, ... 
 all_u2r_train.data,    all_u2r_train.labels, ... 
 all_r2l_train.data,    all_r2l_train.labels] = dataprocess(kdd_train.data, kdd_train.labels); 
 [all_normal_test.data, all_normal_test.labels, ... 
 all_dos_test.data,    all_dos_test.labels, ... 
 all_probe_test.data,  all_probe_test.labels, ... 
 all_u2r_test.data,    all_u2r_test.labels, ... 
 all_r2l_test.data,    all_r2l_test.labels] = dataprocess(kdd_test.data, kdd_test.labels); 
% TRAINING 
% original – 494,020 
% normal:97,277, dos:391,458, probe:4,107, u2r:52, r2l:1,126 
% no duplicate – 145,585 
% normal:87,831, dos:54,572, probe:2,131, u2r:52, r2l:999 
% selected no. of training records in each category 
normal_train_record_no = 878; 
dos_train_record_no = 0; 
probe_train_record_no = 0; 
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u2r_train_record_no = 0; 
r2l_train_record_no = 99; 
train_record_no = normal_train_record_no + dos_train_record_no + probe_train_record_no + 
u2r_train_record_no + r2l_train_record_no; 
% TESTING 
% original – 311,029 
% normal:60,593, dos:229,853, probe:4,166, u2r:228, r2l:16,189 
% no duplicate – 77,291 
% normal:47,913, dos:23,568, probe:2,682, u2r:215, r2l:2,913 
% selected no. of testing records in each category 
normal_test_record_no = 479; 
dos_test_record_no = 0; 
probe_test_record_no = 0; 
u2r_test_record_no = 0; 
r2l_test_record_no = 291; 
test_record_no = normal_test_record_no + dos_test_record_no + probe_test_record_no + 
u2r_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no; 
% attack_index: normal = 1, dos = 2, probe = 3, r2l = 4, u2r = 5 
attack_index = 4; 
% attack_label: normal = 1, dos = 2, probe = 3, r2l = 4, u2r = 5 for knn, fknn, etknn 
attack_label = 4;  
% attack_label: 2 for myknn 
attack_mylabel = 2; % fix 
attack_train_record_no = r2l_train_record_no; 
attack_test_record_no = r2l_test_record_no; 
nn = 2; % number of nearest neighbors 
iter_no = 3; % number of iteration 
for k = 1:nn 
for iter = 1:iter_no 
% RANDOMLY SELECT records  
% randomly select records for normal, dos, probe, u2r and r2l category  
[normal_train.data,normal_train.labels,normal_left.data,normal_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_normal_train.data,all_normal_train.labels,normal_train_record_no); 
[dos_train.data,dos_train.labels,dos_left.data,dos_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_dos_train.data,all_dos_train.labels,dos_train_record_no); 
[probe_train.data,probe_train.labels,probe_left.data,probe_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_probe_train.data,all_probe_train.labels,probe_train_record_no); 
[u2r_train.data,u2r_train.labels,u2r_left.data,u2r_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_u2r_train.data,all_u2r_train.labels,u2r_train_record_no); 
[r2l_train.data,r2l_train.labels,r2l_left.data,r2l_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_r2l_train.data,all_r2l_train.labels,r2l_train_record_no); 
 [normal_test.data,normal_test.labels,normal_left.data,normal_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_normal_test.data,all_normal_test.labels,normal_test_record_no); 
[dos_test.data,dos_test.labels,dos_left.data,dos_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_dos_test.data,all_dos_test.labels,dos_test_record_no); 
[probe_test.data,probe_test.labels,probe_left.data,probe_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_probe_test.data,all_probe_test.labels,probe_test_record_no); 
[u2r_test.data,u2r_test.labels,u2r_left.data,u2r_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_u2r_test.data,all_u2r_test.labels,u2r_test_record_no); 
[r2l_test.data,r2l_test.labels,r2l_left.data,r2l_left.labels] = 
transfer(all_r2l_test.data,all_r2l_test.labels,r2l_test_record_no); 
% FINAL data set 
mytrain.data = [normal_train.data;dos_train.data;probe_train.data;u2r_train.data;r2l_train.data]; 
mytrain.labels = [normal_train.labels;dos_train.labels;probe_train.labels;u2r_train.labels;r2l_train.labels]; 
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mytest.data = [normal_test.data;dos_test.data;probe_test.data;u2r_test.data;r2l_test.data]; 
mytest.labels = [normal_test.labels;dos_test.labels;probe_test.labels;u2r_test.labels;r2l_test.labels]; 
% NORMALIZATION of features  
data_train.X = mytrain.data; 
data_train = clust_normalize(data_train,'range'); 
mytrain.data = data_train.X; 
data_test.X = mytest.data; 
data_test = clust_normalize(data_test,'range'); 
mytest.data = data_test.X; 
% FEATURE SELECTION 
fs = 1;  
% BASIC: 1-9 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_e = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; ...    %   1-10 
0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 11-20  
0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; ...    % 21-30  
1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0];   % 31-41 
% CONTENT: 10-22 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_f = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ...    %   1-10 
  1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...    % 11-20  
1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 21-30  
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0];   % 31-41    
% TRAFFIC: 23-41 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_g = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    %   1-10 
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 11-20  
0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...    % 21-30  
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1];   % 31-41           
% All: 1-41 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_a = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...    %   1-10 
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...    % 11-20  
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; ...    % 21-30  
1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1];   % 31-41 
% Ours 
% dos : 1,2,3,4,5,6,12,23,24,31,32,37 
% probe : 1,2,3,4,12,16,25,27,28,29,30,40  
% u2r : 1,2,3,10,16 
% r2l : 1,2,3,4,5,10,22 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_b = [ 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ...    %   1-10 
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 11-20  
0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 21-30  
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0];   % 31-41 
% CFS 
% dos : 3,6,12,37 
% probe : 3,4,25,29 
% u2r : 10 
% r2l : 10 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_c = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ...    %   1-10 
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 11-20  
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 21-30  
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 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0];  % 31-41 
% FCBF 
% dos : 3,12,31,32 
% probe : 3,26,27,29 
% u2r : 10,16 
% r2l : 5,10,39 
          % 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  
w_d = [ 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; ...    %   1-10 
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0; ...    % 11-20  
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ...    % 21-30  
0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0];   % 31-41 
 [train_data_a, test_data_a] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_a); 
[train_data_b, test_data_b] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_b); 
[train_data_c, test_data_c] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_c); 
[train_data_d, test_data_d] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_d); 
[train_data_e, test_data_e] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_e); 
[train_data_f, test_data_f] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_f); 
[train_data_g, test_data_g] = fselection(mytrain.data, mytest.data, fs, w_g); 
% CONVERTION 
% convert cell (mytrain.labels,mytest.labels) to number (train_labels_num,test_labels_num) 
% reason: fknn can only take number 
[train_labels_num,test_labels_num] = celltonum(mytrain.labels,mytest.labels); 
% for myknn 
% CLUSTERING 
% fuzzy cmeans  
class_no = 2; 
[center_a,U_a,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_a,class_no); % NxM, N = no of class, M = no of training records 
[center_b,U_b,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_b,class_no); 
[center_c,U_c,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_c,class_no);  
[center_d,U_d,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_d,class_no);  
[center_e,U_e,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_e,class_no);  
[center_f,U_f,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_f,class_no);  
[center_g,U_g,objFcn] = fcm(train_data_g,class_no);  
% for myknn 
% for FCM to find clustering order (final_perms) 
[finalperms_a, fcm1_labels_a] = fcm_order_binary(U_a, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_b, fcm1_labels_b] = fcm_order_binary(U_b, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_c, fcm1_labels_c] = fcm_order_binary(U_c, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_d, fcm1_labels_d] = fcm_order_binary(U_d, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_e, fcm1_labels_e] = fcm_order_binary(U_e, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_f, fcm1_labels_f] = fcm_order_binary(U_f, mytrain.labels); 
[finalperms_g, fcm1_labels_g] = fcm_order_binary(U_g, mytrain.labels); 
% CLASSIFICATION of k-NN, fuzzy k-NN, evidence-theoretic k-NN and my-knn 
% k-NN  
tic; 
[knn_predicted_a,  knn_memberships_a,  knn_numhits_a] = fknn(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_a, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_a = toc; tic; 
[knn_predicted_b,  knn_memberships_b,  knn_numhits_b] = fknn(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_b, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_b = toc; tic; 
[knn_predicted_c,  knn_memberships_c,  knn_numhits_c] = fknn(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_c, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_c = toc; tic; 
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[knn_predicted_d,  knn_memberships_d,  knn_numhits_d] = fknn(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_d, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_d = toc; tic; 
[knn_predicted_e,  knn_memberships_e,  knn_numhits_e] = fknn(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_e, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_e = toc; tic; 
[knn_predicted_f,  knn_memberships_f,  knn_numhits_f] = fknn(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_f, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_f = toc; tic; 
[knn_predicted_g,  knn_memberships_g,  knn_numhits_g] = fknn(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_g, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0, 0);  
t_knn_g = toc; 
% fuzzy k-NN 
tic; 
 [fknn_predicted_a, fknn_memberships_a, fknn_numhits_a] = fknn(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_a, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_a = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_b, fknn_memberships_b, fknn_numhits_b] = fknn(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_b, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_b = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_c, fknn_memberships_c, fknn_numhits_c] = fknn(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_c, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_c = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_d, fknn_memberships_d, fknn_numhits_d] = fknn(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_d, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_d = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_e, fknn_memberships_e, fknn_numhits_e] = fknn(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_e, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_e = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_f, fknn_memberships_f, fknn_numhits_f] = fknn(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_f, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_f = toc; tic; 
[fknn_predicted_g, fknn_memberships_g, fknn_numhits_g] = fknn(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2), 
test_data_g, test_labels_num(:,2), k, 0);  
t_fknn_g = toc; 
% evidence-theoretic k-NN  
[gamm_a, alpha_a] = knndsinit(train_data_a, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_a, etknn_predicted_a] = knndsval(train_data_a, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_a,alpha_a,0,test_data_a); 
t_etknn_a = toc; 
[gamm_b, alpha_b] = knndsinit(train_data_b, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_b, etknn_predicted_b] = knndsval(train_data_b, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_b,alpha_b,0,test_data_b); 
t_etknn_b = toc; 
[gamm_c, alpha_c] = knndsinit(train_data_c, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_c, etknn_predicted_c] = knndsval(train_data_c, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_c,alpha_c,0,test_data_c); 
t_etknn_c = toc; 
[gamm_d, alpha_d] = knndsinit(train_data_d, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
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[etknn_memberships_d, etknn_predicted_d] = knndsval(train_data_d, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_d,alpha_d,0,test_data_d); 
t_etknn_d = toc; 
[gamm_e, alpha_e] = knndsinit(train_data_e, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_e, etknn_predicted_e] = knndsval(train_data_e, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_e,alpha_e,0,test_data_e); 
t_etknn_e = toc; 
[gamm_f, alpha_f] = knndsinit(train_data_f, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_f, etknn_predicted_f] = knndsval(train_data_f, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_f,alpha_f,0,test_data_f); 
t_etknn_f = toc; 
[gamm_g, alpha_g] = knndsinit(train_data_g, train_labels_num(:,2));  
tic; 
[etknn_memberships_g, etknn_predicted_g] = knndsval(train_data_g, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,gamm_g,alpha_g,0,test_data_g); 
t_etknn_g = toc; 
tic; 
[myknn_memberships_a, myknn_predicted_a] = myknn_binary(train_data_a, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_a,0,test_data_a,finalperms_a); 
t_myknn_a = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_b, myknn_predicted_b] = myknn_binary(train_data_b, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_b,0,test_data_b,finalperms_b); 
t_myknn_b = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_c, myknn_predicted_c] = myknn_binary(train_data_c, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_c,0,test_data_c,finalperms_c); 
t_myknn_c = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_d, myknn_predicted_d] = myknn_binary(train_data_d, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_d,0,test_data_d,finalperms_d); 
t_myknn_d = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_e, myknn_predicted_e] = myknn_binary(train_data_e, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_e,0,test_data_e,finalperms_e); 
t_myknn_e = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_f, myknn_predicted_f] = myknn_binary(train_data_f, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_f,0,test_data_f,finalperms_f); 
t_myknn_f = toc; tic; 
[myknn_memberships_g, myknn_predicted_g] = myknn_binary(train_data_g, 
train_labels_num(:,2),k,U_g,0,test_data_g,finalperms_g); 
t_myknn_g = toc; 
train_data_a_w = train_data_a; 
test_data_a_w = test_data_a; 
mytrain.labels_a_w = mytrain.labels; 
train_labels_num_a_w = train_labels_num; 
U_a_w = U_a; 
finalperms_a_w = finalperms_a; 
[m_a_w,L_a_w] = 
myknn_binary(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w(:,2),k,U_a_w,0,train_data_a_w,finalperms_a_w); 
a_w = weight(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w,m_a_w); 
tic; 
[myknn_memberships_a_w,myknn_predicted_a_w] = 
myknn_binary_w(train_data_a_w,train_labels_num_a_w(:,2),k,U_a_w,0,test_data_a_w,finalperms_a_w,a_
w); 
t_myknn_a_w = toc; 
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train_data_b_w = train_data_b; 
test_data_b_w = test_data_b; 
mytrain.labels_b_w = mytrain.labels; 
train_labels_num_b_w = train_labels_num; 
U_b_w = U_b; 
finalperms_b_w = finalperms_b; 
[m_b_w,L_b_w] = 
myknn_binary(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w(:,2),k,U_b_w,0,train_data_b_w,finalperms_b_w); 
b_w = weight(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w,m_b_w); 
tic; 
[myknn_memberships_b_w,myknn_predicted_b_w] = 
myknn_binary_w(train_data_b_w,train_labels_num_b_w(:,2),k,U_b_w,0,test_data_b_w,finalperms_b_w,b
_w); 
t_myknn_b_w = toc; 
train_data_c_w = train_data_c; 
test_data_c_w = test_data_c; 
mytrain.labels_c_w = mytrain.labels; 
train_labels_num_c_w = train_labels_num; 
U_c_w = U_c; 
finalperms_c_w = finalperms_c; 
[m_c_w,L_c_w] = 
myknn_binary(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w(:,2),k,U_c_w,0,train_data_c_w,finalperms_c_w); 
c_w = weight(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w,m_c_w); 
tic; 
[myknn_memberships_c_w,myknn_predicted_c_w] = 
myknn_binary_w(train_data_c_w,train_labels_num_c_w(:,2),k,U_c_w,0,test_data_c_w,finalperms_c_w,c_
w); 
t_myknn_c_w = toc; 
train_data_d_w = train_data_d; 
test_data_d_w = test_data_d; 
mytrain.labels_d_w = mytrain.labels; 
train_labels_num_d_w = train_labels_num; 
U_d_w = U_d; 
finalperms_d_w = finalperms_d; 
[m_d_w,L_d_w] = 
myknn_binary(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w(:,2),k,U_d_w,0,train_data_d_w,finalperms_d_w); 
d_w = weight(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w,m_d_w); 
tic; 
[myknn_memberships_d_w,myknn_predicted_d_w] = 
myknn_binary_w(train_data_d_w,train_labels_num_d_w(:,2),k,U_d_w,0,test_data_d_w,finalperms_d_w,d
_w); 
t_myknn_d_w = toc; 
fprintf('k = %d\n', k); 
fprintf('\n KNN'); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_a, knn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no,    
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_b, knn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_c, knn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_d, knn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ... 
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    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_e, knn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_f, knn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[knn_correct_normal_rate_g, knn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, knn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
fprintf('\n FKNN'); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_a, fknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_b, fknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_c, fknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_d, fknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_e, fknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_f, fknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[fknn_correct_normal_rate_g, fknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, fknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
fprintf('\n ETKNN'); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_a, etknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_b, etknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_c, etknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_d, etknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_e, etknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_f, etknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
[etknn_correct_normal_rate_g, etknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ... 
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    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, etknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_label); 
fprintf('\n MYKNN'); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_a, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_e, myknn_correct_attack_rate_e] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_e, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_f, myknn_correct_attack_rate_f] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_f, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_g, myknn_correct_attack_rate_g] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_g, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W'); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w] = ... 
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w] = ... 
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w] = ... 
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w] = ... 
accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d_w, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
A_memberships = myknn_memberships_b; 
A_predicted = myknn_predicted_b; 
B_memberships = myknn_memberships_e; 
B_predicted = myknn_predicted_e; 
C_memberships = myknn_memberships_f; 
C_predicted = myknn_predicted_f; 
D_memberships = myknn_memberships_g; 
D_predicted = myknn_predicted_g; 
E_memberships = myknn_memberships_e; 
E_predicted = myknn_predicted_e; 
F_memberships = myknn_memberships_a; 
F_predicted = myknn_predicted_a; 
G_memberships = etknn_memberships_b; 
G_predicted = etknn_predicted_b; 
G_membership(:,1) = G_memberships(:,1); 
G_membership(:,2) = G_memberships(:,attack_label); 
G_membership(:,3) = G_memberships(:,attack_label+1); 
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H_memberships = etknn_memberships_d; 
H_predicted = etknn_predicted_d; 
H_membership(:,1) = H_memberships(:,1); 
H_membership(:,2) = H_memberships(:,attack_label); 
H_membership(:,3) = H_memberships(:,attack_label+1); 
I_memberships = etknn_memberships_c; 
I_predicted = etknn_predicted_c; 
I_membership(:,1) = I_memberships(:,1); 
I_membership(:,2) = I_memberships(:,attack_label); 
I_membership(:,3) = I_memberships(:,attack_label+1); 
    if finalperms_b == [2 1] 
       A_membership(:,1) = A_memberships(:,2); 
       A_membership(:,2) = A_memberships(:,1); 
       A_membership(:,3) = A_memberships(:,3); 
    else  
       A_membership = A_memberships;  
    end 
    if finalperms_e == [2 1] 
       B_membership(:,1) = B_memberships(:,2); 
       B_membership(:,2) = B_memberships(:,1); 
       B_membership(:,3) = B_memberships(:,3); 
     else  
       B_membership = B_memberships; 
    end       
    if finalperms_f == [2 1]        
       C_membership(:,1) = C_memberships(:,2); 
       C_membership(:,2) = C_memberships(:,1); 
       C_membership(:,3) = C_memberships(:,3); 
    else  
       C_membership = C_memberships; 
    end 
    if finalperms_g == [2 1]        
       D_membership(:,1) = D_memberships(:,2); 
       D_membership(:,2) = D_memberships(:,1); 
       D_membership(:,3) = D_memberships(:,3); 
    else  
       D_membership = D_memberships; 
    end 
    if finalperms_e == [2 1]        
       E_membership(:,1) = E_memberships(:,2); 
       E_membership(:,2) = E_memberships(:,1); 
       E_membership(:,3) = E_memberships(:,3); 
    else  
       E_membership = E_memberships; 
    end 
    if finalperms_a == [2 1] 
       F_membership(:,1) = F_memberships(:,2); 
       F_membership(:,2) = F_memberships(:,1); 
       F_membership(:,3) = F_memberships(:,3); 
    else  
       F_membership = F_memberships;  
    end 
index = attack_mylabel; 
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE'); 
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% ensemble: majority voting 
[ensemble_predicted_mv, predict_mv] = ensemble_mv(A_predicted, ... 
  C_predicted, ... 
  D_predicted, ... 
  test_labels_num);   
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv] = ... 
   accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_mv, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
A1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b; 
A2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b; 
A_p = myknn_predicted_b; 
B1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e; 
B2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e; 
B_p = myknn_predicted_e; 
C1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f; 
C2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f; 
C_p = myknn_predicted_f; 
D1 = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g; 
D2 = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g; 
D_p = myknn_predicted_g; 
% ensemble: average 
[ensemble_memberships_avg, ensemble_predicted_avg, predict_avg] = ensemble_avg(A_membership, … 
A1, A2, index, ... 
B_membership, B1, B2, ... 
C_membership, C1, C2, ... 
D_membership, D1, D2, ... 
test_labels_num); 
% ensemble: dempster-shafer 
[ensemble_memberships_m, ensemble_predicted_m, predict_m] = ensemble_m(A_membership, … 
A_predicted, index, ... 
B_membership, B_predicted, ... 
C_membership, C_predicted, ... 
D_membership, D_predicted, ... 
test_labels_num); 
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m] = ... 
   accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_m, normal_test_record_no, attack_test_record_no, 
attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
% ensemble: naive bayes 
% prior probability 
if attack_index == 4 
   P1 = normal_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no); % normal distribution 
   P2 = r2l_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + r2l_test_record_no); % attack distribution 
elseif attack_index == 5 
   P1 = normal_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + u2r_test_record_no); 
   P2 = u2r_test_record_no / (normal_test_record_no + u2r_test_record_no); 
end 
tic; 
[ensemble_predicted_bayes] = ensemble4(A1, A2, A_p, B1, B2, B_p, C1, C2, C_p, D1, D2, D_p, P1, P2); 
t_ensemble_bayes = toc; 
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes] = ... 
   accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_bayes, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
% normal 
myknn_predicted_a_tree = myknn_predicted_a; 
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myknn_predicted_b_tree = myknn_predicted_b; 
myknn_predicted_c_tree = myknn_predicted_c; 
myknn_predicted_d_tree = myknn_predicted_d; 
myknn_predicted_e_tree = myknn_predicted_e; 
myknn_predicted_f_tree = myknn_predicted_f; 
myknn_predicted_g_tree = myknn_predicted_g; 
ensemble_predicted_tree_m = ensemble_predicted_m; 
ensemble_predicted_tree_mv = ensemble_predicted_mv; 
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes = ensemble_predicted_bayes; 
% use reduced training set 145585 (41 features, normal-attacks) to generate rules 
tic; 
for i=1:size(myknn_predicted_a,1) 
if attack_index == 4 || attack_index == 5  
% 55229     
if data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 20  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1; 
% 9541 
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 49  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1; 
% 4611 
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
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    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) >= 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 20 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,30) < 0.01 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 2 
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1; 
% 9167      
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,40) < 0.01 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,30) < 0.01 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 30 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) < 158  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1; 
% 1212 
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,40) < 0.01 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,30) >= 0.5  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
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        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;  
% 107 
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 5 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) < 30  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1; 
% 611 
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 32 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) < 246  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;         
% 88  
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
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    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 248 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) < 334  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;        
% 628  
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 335 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) < 644  
        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;  
% 2310         
elseif data_test.Xold(i,8) < 3 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,13) < 1 & ...  
    data_test.Xold(i,26) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,27) < 0.06 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,4) == 10 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,10) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,2) == 2 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,3) == 17 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,6) < 29 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,1) < 1 & ... 
    data_test.Xold(i,5) >= 726  
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        myknn_predicted_a_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_b_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_c_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_d_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_e_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_f_tree(i) = 1; 
        myknn_predicted_g_tree(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_m(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_mv(i) = 1; 
        ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes(i) = 1;  
end 
end 
end 
t_tree = toc; 
 [myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_a_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_b_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_c_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_d_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_e_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_f_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree, myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, myknn_predicted_g_tree, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_m, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_mv, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
[ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes, ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes] = ... 
    accuracy_binary(test_labels_num, ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes, normal_test_record_no, 
attack_test_record_no, attack_index, attack_mylabel); 
fprintf('\n KNN'); 
knn_normal_rate_a(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_a; 
knn_attack_rate_a(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_a; 
knn_normal_rate_b(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_b; 
knn_attack_rate_b(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_b; 
knn_normal_rate_c(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_c; 
knn_attack_rate_c(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_c; 
knn_normal_rate_d(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_d; 
knn_attack_rate_d(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_d; 
knn_normal_rate_e(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_e; 
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knn_attack_rate_e(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_e; 
knn_normal_rate_f(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_f; 
knn_attack_rate_f(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_f; 
knn_normal_rate_g(iter)   = knn_correct_normal_rate_g; 
knn_attack_rate_g(iter)   = knn_correct_attack_rate_g; 
knn_rate_a(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_b(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_c(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_d(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_e(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_f(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
knn_rate_g(iter) = (knn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no + 
knn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_knn_a(iter) = t_knn_a; 
time_knn_b(iter) = t_knn_b; 
time_knn_c(iter) = t_knn_c; 
time_knn_d(iter) = t_knn_d; 
time_knn_e(iter) = t_knn_e; 
time_knn_f(iter) = t_knn_f; 
time_knn_g(iter) = t_knn_g; 
fprintf('\n FKNN'); 
fknn_normal_rate_a(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_a; 
fknn_attack_rate_a(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_a; 
fknn_normal_rate_b(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_b; 
fknn_attack_rate_b(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_b; 
fknn_normal_rate_c(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_c; 
fknn_attack_rate_c(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_c; 
fknn_normal_rate_d(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_d; 
fknn_attack_rate_d(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_d; 
fknn_normal_rate_e(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_e; 
fknn_attack_rate_e(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_e; 
fknn_normal_rate_f(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_f; 
fknn_attack_rate_f(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_f; 
fknn_normal_rate_g(iter)  = fknn_correct_normal_rate_g; 
fknn_attack_rate_g(iter)  = fknn_correct_attack_rate_g; 
fknn_rate_a(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fknn_rate_b(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fknn_rate_c(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fknn_rate_d(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fknn_rate_e(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fknn_rate_f(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
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fknn_rate_g(iter) = (fknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no + 
fknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_fknn_a(iter) = t_fknn_a; 
time_fknn_b(iter) = t_fknn_b; 
time_fknn_c(iter) = t_fknn_c; 
time_fknn_d(iter) = t_fknn_d; 
time_fknn_e(iter) = t_fknn_e; 
time_fknn_f(iter) = t_fknn_f; 
time_fknn_g(iter) = t_fknn_g; 
fprintf('\n ETKNN'); 
etknn_normal_rate_a(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_a; 
etknn_attack_rate_a(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_a; 
etknn_normal_rate_b(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_b; 
etknn_attack_rate_b(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_b; 
etknn_normal_rate_c(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_c; 
etknn_attack_rate_c(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_c; 
etknn_normal_rate_d(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_d; 
etknn_attack_rate_d(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_d; 
etknn_normal_rate_e(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_e; 
etknn_attack_rate_e(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_e; 
etknn_normal_rate_f(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_f; 
etknn_attack_rate_f(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_f; 
etknn_normal_rate_g(iter) = etknn_correct_normal_rate_g; 
etknn_attack_rate_g(iter) = etknn_correct_attack_rate_g; 
etknn_rate_a(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_b(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_c(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_d(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_e(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_f(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
etknn_rate_g(iter) = (etknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no + 
etknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_etknn_a(iter) = t_etknn_a; 
time_etknn_b(iter) = t_etknn_b; 
time_etknn_c(iter) = t_etknn_c; 
time_etknn_d(iter) = t_etknn_d; 
time_etknn_e(iter) = t_etknn_e; 
time_etknn_f(iter) = t_etknn_f; 
time_etknn_g(iter) = t_etknn_g; 
fprintf('\n MYKNN'); 
myknn_normal_rate_a(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a; 
myknn_attack_rate_a(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a; 
myknn_normal_rate_b(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b; 
myknn_attack_rate_b(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b; 
myknn_normal_rate_c(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c; 
myknn_attack_rate_c(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c; 
myknn_normal_rate_d(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d; 
myknn_attack_rate_d(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d; 
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myknn_normal_rate_e(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e; 
myknn_attack_rate_e(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e; 
myknn_normal_rate_f(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f; 
myknn_attack_rate_f(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f; 
myknn_normal_rate_g(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g; 
myknn_attack_rate_g(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g; 
myknn_rate_a(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_b(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_c(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_d(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_e(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_e*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_e*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_f(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_f*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_f*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_g(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_g*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_g*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_myknn_a(iter) = t_myknn_a; 
time_myknn_b(iter) = t_myknn_b; 
time_myknn_c(iter) = t_myknn_c; 
time_myknn_d(iter) = t_myknn_d; 
time_myknn_e(iter) = t_myknn_e; 
time_myknn_f(iter) = t_myknn_f; 
time_myknn_g(iter) = t_myknn_g; 
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W'); 
myknn_normal_rate_a_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w; 
myknn_attack_rate_a_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w; 
myknn_normal_rate_b_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w; 
myknn_attack_rate_b_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w; 
myknn_normal_rate_c_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w; 
myknn_attack_rate_c_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w; 
myknn_normal_rate_d_w(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w; 
myknn_attack_rate_d_w(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w; 
myknn_rate_a_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_w*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_b_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_w*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_c_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_w*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_d_w(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_w*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_w*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_myknn_a_w(iter) = t_myknn_a_w; 
time_myknn_b_w(iter) = t_myknn_b_w; 
time_myknn_c_w(iter) = t_myknn_c_w; 
time_myknn_d_w(iter) = t_myknn_d_w; 
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE'); 
ensemble_normal_rate_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m; 
ensemble_attack_rate_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m; 
ensemble_normal_rate_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv; 
ensemble_attack_rate_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv; 
ensemble_normal_rate_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes; 
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ensemble_attack_rate_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes; 
ensemble_rate_m(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_m*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_m*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
ensemble_rate_mv(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_mv*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_mv*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
ensemble_rate_bayes(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_bayes*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_bayes*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_ensemble_bayes(iter) = t_ensemble_bayes; 
fprintf('\n TREE'); 
myknn_normal_rate_a_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_a_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_b_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_b_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_c_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_c_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_d_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_d_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_e_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_e_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_f_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_f_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree; 
myknn_normal_rate_g_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree; 
myknn_attack_rate_g_tree(iter) = myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree; 
myknn_rate_a_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_a_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_a_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_b_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_b_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_b_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_c_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_c_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_c_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_d_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_d_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_d_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_e_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_e_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_e_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_f_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_f_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_f_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
myknn_rate_g_tree(iter) = (myknn_correct_normal_rate_g_tree*normal_test_record_no + 
myknn_correct_attack_rate_g_tree*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
fprintf('\n ENSENBLE + TREE'); 
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m; 
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_m(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m; 
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv; 
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_mv(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv; 
ensemble_normal_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes; 
ensemble_attack_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes; 
ensemble_rate_tree_m(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_m*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_m*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
ensemble_rate_tree_mv(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_mv*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_mv*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
ensemble_rate_tree_bayes(iter) = (ensemble_correct_normal_rate_tree_bayes*normal_test_record_no + 
ensemble_correct_attack_rate_tree_bayes*attack_test_record_no)/test_record_no; 
time_tree(iter) = t_tree; 
%attacks in training set 
[train_3_no,  train_4_no,  train_5_no,  train_6_no,  train_7_no,  train_8_no,  train_9_no,  train_10_no, ... 
 train_11_no, train_12_no, train_13_no, train_14_no, train_15_no, train_16_no, train_17_no, … 
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train_18_no, train_19_no, train_20_no, train_21_no, train_22_no, train_23_no, train_24_no, … 
train_25_no, train_26_no, train_27_no, train_28_no, train_29_no, train_30_no, train_31_no, … 
train_32_no, train_33_no, train_34_no, train_35_no, train_36_no, train_37_no, train_38_no, … 
train_39_no, train_40_no, train_41_no ] = attack_train_binary(train_labels_num); 
train_3_number(iter,:)  = train_3_no;   train_4_number(iter,:) = train_4_no; 
train_5_number(iter,:)  = train_5_no;   train_6_number(iter,:) = train_6_no; 
train_7_number(iter,:)  = train_7_no;   train_8_number(iter,:) = train_8_no; 
train_9_number(iter,:)  = train_9_no;  train_10_number(iter,:) = train_10_no; 
train_11_number(iter,:) = train_11_no; train_12_number(iter,:) = train_12_no; 
train_13_number(iter,:) = train_13_no; train_14_number(iter,:) = train_14_no; 
train_15_number(iter,:) = train_15_no; train_16_number(iter,:) = train_16_no; 
train_17_number(iter,:) = train_17_no; train_18_number(iter,:) = train_18_no; 
train_19_number(iter,:) = train_19_no; train_20_number(iter,:) = train_20_no; 
train_21_number(iter,:) = train_21_no; train_22_number(iter,:) = train_22_no; 
train_23_number(iter,:) = train_23_no; train_24_number(iter,:) = train_24_no; 
train_25_number(iter,:) = train_25_no; train_26_number(iter,:) = train_26_no; 
train_27_number(iter,:) = train_27_no; train_28_number(iter,:) = train_28_no; 
train_29_number(iter,:) = train_29_no; train_30_number(iter,:) = train_30_no; 
train_31_number(iter,:) = train_31_no; train_32_number(iter,:) = train_32_no; 
train_33_number(iter,:) = train_33_no; train_34_number(iter,:) = train_34_no; 
train_35_number(iter,:) = train_35_no; train_36_number(iter,:) = train_36_no; 
train_37_number(iter,:) = train_37_no; train_38_number(iter,:) = train_38_no; 
train_39_number(iter,:) = train_39_no; train_40_number(iter,:) = train_40_no; 
train_41_number(iter,:) = train_41_no; 
% attacks in testing set 
         [ total_3_no,  correct_3_no, total_4_no,  correct_4_no, total_5_no,  correct_5_no,  ... 
           total_6_no,  correct_6_no, total_7_no,  correct_7_no, total_8_no,  correct_8_no,  ... 
           total_9_no,  correct_9_no, total_10_no, correct_10_no, total_11_no, correct_11_no,  ... 
          total_12_no, correct_12_no, total_13_no, correct_13_no, total_14_no, correct_14_no,  ... 
          total_15_no, correct_15_no, total_16_no, correct_16_no, otal_17_no, correct_17_no,  ... 
          total_18_no, correct_18_no, total_19_no, correct_19_no, total_20_no, correct_20_no,  ...           
          total_21_no, correct_21_no, total_22_no, correct_22_no, total_23_no, correct_23_no,  ...           
          total_24_no, correct_24_no, total_25_no, correct_25_no, total_26_no, correct_26_no,  ... 
          total_27_no, correct_27_no, total_28_no, correct_28_no, total_29_no, correct_29_no,  ... 
          total_30_no, correct_30_no, total_31_no, correct_31_no, total_32_no, correct_32_no,  ... 
          total_33_no, correct_33_no, total_34_no, correct_34_no, total_35_no, correct_35_no,  ... 
          total_36_no, correct_36_no, total_37_no, correct_37_no, total_38_no, correct_38_no,  ... 
          total_39_no, correct_39_no, total_40_no, correct_40_no, total_41_no, correct_41_no]= ... 
          attack_test_binary(test_labels_num, ... 
                             knn_predicted_a,     knn_predicted_b,     knn_predicted_c,     knn_predicted_d, ... 
                             fknn_predicted_a,    fknn_predicted_b,    fknn_predicted_c,    fknn_predicted_d, ... 
                             etknn_predicted_a,   etknn_predicted_b,   etknn_predicted_c,   etknn_predicted_d, ... 
                             myknn_predicted_a,   myknn_predicted_b,   myknn_predicted_c,   myknn_predicted_d, ... 
                             myknn_predicted_e,   myknn_predicted_f,   myknn_predicted_g, ... 
                             myknn_predicted_a_w, myknn_predicted_b_w, myknn_predicted_c_w, … 
myknn_predicted_d_w, ... 
                             ensemble_predicted_m, ensemble_predicted_mv, ensemble_predicted_bayes, ... 
                             ensemble_predicted_tree_m, ensemble_predicted_tree_mv, … 
ensemble_predicted_tree_bayes); 
total_3_number(iter,:) = total_3_no;   correct_3_number(iter,:)  = correct_3_no; 
total_4_number(iter,:) = total_4_no;   correct_4_number(iter,:)  = correct_4_no; 
total_5_number(iter,:) = total_5_no;   correct_5_number(iter,:)  = correct_5_no; 
total_6_number(iter,:) = total_6_no;   correct_6_number(iter,:)  = correct_6_no; 
total_7_number(iter,:) = total_7_no;   correct_7_number(iter,:)  = correct_7_no; 
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total_8_number(iter,:) = total_8_no;   correct_8_number(iter,:)  = correct_8_no; 
total_9_number(iter,:) = total_9_no;   correct_9_number(iter,:)  = correct_9_no; 
total_10_number(iter,:) = total_10_no; correct_10_number(iter,:) = correct_10_no; 
total_11_number(iter,:) = total_11_no; correct_11_number(iter,:) = correct_11_no; 
total_12_number(iter,:) = total_12_no; correct_12_number(iter,:) = correct_12_no; 
total_13_number(iter,:) = total_13_no; correct_13_number(iter,:) = correct_13_no; 
total_14_number(iter,:) = total_14_no; correct_14_number(iter,:) = correct_14_no; 
total_15_number(iter,:) = total_15_no; correct_15_number(iter,:) = correct_15_no; 
total_16_number(iter,:) = total_16_no; correct_16_number(iter,:) = correct_16_no; 
total_17_number(iter,:) = total_17_no; correct_17_number(iter,:) = correct_17_no; 
total_18_number(iter,:) = total_18_no; correct_18_number(iter,:) = correct_18_no; 
total_19_number(iter,:) = total_19_no; correct_19_number(iter,:) = correct_19_no; 
total_20_number(iter,:) = total_20_no; correct_20_number(iter,:) = correct_20_no; 
total_21_number(iter,:) = total_21_no; correct_21_number(iter,:) = correct_21_no; 
total_22_number(iter,:) = total_22_no; correct_22_number(iter,:) = correct_22_no; 
total_23_number(iter,:) = total_23_no; correct_23_number(iter,:) = correct_23_no; 
total_24_number(iter,:) = total_24_no; correct_24_number(iter,:) = correct_24_no; 
total_25_number(iter,:) = total_25_no; correct_25_number(iter,:) = correct_25_no; 
total_26_number(iter,:) = total_26_no; correct_26_number(iter,:) = correct_26_no; 
total_27_number(iter,:) = total_27_no; correct_27_number(iter,:) = correct_27_no; 
total_28_number(iter,:) = total_28_no; correct_28_number(iter,:) = correct_28_no; 
total_29_number(iter,:) = total_29_no; correct_29_number(iter,:) = correct_29_no; 
total_30_number(iter,:) = total_30_no; correct_30_number(iter,:) = correct_30_no; 
total_31_number(iter,:) = total_31_no; correct_31_number(iter,:) = correct_31_no; 
total_32_number(iter,:) = total_32_no; correct_32_number(iter,:) = correct_32_no; 
total_33_number(iter,:) = total_33_no; correct_33_number(iter,:) = correct_33_no; 
total_34_number(iter,:) = total_34_no; correct_34_number(iter,:) = correct_34_no; 
total_35_number(iter,:) = total_35_no; correct_35_number(iter,:) = correct_35_no; 
total_36_number(iter,:) = total_36_no; correct_36_number(iter,:) = correct_36_no; 
total_37_number(iter,:) = total_37_no; correct_37_number(iter,:) = correct_37_no; 
total_38_number(iter,:) = total_38_no; correct_38_number(iter,:) = correct_38_no; 
total_39_number(iter,:) = total_39_no; correct_39_number(iter,:) = correct_39_no; 
total_40_number(iter,:) = total_40_no; correct_40_number(iter,:) = correct_40_no; 
total_41_number(iter,:) = total_41_no; correct_41_number(iter,:) = correct_41_no;                               
end % iter 
fprintf('\n KNN'); 
knn_average_normal_rate_a(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_a(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_b(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_b(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_c(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_c(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_d(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_d(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_e(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_e(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_f(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_f(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no; 
knn_average_normal_rate_g(k)   = 1- sum(knn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no; 
knn_average_attack_rate_g(k)   = sum(knn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(knn_rate_a) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(knn_rate_b) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(knn_rate_c) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(knn_rate_d) / iter_no; 
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knn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(knn_rate_e) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(knn_rate_f) / iter_no; 
knn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(knn_rate_g) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_a(k) = sum(time_knn_a) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_b(k) = sum(time_knn_b) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_c(k) = sum(time_knn_c) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_d(k) = sum(time_knn_d) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_e(k) = sum(time_knn_e) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_f(k) = sum(time_knn_f) / iter_no; 
time_average_knn_g(k) = sum(time_knn_g) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n FKNN'); 
fknn_average_normal_rate_a(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_a(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_b(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_b(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_c(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_c(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_d(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_d(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_e(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_e(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_f(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_f(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_normal_rate_g(k)  = 1- sum(fknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_attack_rate_g(k)  = sum(fknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(fknn_rate_a) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(fknn_rate_b) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(fknn_rate_c) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(fknn_rate_d) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(fknn_rate_e) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(fknn_rate_f) / iter_no; 
fknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(fknn_rate_g) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_a(k) = sum(time_fknn_a) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_b(k) = sum(time_fknn_b) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_c(k) = sum(time_fknn_c) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_d(k) = sum(time_fknn_d) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_e(k) = sum(time_fknn_e) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_f(k) = sum(time_fknn_f) / iter_no; 
time_average_fknn_g(k) = sum(time_fknn_g) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n ETKNN'); 
etknn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(etknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(etknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no; 
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etknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(etknn_rate_a) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(etknn_rate_b) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(etknn_rate_c) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(etknn_rate_d) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(etknn_rate_e) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(etknn_rate_f) / iter_no; 
etknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(etknn_rate_g) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_a(k) = sum(time_etknn_a) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_b(k) = sum(time_etknn_b) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_c(k) = sum(time_etknn_c) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_d(k) = sum(time_etknn_d) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_e(k) = sum(time_etknn_e) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_f(k) = sum(time_etknn_f) / iter_no; 
time_average_etknn_g(k) = sum(time_etknn_g) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n MYKNN'); 
myknn_average_normal_rate_a(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_a(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_b(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_b(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_c(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_c(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_d(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_d(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_e(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_e) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_e(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_e) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_f(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_f) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_f(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_f) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_g(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_g) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_g(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_g) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_a(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_b(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_c(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_d(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_e(k) = sum(myknn_rate_e) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_f(k) = sum(myknn_rate_f) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_g(k) = sum(myknn_rate_g) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_a(k) = sum(time_myknn_a) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_b(k) = sum(time_myknn_b) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_c(k) = sum(time_myknn_c) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_d(k) = sum(time_myknn_d) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_e(k) = sum(time_myknn_e) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_f(k) = sum(time_myknn_f) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_g(k) = sum(time_myknn_g) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n MYKNN-W'); 
myknn_average_normal_rate_a_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_a_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_b_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_b_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_c_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_c_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_d_w(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_d_w(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_a_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_b_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b_w) / iter_no; 
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myknn_average_rate_c_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c_w) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_d_w(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d_w) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_a_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_a_w) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_b_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_b_w) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_c_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_c_w) / iter_no; 
time_average_myknn_d_w(k) = sum(time_myknn_d_w) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n ENSEMBLE'); 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_m(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_m(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_mv(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_bayes) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_bayes) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_m(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_bayes) / iter_no; 
time_average_ensemble_bayes(k) = sum(time_ensemble_bayes) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n TREE'); 
myknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_a_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_a_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_b_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_b_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_c_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_c_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_d_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_d_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_e_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_e_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_f_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_f_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree(k) = 1- sum(myknn_normal_rate_g_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree(k) = sum(myknn_attack_rate_g_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_a_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_a_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_b_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_b_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_c_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_c_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_d_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_d_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_e_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_e_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_f_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_f_tree) / iter_no; 
myknn_average_rate_g_tree(k) = sum(myknn_rate_g_tree) / iter_no; 
fprintf('\n TREE + ENSEMBLE'); 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes(k) = 1- sum(ensemble_normal_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_attack_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_tree_m(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_m) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_tree_mv(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_mv) / iter_no; 
ensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes(k) = sum(ensemble_rate_tree_bayes) / iter_no; 
time_average_tree(k) = sum(time_tree) / iter_no; 
sum_train_3_number(k,:) = sum(train_3_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_4_number(k,:) = sum(train_4_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_5_number(k,:) = sum(train_5_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_6_number(k,:) = sum(train_6_number(:,:)); 
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sum_train_7_number(k,:) = sum(train_7_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_8_number(k,:) = sum(train_8_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_9_number(k,:) = sum(train_9_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_10_number(k,:) = sum(train_10_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_11_number(k,:) = sum(train_11_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_12_number(k,:) = sum(train_12_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_13_number(k,:) = sum(train_13_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_14_number(k,:) = sum(train_14_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_15_number(k,:) = sum(train_15_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_16_number(k,:) = sum(train_16_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_17_number(k,:) = sum(train_17_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_18_number(k,:) = sum(train_18_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_19_number(k,:) = sum(train_19_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_20_number(k,:) = sum(train_20_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_21_number(k,:) = sum(train_21_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_22_number(k,:) = sum(train_22_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_23_number(k,:) = sum(train_23_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_24_number(k,:) = sum(train_24_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_25_number(k,:) = sum(train_25_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_26_number(k,:) = sum(train_26_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_27_number(k,:) = sum(train_27_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_28_number(k,:) = sum(train_28_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_29_number(k,:) = sum(train_29_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_30_number(k,:) = sum(train_30_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_31_number(k,:) = sum(train_31_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_32_number(k,:) = sum(train_32_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_33_number(k,:) = sum(train_33_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_34_number(k,:) = sum(train_34_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_35_number(k,:) = sum(train_35_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_36_number(k,:) = sum(train_36_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_37_number(k,:) = sum(train_37_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_38_number(k,:) = sum(train_38_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_39_number(k,:) = sum(train_39_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_40_number(k,:) = sum(train_40_number(:,:)); 
sum_train_41_number(k,:) = sum(train_41_number(:,:)); 
sum_total_3_number(k,:) = sum(total_3_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_3_number(k,:) = sum(correct_3_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_3_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_3_number(k,:)/sum_total_3_number(k,:); 
sum_total_4_number(k,:) = sum(total_4_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_4_number(k,:) = sum(correct_4_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_4_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_4_number(k,:)/sum_total_4_number(k,:); 
sum_total_5_number(k,:) = sum(total_5_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_5_number(k,:) = sum(correct_5_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_5_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_5_number(k,:)/sum_total_5_number(k,:); 
sum_total_6_number(k,:) = sum(total_6_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_6_number(k,:) = sum(correct_6_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_6_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_6_number(k,:)/sum_total_6_number(k,:); 
sum_total_7_number(k,:) = sum(total_7_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_7_number(k,:) = sum(correct_7_number); 
k_correct_7_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_7_number(k,:)/sum_total_7_number(k,:); 
sum_total_8_number(k,:) = sum(total_8_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_8_number(k,:) = sum(correct_8_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_8_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_8_number(k,:)/sum_total_8_number(k,:); 
sum_total_9_number(k,:) = sum(total_9_number(:,:)); 
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sum_correct_9_number(k,:) = sum(correct_9_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_9_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_9_number(k,:)/sum_total_9_number(k,:); 
sum_total_10_number(k,:) = sum(total_10_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_10_number(k,:) = sum(correct_10_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_10_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_10_number(k,:)/sum_total_10_number(k,:); 
sum_total_11_number(k,:) = sum(total_11_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_11_number(k,:) = sum(correct_11_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_11_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_11_number(k,:)/sum_total_11_number(k,:); 
sum_total_12_number(k,:) = sum(total_12_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_12_number(k,:) = sum(correct_12_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_12_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_12_number(k,:)/sum_total_12_number(k,:); 
sum_total_13_number(k,:) = sum(total_13_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_13_number(k,:) = sum(correct_13_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_13_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_13_number(k,:)/sum_total_13_number(k,:); 
sum_total_14_number(k,:) = sum(total_14_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_14_number(k,:) = sum(correct_14_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_14_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_14_number(k,:)/sum_total_14_number(k,:); 
sum_total_15_number(k,:) = sum(total_15_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_15_number(k,:) = sum(correct_15_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_15_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_15_number(k,:)/sum_total_15_number(k,:); 
sum_total_16_number(k,:) = sum(total_16_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_16_number(k,:) = sum(correct_16_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_16_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_16_number(k,:)/sum_total_16_number(k,:); 
sum_total_17_number(k,:) = sum(total_17_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_17_number(k,:) = sum(correct_17_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_17_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_17_number(k,:)/sum_total_17_number(k,:); 
sum_total_18_number(k,:) = sum(total_18_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_18_number(k,:) = sum(correct_18_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_18_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_18_number(k,:)/sum_total_18_number(k,:); 
sum_total_19_number(k,:) = sum(total_19_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_19_number(k,:) = sum(correct_19_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_19_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_19_number(k,:)/sum_total_19_number(k,:); 
sum_total_20_number(k,:) = sum(total_20_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_20_number(k,:) = sum(correct_20_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_20_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_20_number(k,:)/sum_total_20_number(k,:); 
sum_total_21_number(k,:) = sum(total_21_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_21_number(k,:) = sum(correct_21_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_21_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_21_number(k,:)/sum_total_21_number(k,:); 
sum_total_22_number(k,:) = sum(total_22_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_22_number(k,:) = sum(correct_22_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_22_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_22_number(k,:)/sum_total_22_number(k,:); 
sum_total_23_number(k,:) = sum(total_23_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_23_number(k,:) = sum(correct_23_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_23_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_23_number(k,:)/sum_total_23_number(k,:); 
sum_total_24_number(k,:) = sum(total_24_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_24_number(k,:) = sum(correct_24_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_24_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_24_number(k,:)/sum_total_24_number(k,:); 
sum_total_25_number(k,:) = sum(total_25_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_25_number(k,:) = sum(correct_25_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_25_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_25_number(k,:)/sum_total_25_number(k,:); 
sum_total_26_number(k,:) = sum(total_26_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_26_number(k,:) = sum(correct_26_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_26_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_26_number(k,:)/sum_total_26_number(k,:); 
sum_total_27_number(k,:) = sum(total_27_number(:,:)); 
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sum_correct_27_number(k,:) = sum(correct_27_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_27_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_27_number(k,:)/sum_total_27_number(k,:); 
sum_total_28_number(k,:) = sum(total_28_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_28_number(k,:) = sum(correct_28_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_28_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_28_number(k,:)/sum_total_28_number(k,:); 
sum_total_29_number(k,:) = sum(total_29_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_29_number(k,:) = sum(correct_29_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_29_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_29_number(k,:)/sum_total_29_number(k,:); 
sum_total_30_number(k,:) = sum(total_30_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_30_number(k,:) = sum(correct_30_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_30_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_30_number(k,:)/sum_total_30_number(k,:); 
sum_total_31_number(k,:) = sum(total_31_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_31_number(k,:) = sum(correct_31_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_31_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_31_number(k,:)/sum_total_31_number(k,:); 
sum_total_32_number(k,:) = sum(total_32_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_32_number(k,:) = sum(correct_32_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_32_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_32_number(k,:)/sum_total_32_number(k,:); 
sum_total_33_number(k,:) = sum(total_33_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_33_number(k,:) = sum(correct_33_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_33_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_33_number(k,:)/sum_total_33_number(k,:); 
sum_total_34_number(k,:) = sum(total_34_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_34_number(k,:) = sum(correct_34_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_34_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_34_number(k,:)/sum_total_34_number(k,:); 
sum_total_35_number(k,:) = sum(total_35_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_35_number(k,:) = sum(correct_35_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_35_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_35_number(k,:)/sum_total_35_number(k,:); 
sum_total_36_number(k,:) = sum(total_36_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_36_number(k,:) = sum(correct_36_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_36_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_36_number(k,:)/sum_total_36_number(k,:); 
sum_total_37_number(k,:) = sum(total_37_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_37_number(k,:) = sum(correct_37_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_37_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_37_number(k,:)/sum_total_37_number(k,:); 
sum_total_38_number(k,:) = sum(total_38_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_38_number(k,:) = sum(correct_38_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_38_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_38_number(k,:)/sum_total_38_number(k,:); 
sum_total_39_number(k,:) = sum(total_39_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_39_number(k,:) = sum(correct_39_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_39_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_39_number(k,:)/sum_total_39_number(k,:); 
sum_total_40_number(k,:) = sum(total_40_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_40_number(k,:) = sum(correct_40_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_40_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_40_number(k,:)/sum_total_40_number(k,:); 
sum_total_41_number(k,:) = sum(total_41_number(:,:)); 
sum_correct_41_number(k,:) = sum(correct_41_number(:,:)); 
k_correct_41_rate(k,:) = sum_correct_41_number(k,:)/sum_total_41_number(k,:); 
end % nn 
final_train_3_number = sum(sum_train_3_number(:,:)); 
final_train_4_number = sum(sum_train_4_number(:,:)); 
final_train_5_number = sum(sum_train_5_number(:,:)); 
final_train_6_number = sum(sum_train_6_number(:,:)); 
final_train_7_number = sum(sum_train_7_number(:,:)); 
final_train_8_number = sum(sum_train_8_number(:,:)); 
final_train_9_number = sum(sum_train_9_number(:,:)); 
final_train_10_number = sum(sum_train_10_number(:,:)); 
final_train_11_number = sum(sum_train_11_number(:,:)); 
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final_train_12_number = sum(sum_train_12_number(:,:)); 
final_train_13_number = sum(sum_train_13_number(:,:)); 
final_train_14_number = sum(sum_train_14_number(:,:)); 
final_train_15_number = sum(sum_train_15_number(:,:)); 
final_train_16_number = sum(sum_train_16_number(:,:)); 
final_train_17_number = sum(sum_train_17_number(:,:)); 
final_train_18_number = sum(sum_train_18_number(:,:)); 
final_train_19_number = sum(sum_train_19_number(:,:)); 
final_train_20_number = sum(sum_train_20_number(:,:)); 
final_train_21_number = sum(sum_train_21_number(:,:)); 
final_train_22_number = sum(sum_train_22_number(:,:)); 
final_train_23_number = sum(sum_train_23_number(:,:)); 
final_train_24_number = sum(sum_train_24_number(:,:)); 
final_train_25_number = sum(sum_train_25_number(:,:)); 
final_train_26_number = sum(sum_train_26_number(:,:)); 
final_train_27_number = sum(sum_train_27_number(:,:)); 
final_train_28_number = sum(sum_train_28_number(:,:)); 
final_train_29_number = sum(sum_train_29_number(:,:)); 
final_train_30_number = sum(sum_train_30_number(:,:)); 
final_train_31_number = sum(sum_train_31_number(:,:)); 
final_train_32_number = sum(sum_train_32_number(:,:)); 
final_train_33_number = sum(sum_train_33_number(:,:)); 
final_train_34_number = sum(sum_train_34_number(:,:)); 
final_train_35_number = sum(sum_train_35_number(:,:)); 
final_train_36_number = sum(sum_train_36_number(:,:)); 
final_train_37_number = sum(sum_train_37_number(:,:)); 
final_train_38_number = sum(sum_train_38_number(:,:)); 
final_train_39_number = sum(sum_train_39_number(:,:)); 
final_train_40_number = sum(sum_train_40_number(:,:)); 
final_train_41_number = sum(sum_train_41_number(:,:)); 
final_total_3_number = sum(sum_total_3_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_3_number = sum(sum_correct_3_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_3_rate = final_correct_3_number./final_total_3_number; 
final_total_4_number = sum(sum_total_4_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_4_number = sum(sum_correct_4_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_4_rate = final_correct_4_number./final_total_4_number; 
final_total_5_number = sum(sum_total_5_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_5_number = sum(sum_correct_5_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_5_rate = final_correct_5_number./final_total_5_number; 
final_total_6_number = sum(sum_total_6_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_6_number = sum(sum_correct_6_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_6_rate = final_correct_6_number./final_total_6_number; 
final_total_7_number = sum(sum_total_7_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_7_number = sum(sum_correct_7_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_7_rate = final_correct_7_number./final_total_7_number; 
final_total_8_number = sum(sum_total_8_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_8_number = sum(sum_correct_8_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_8_rate = final_correct_8_number./final_total_8_number; 
final_total_9_number = sum(sum_total_9_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_9_number = sum(sum_correct_9_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_9_rate = final_correct_9_number./final_total_9_number; 
final_total_10_number = sum(sum_total_10_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_10_number = sum(sum_correct_10_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_10_rate = final_correct_10_number./final_total_10_number; 
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final_total_11_number = sum(sum_total_11_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_11_number = sum(sum_correct_11_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_11_rate = final_correct_11_number./final_total_11_number; 
final_total_12_number = sum(sum_total_12_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_12_number = sum(sum_correct_12_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_12_rate = final_correct_12_number./final_total_12_number; 
final_total_13_number = sum(sum_total_13_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_13_number = sum(sum_correct_13_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_13_rate = final_correct_13_number./final_total_13_number; 
final_total_14_number = sum(sum_total_14_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_14_number = sum(sum_correct_14_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_14_rate = final_correct_14_number./final_total_14_number; 
final_total_15_number = sum(sum_total_15_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_15_number = sum(sum_correct_15_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_15_rate = final_correct_15_number./final_total_15_number; 
final_total_16_number = sum(sum_total_16_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_16_number = sum(sum_correct_16_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_16_rate = final_correct_16_number./final_total_16_number; 
final_total_17_number = sum(sum_total_17_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_17_number = sum(sum_correct_17_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_17_rate = final_correct_17_number./final_total_17_number; 
final_total_18_number = sum(sum_total_18_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_18_number = sum(sum_correct_18_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_18_rate = final_correct_18_number./final_total_18_number; 
final_total_19_number = sum(sum_total_19_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_19_number = sum(sum_correct_19_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_19_rate = final_correct_19_number./final_total_19_number; 
final_total_20_number = sum(sum_total_20_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_20_number = sum(sum_correct_20_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_20_rate = final_correct_20_number./final_total_20_number; 
final_total_21_number = sum(sum_total_21_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_21_number = sum(sum_correct_21_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_21_rate = final_correct_21_number./final_total_21_number; 
final_total_22_number = sum(sum_total_22_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_22_number = sum(sum_correct_22_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_22_rate = final_correct_22_number./final_total_22_number; 
final_total_23_number = sum(sum_total_23_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_23_number = sum(sum_correct_23_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_23_rate = final_correct_23_number./final_total_23_number; 
final_total_24_number = sum(sum_total_24_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_24_number = sum(sum_correct_24_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_24_rate = final_correct_24_number./final_total_24_number; 
final_total_25_number = sum(sum_total_25_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_25_number = sum(sum_correct_25_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_25_rate = final_correct_25_number./final_total_25_number; 
final_total_26_number = sum(sum_total_26_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_26_number = sum(sum_correct_26_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_26_rate = final_correct_26_number./final_total_26_number; 
final_total_27_number = sum(sum_total_27_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_27_number = sum(sum_correct_27_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_27_rate = final_correct_27_number./final_total_27_number; 
final_total_28_number = sum(sum_total_28_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_28_number = sum(sum_correct_28_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_28_rate = final_correct_28_number./final_total_28_number; 
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final_total_29_number = sum(sum_total_29_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_29_number = sum(sum_correct_29_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_29_rate = final_correct_29_number./final_total_29_number; 
final_total_30_number = sum(sum_total_30_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_30_number = sum(sum_correct_30_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_30_rate = final_correct_30_number./final_total_30_number; 
final_total_31_number = sum(sum_total_31_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_31_number = sum(sum_correct_31_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_31_rate = final_correct_31_number./final_total_31_number; 
final_total_32_number = sum(sum_total_32_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_32_number = sum(sum_correct_32_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_32_rate = final_correct_32_number./final_total_32_number; 
final_total_33_number = sum(sum_total_33_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_33_number = sum(sum_correct_33_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_33_rate = final_correct_33_number./final_total_33_number; 
final_total_34_number = sum(sum_total_34_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_34_number = sum(sum_correct_34_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_34_rate = final_correct_34_number./final_total_34_number; 
final_total_35_number = sum(sum_total_35_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_35_number = sum(sum_correct_35_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_35_rate = final_correct_35_number./final_total_35_number; 
final_total_36_number = sum(sum_total_36_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_36_number = sum(sum_correct_36_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_36_rate = final_correct_36_number./final_total_36_number; 
final_total_37_number = sum(sum_total_37_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_37_number = sum(sum_correct_37_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_37_rate = final_correct_37_number./final_total_37_number; 
final_total_38_number = sum(sum_total_38_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_38_number = sum(sum_correct_38_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_38_rate = final_correct_38_number./final_total_38_number; 
final_total_39_number = sum(sum_total_39_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_39_number = sum(sum_correct_39_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_39_rate = final_correct_39_number./final_total_39_number; 
final_total_40_number = sum(sum_total_40_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_40_number = sum(sum_correct_40_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_40_rate = final_correct_40_number./final_total_40_number; 
final_total_41_number = sum(sum_total_41_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_41_number = sum(sum_correct_41_number(:,:)); 
final_correct_41_rate = final_correct_41_number./final_total_41_number; 
% write statistics of ATTACK to a file 
fid = fopen('d:\attack.txt','w'); 
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks in training set\n');  
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks in testing set\n');  
fprintf(fid,'Number of attacks be correctly detected\n');  
fprintf(fid,'Detection rates\n');  
fprintf(fid,'\nDOS\n\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'3\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_3_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_3_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_3_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'9\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_9_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_9_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_9_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
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fprintf(fid,'12\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_12_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_12_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_12_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'16\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_16_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_16_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_16_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'20\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_20_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_20_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_20_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'25\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_25_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_25_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_25_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'27\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_27_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_27_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_27_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'30\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_30_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_30_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_30_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'37\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_37_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_37_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_37_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nPROBE\n\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'8\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_8_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_8_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_8_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'13\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_13_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_13_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_13_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'17\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_17_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_17_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_17_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'19\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_19_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_19_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_19_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'28\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_28_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_28_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_28_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'32\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_32_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_32_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_32_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nR2L\n\n'); 
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fprintf(fid,'5\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_5_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_5_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_5_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'6\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_6_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_6_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_6_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'7\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_7_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_7_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_7_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'11\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_11_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_11_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_11_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'15\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_15_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_15_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_15_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'21\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_21_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_21_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_21_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'23\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_23_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_23_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_23_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'24\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_24_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_24_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_24_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'29\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_29_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_29_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_29_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'33\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_33_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_33_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_33_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'34\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_34_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_34_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_34_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'35\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_35_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_35_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_35_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'38\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_38_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_38_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_38_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'39\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_39_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
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fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_39_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_39_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'40\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_40_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_40_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_40_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nU2R\n\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'4\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_4_number);      fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_4_number);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_4_rate);    fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'10\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_10_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_10_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_10_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'14\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_14_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_14_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_14_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'18\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_18_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_18_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_18_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'22\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_22_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_22_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_22_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'26\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_26_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_26_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_26_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'31\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_31_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_31_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_31_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'36\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_36_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_36_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_36_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'41\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_total_41_number);     fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%d\t',final_correct_41_number);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'%.2f\t',final_correct_41_rate);   fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fclose(fid); 
% write COMPUTATION TIME to a file 
% TIME 
fid = fopen('d:\time.txt','w'); 
fprintf(fid,'KNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_c); 
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fprintf(fid,'\nknn_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_knn_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nFKNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_fknn_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nETKNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_etknn_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN-W'); 
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fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_a_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_a_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_b_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_b_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_c_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_c_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_d_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_myknn_d_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nENSEMBLE'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nt_ensemble_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_ensemble_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nt_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',time_average_tree); 
fclose(fid); 
% write CLASSIFICATION RATE to a file 
fid = fopen('d:\result.txt','w'); 
fprintf(fid,'KNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_normal_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_normal_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_attack_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_attack_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_c); 
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fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nknn_average_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',knn_average_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nFKNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_normal_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_normal_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_attack_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_attack_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nfknn_average_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',fknn_average_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nETKNN'); 
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fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_normal_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_normal_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_attack_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_attack_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\netknn_average_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',etknn_average_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_e\t'); 
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fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_e\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_e); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_f\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_f); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_g\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_g); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nMYKNN-W'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
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fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d_w\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d_w); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nENSEMBLE'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_a_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_b_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_c_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_d_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_e_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_f_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_normal_rate_g_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_a_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_b_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_c_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_d_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree\t'); 
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fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_e_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_f_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_attack_rate_g_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_a_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_a_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_b_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_b_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_c_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_c_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_d_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_d_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_e_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_e_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_f_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_f_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\nmyknn_average_rate_g_tree\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',myknn_average_rate_g_tree); 
fprintf(fid,'\n\nTREE + ENSEMBLE'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_normal_rate_tree_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_attack_rate_tree_bayes); 
fprintf(fid,'\n'); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_m\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_m); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_mv\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_mv); 
fprintf(fid,'\nensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes\t'); 
fprintf(fid,'%f\t',ensemble_average_rate_tree_bayes); 
fclose(fid); 
fprintf('\nDONE\n\n'); 
beep; 
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